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ABSTRACT 
The technique of fault tree analysis is commonly used to assess the probability of 
failure of industrial systems. During the analysis of the fault tree the component 
failures are assumed to occur independently. When this condition is not satisfied 
alternative approaches such as the Markov method can be used. Constructing the 
Markov representation of a system is not such as intuitive process for engineers as 
fault tree construction since the state-transition diagram does not readily document the 
failure logic. In addition to this the size of the Markov diagram increases rapidly as 
the number of components in the system increases. 
This thesis presents the development of a new model which uses a combination of 
conventional fault tree methods with those of Markov methods to solve systems 
containing sequential or standby failures. New gates were developed in order to 
incorporate the dependent failures on the fault tree structure. The new assessment 
method was shown to efficiently solve these systems. With theses extended fault tree 
capabilities in place the technique was embedded within an optimisation framework to 
obtain the best system performance for systems containing standby failures. 
Sequential failures can be represented on a fault tree by using the Priority-And gate, 
however they can also be represented on a Cause-Consequence diagram. As with the 
fault tree analysis method, the Cause-Consequence Diagram method documents the 
failure logic of the system. In addition to this the Cause-Consequence Diagram 
produces the exact failure probability in a very efficient calculation procedure and has 
significant implications in terms of efficiency for static systems. Construction and 
analysis rules were devised for a cause-consequence diagram and used on systems 
containing independent and dependent failures. 
KEY WORDS: Fault Tree Analysis, Markov Analysis, Cause-Consequence Diagram 
Method, Binary Decision Diagrams, Dependency Modelling, Sequential failures, 
Standby Failures, Genetic Algorithms 
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NOTATION 
A(t) Availability at time t 
Q(t) Unavailability at time t 
F(t) Cumulative Failure Distribution, Unreliability 
f(t) Probability Density Function of failure distribution 
G(t) Cumulative Repair Distribution 
g(t) Probability Density Function of repair distribution 
dt small time interval 
w(t) Unconditional Failure Intensity 
v(t) Unconditional Repair Intensity 
X(t) Conditional Failure Intensity 
µ(t) Conditional Repair Intensity 
W(O, t) Expected number of failures in the interval 0 to t 
V(0, t) Expected number of repairs in the interval 0 to t 
Mc; Minimal Cut Set i 
Q; or q; Failure Probability of i 
- Complement 
G; (y) Birnbaums Criticality Function. The probability that the 
system is in a critical state for component i 
4(x) Structure Function 
P(i) Probability of i occurring 
MTTR Mean time to repair 
MTBF Mean time before failure 
MUT Mean up time 
Fti Fault tree i 
0 Maintenance Interval 
ti Mean time to repair 
Hi House Event i 
x Constant Failure Rate 
µ Constant Repair Rate 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
1.1 Introduction 
An accident is the result of a coincidence of events and/or failures of individual 
components. Industrial accidents can bring about different outcomes depending on 
their severity and may result in loss of profit, injury and in the worse case scenario one 
or several fatalities. During the last twenty years a number of significant accidents 
have occurred which have given rise to increased public concern. Discussed are two 
examples which are used to highlight the need for reliability analysis. On April 26`h 
1986 the most traumatic event in the history of civil nuclear power occurred at the 
Chernobyl site (ref. 1). The accident was triggered by a turbogenerator experiment, 
carried out when the reactor core contained water just below boiling point. At the 
start of the experiment half of the main coolant pumps slowed down which caused the 
water in the reactor core to boil. Due to "positive feedback" the power to the reactor 
increased which in turn caused the fuel to heat-up, melt down and disintegrate. 
Fragments of the fuel were ejected causing a steam explosion which led to the pile cap 
being blown off. Radionuclides escaped into the atmosphere where the wind carried 
them to nearby towns and cities as well as distant countries. Malpractice by the 
operators was later announced as an additional cause and safety systems were 
identified as being inadequate (ref. 2). The result of the accident was catastrophic 
with 31 deaths, many caused by fighting the fires caused by the accident, and 200 
cases of acute radiation. The accident also incurred a financial loss, as a vast amount 
of money was spent evacuating and relocating 135,000 people from neighbouring 
areas and on distributing iodine tablets to millions. Today 30 sq. km of land is still 
limited in use and deaths due to radiation may still occur. In this example the effect of 
an inadequate design and no safeguard against operator error resulted in loss of life, 
money and land. 
Closer to home, Britain has witnessed several horrific train accidents which have 
highlighted the need for tighter safety. The most recent accident involved the 
collision of two trains just outside Paddington station. At 8.11 a. m. on Tuesday 5th 
October 1999 a Thames Train collided with a Great Western Train. The Thames 
Train, travelling out of Paddington station, crossed the tracks from right to left in front 
of the Great Western which was travelling towards the station. The Thames train 
attempted to move out of the path of the Great Western but the two collided almost 
head on. The front of the Thames train was tossed in the air and ripped apart. The 
middle and rear carriages caught fire and the first class carriage of the Great Western 
was burnt to its shell. The accident resulted in 31 fatalities and several injuries 
ranging from cuts to severe burns. The cause of the accident was stated to be that the 
driver of the Thames train had passed signal `109' when it had been red. It was 
disclosed that the Great Western had been given a green signal. Following an 
investigation into the cause of the accident it was reported that signal `109' had been 
obscured by a pylon carrying overhead electric wires and was therefore very difficult 
to see. In addition to this an inappropriate safety system had been installed on the 
train to deal with the case of a red light being passed. Due to poor visual signals, an 
inadequate safety design, which allowed red lights to be passed, 31 people died and a 
train company lost money as well as its reputation. 
The motivation for the analysis of industrial systems is thus to aid in the protection of 
important facilities and to help reduce the risk of such adverse events. 
1.2 What is Reliability ? 
A manufacturer's primary concern for their product is that it serves every user. Many 
modern products are complex constructions comprising many interrelating parts. This 
complexity creates a problem in how to prolong, predict and guarantee a product's 
life. Reliability is the main discipline that has developed to address this concern, with 
the overall strategy to identify weaknesses or events which prevent the product from 
functioning as desired. Reliability is used as a measure of the system's success and is 
defined, by British Standards, as: 
" the ability of an item to perform the required function under stated 
conditions for a stated period of time " 
1.3 The History of Reliability 
Until the application of modem scientific theory, technical progress was achieved by 
the process of trial and error. As manufacturing technology increased, so the 
relationship between safety and reliability intensified. With the dawn of the Industrial 
Revolution new sources of power gave great potential for rapid development but also 
provided a proportional increase in the potential for death and injury. Early methods 
of analysis were purely deterministic, where structures were designed to a 
predetermined load factor, commonly referred to as the factor of safety' (ref. 3). As 
the complexity of systems increased the application of the factor of safety became 
inappropriate and towards the end of the 19th century statistical and probabilistic 
approaches were utilised. 
Reliability practices can be traced back to the late 1940's, early 1950's, especially in 
the area of air-traffic control. At this time jobs that were previously performed 
manually, such as the control of take-off and landing, were now being performed by 
newly developed electronics. It was recognised that with such complex equipment it 
was not enough to expect the equipment to just meet satisfaction on delivery, it had to 
perform when needed. In addition to this, at different times failure of the equipment 
could result in consequences that were potentially more catastrophic than at other 
times. The equipment was therefore required to perform when needed with a small 
likelihood of failure, especially in potentially hazardous situations. The increase in 
the size and complexity of civil aircraft meant that the number of components that 
could fail increased and due to an increased passenger capability the number of lives 
at risk also magnified. The US Department of Defense (DOD) and the Federal 
Aviation Authority (FAA) recognised the need to establish reliability requirements 
and in 1952 the DOD funded a study into reliability issues. 
In 1957 the Advisory Group on Reliability of Electronic Equipment (AGREE), funded 
by the DOD, issued a report which became the basis of reliability engineering (ref. 4). 
At the same time the Air Force also established a study on the reliability of electronic 
components at the Rome Air Development Center (RADC) in New York. The 
databases produced aided in the development of the military standard, MIL-STD-217, 
which is commonly used today for reliability predictions. The military standard, MIL- 
STD-785, developed in 1965 evolved from the AGREE report. 
The AGREE and RADC concentrated entirely on the reliability of electronic 
components. However, other organizations soon developed handbooks for reliability 
prediction of non-electronic components. During the 1970's the newly established 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) published a set of standards for nuclear 
power plants and in 1980 the Food and Drug administration commenced the 
regulation of all medical devices. 
Using the reliability prediction handbooks the occurrence of an undesired event can be 
estimated. In addition to this, weak links in the system can be identified and 
suggestions made on how to reduce the frequency of failure. 
1.4 Obtaining the Reliability of a System 
Since the early 1960's various types of mathematical models have been used to 
perform reliability analysis (ref. 5) in order to predict the likelihood that a system will 
function given a demand. These include such techniques as: Reliability Block 
Diagrams, Fault Tree Analysis, Markov Analysis and Simulation. These techniques 
can be viewed as a continuum corresponding to the complexity of using each of the 
alternative methods to perform the analysis (Figure 1.1). Reliability Block Diagrams 
(RBD) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are deemed as the least complex methods to 
implement for two reasons. Firstly the diagram construction for both techniques is 
logical and well developed and secondly both techniques assume independence 
between failures which can be analysed using basic probability theory. Markov 
analysis, Simulation and Petri Nets are more complex in that they are capable of 
analysing components that when failed effect the functionality of other components. 
These type of components are referred to as 'dependent' components. More 
sophisticated procedures are required to analyse such systems. The methods 
4 
represented in figure 1.1 show the causes of one particular outcome, other techniques 
exist which can illustrate all possible consequences from some initial event. Two 
such methods will be discussed: The Cause-Consequence Analysis method and the 
Event Tree Analysis method. These techniques deal with sequences of events that 
result in different consequences proceeding a particular initial event. 
SIMPLE COMPLEX 
Reliabili Block Fault Tree Markov Petri Nets Simulation 
Diagram Analysis 
Figure 1.1 Continuum representing the complexity of available reliability techniques 
1.5 Summary of Available Analysis Tools 
Each analysis model has different features which make it more applicable to some 
systems than others and to achieve the most efficient analysis the simplest technique 
should be used. In order to be able to select the most appropriate method a knowledge 
of each technique is required. The available techniques can be segregated into 
different types: 
1) Systems containing independent failures: Independent modelling tools- 
2) Systems containing dependent failures: Dependent modelling tools. 
3) Systems with varying levels of system outcome: Consequence identification tools. 
This chapter aims to summarise the available techniques in terms of application 
highlighting their advantageous and disadvantageous features. A more in-depth 
description of the relevant techniques is presented in the proceeding chapters. 
1.5.1 Independent Modelling Tools 
1.5.1.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
An underlying assumption common to both the RBD and FTA techniques is that the 
failure of individual components must occur independently. The RBD method 
describes the system in terms of success and therefore considers the components in a 
working state. FTA utilises an opposite concept to that used in the RBD method. 
FTA describes the system in a failed state and represents the failure logic in a tree like 
structure. The undesired outcome being analysed is referred to as the TOP EVENT 
and the tree structure is developed by extending branches below this event. The 
development of the fault tree involves the use of Boolean expressions which represent 
the logical operators of OR, AND and NOT. The fault tree diagram consists of two 
main features: gates and basic events. The gates represent the Boolean logic of 
system failure and the basic events hold information regarding the failure 
characteristics of a component. A branch is considered complete when a basic event 
is encountered which represents the limit of resolution of the analysis. Figure 1.2 
illustrates a simple fault tree structure containing three basic events A, B and C. 
TOP 
EVENT 
OR 
GATE 1O 
AN 
B FAILS C FAILS 
BC 
Figure 1.2 Typical Features of a Fault Tree 
The top event can be represented by a Boolean expression using various techniques 
such as the "Top-Down' or "Bottom-Up" approach (ref. 6)_ For the example fault tree 
illustrated in figure 1.2 the Boolean expression for the top event is: 
TOP=A+B. C 
where the `+' symbol represents the logical OR gate and the `. ' symbol represents the 
logical AND gate. The Boolean expression is made up of a number of terms, known 
as Cut Sets of the system. A cut set can be defined as: 
6 
A collection of basic events such that if they all occur the top event occurs. ' 
The top event expression is reduced using Boolean algebra rules to produce a minimal 
expression which contains only Minimal Cut Sets of the system. A minimal cut set 
can be defined as: 
`The smallest combination of component failures which if they all occur cause 
the system to fail. ' 
For the example fault tree in figure 1.2 no reduction is possible and the minimal cut 
sets can be found to be: 
{A} 
{BC} 
meaning that the top event can be caused by the failure of component A alone OR the 
failure of components B AND C. The probability of failure for component i can be 
symbolised as Q;. The probability of failure for the example fault tree in figure 1.2 is 
therefore equal to, 
P(System Failure) = QA + QB-QC - QA-QB-QC 
The minimal cut sets are utilised in the quantification of the system's failure 
probability and can also be used to highlight the most likely contributor to system 
failure. 
FTA is the most commonly employed technique for reliability analysis and hence over 
the years a comprehensive set of rules for analysis has evolved. There are numerous 
advantages of the FTA technique. One of the main attractions lies within the fault tree 
structure itself. As the tree contains a textual description of the system failure logic it 
can be used as a means of communicating the model development to non- 
mathematicians. FTA also provides a means of system quantification, and the 
minimal cut sets can aid in highlighting deficiencies in the design. 
The FTA method, however, also possess some disadvantages. Firstly the 
quantification of large systems cannot always be found exactly and in such situations 
approximations are used. The approximations rely on the components having a small 
likelihood of occurrence and when this is not the case errors can result. A second 
disadvantage with the FTA technique is that it is unable to deal with systems 
containing dependent failure events. The Kinetic Tree Theory (ref. 7), which forms the 
basis of FTA, requires statistical independence and violation of this assumption occurs 
in many systems not only in sequentially operating systems but also in standby 
systems and systems that are affected by common cause failures and secondary 
failures. FTA can be used for such systems but ignores any dependencies and 
assumes independence which can, in some cases, result in gross inaccuracies. 
1.5.1.2 Binary Decision Diagrams 
For large fault trees the identification of the minimal cut sets can prove to be difficult. 
In addition to this the approximation techniques used to calculate the top event 
probability can be inaccurate if the likelihood of component failure is not small. The 
problem of inaccuracies due to approximation techniques has been alleviated recently 
by the development of the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) approach. BDDs are 
based on Bryant's trees and obtain the exact top event probability efficiently by 
expressing the system failure modes as disjoint paths. The calculation of the top event 
probability is achieved by summing the probabilities of these disjoint paths. 
A BDD is a directed acyclic graph and consists of two main features, a non-terminal 
node and a terminal node. Non-terminal nodes represent the components of a system 
and are represented on the diagram by a circle. Terminal nodes, represented by a 
square box on the BDD, indicate whether the system is in a working or failed state. A 
working state is symbolised by a `0' in the terminal node and a failed state by a `1'. 
Each non-terminal node has two outlet branches which indicate whether the 
component is working, `0' outlet branch, or failed, `1' outlet branch. An example 
BDD is depicted in figure 1.3. 
T NODE 
X1 
10 
NON-TERMINAL 0 
X2 - NODE 
10 
1 X3 
TERMINAL 
NODE 10 
10 
Figure 1.3 A Typical BDD 
The BDD is constructed by considering the components of the system in a certain 
order starting from the top node (root node), which represents the first component in 
the variable ordering. The functionality and effect of each component on the system is 
then determined. The fault tree structure in figure 1.4 can be used to illustrate the 
construction process. 
The top event expression for the example fault tree in figure 1.4 is: 
TOP = (A + C). (B + C) 
= A. B +C (following Boolean reduction) 
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Taking the variable ordering to be A<B<C, i. e. A before B before C, the root node 
contains component A. Failure of component A, represented on the '1' outlet branch 
from the root node, reduces the top event expression to: 
TOP=B+C 
As both B and C are still present in the top event expression, component B is 
considered next. Failure of component B causes system failure and therefore the `1' 
outlet branch terminates in the terminal node `1'. Given component B functions 
correctly the top event expression reduces to: 
TOP =C 
For the `0' outlet branch of both components A and B the affect of failure or 
functionality of component C on the top event is determined. The BDD for the fault 
tree representation given in figure 1.4 is depicted in figure 1.5. 
This process of construction is trivial for such a small system. For larger systems, 
though, this approach would be inefficient. Construction of the BDD from the fault 
tree diagram is generally performed using the IF-THEN-ELSE (ite) structure, which is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
TOP=AB+C 
A 
0 
TOP = B+C TOP =C 
BC 
00 
TOP=C 
C0 
iQ 
10 
Figure 1.5 BDD for Fault Tree Structure in figure 1.4 
10 
The cut set identification of the system is obtained by determining the various paths, 
from the root node, which terminate in a `1'. Only the basic events that lie on a 'l' 
outlet branch, indicating component failure, are included in the cut set. The cut sets 
for the BDD in figure 1.5 are therefore: 
{AB} 
{AC} 
{C} 
To obtain the minimal cut sets either the resulting list of cut sets is reduced using 
Boolean algebra or the BDD can undergo a minimisation process. However for the 
purpose of quantification the non-minimal BDD should be used. 
The Top Event probability is obtained by summation of the probability of each 
sequence path that terminates in a `1'. For component i that lies on a `0' outlet 
branch, the probability of travelling down such a branch is given by Q, which is equal 
to (1- Q; ). The top event probability for figure 1.5 is therefore equal to: 
P(TOP) = QAQB + QA QB QC + Q, 4 
Qc 
= QAQB + QA(1-QB)QC + (1-QA)QC 
= QAQB + QC -QAQBQC 
which can be shown to be identical to the exact top event probability that would be 
obtained via FTA. 
This analysis procedure makes the BDD technique more efficient that the traditional 
FTA technique. The main advantages of the BDD method are thus that it produces the 
exact top event probability and reduces the amount of computing time if the ordering 
of the variables is efficient. In addition to this, as the BDD is created from the fault 
tree structure, the textual description of the system failure logic is not lost. 
A disadvantage of the BDD method is that it is impractical to construct the diagram 
directly from the system description and it must be generated from the fault tree 
structure. As the BDD is created from the fault tree any limitations with the FTA 
technique will transfer to the BDD and limit the techniques ability. For example the 
assumption of independence is apparent in the BDD analysis routines implying this 
technique is unable to accurately analyse systems containing dependent failure events. 
1.5.2 Dependent Modelling Tools 
If independence is an unrealistic assumption then more sophisticated techniques are 
required. 
1.5.2.1 Markov Analysis 
Markov models do not require the assumption of independence and can therefore be 
used to analyse systems containing dependencies, such as common cause failure and 
standby failures. The Markov diagram consists of two features, states and transitions 
between states. This modelling technique describes the system in a state-transition 
diagram. The states in the diagram represent the mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
states of the system. Each of these will correspond to either a working or failed state 
for the system. The individual components themselves, that are contained within each 
state, can represent different states of functionality, e. g. they can represent a working 
component, a failed component, a component that is in standby or a component 
undergoing repair. The states are represented by a circle on the Markov diagram and 
the transitions are illustrated by arcs between states. 
The construction of the Markov diagram begins with the identification of the initial 
state of the system at time t=0. The initial state is generally the working state where 
each component is assumed to be functioning as desired. Therefore for a system 
comprising of two components, A and B that can be either working or failed, the 
initial state would be, A working, B working. This initial state can be seen as state 1, 
S 1, in figure 1.6, where `0' represents a working component and '1' a failed 
component. The remainder of the diagram is developed by creating new states due to 
all possible transitions out of any developed state, where only one transition (failure or 
repair) is considered at a time. Two new states can be developed from Si due to 
either the failure of component A or component B. Failure of component A results in 
the transition to state 2, S2, where A is failed and B is working. The transition rate 
from Si to S2 is equivalent to the failure rate of component A, X, N. Similarly state 3, 
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S3, is developed from the initial state due to the failure of component B, represented 
on the Markov diagram by A, a. The available transitions out of states 2 and 3 are then 
considered and the Markov diagram is deemed complete when no further transitions 
out of any newly developed states can be identified. The complete Markov diagram is 
given in figure 1.6 where pi represents the repair rate of component i. 
AO 
A, BO 
s1 
µIA 
Al Ne AO 
B0 B1 
s2 A. s3 
NR A1 
B1 
s4 1= FAILED 
0= WORKING 
Figure 1.6 Markov Representation of a 2-component System 
The probability of system failure is calculated by determining the probability of 
residing in any state that represents system failure. The probability of residing in state 
i at time t can be achieved in numerous ways, depending on whether the system is 
discrete or continuous with respect to time, and is discussed in-depth in chapter 4. 
The identification of the failed states is problem dependent. For example, if 
components A and B were in a series network then the failed states in figure 1.6 
would be S2, S3, and S4, as the system fails if either component A or B have failed. 
Dependencies are modelled on the Markov diagram due to its ability to represent 
different functionality of each component by using appropriate states and transitions 
between these states. Boyd (1996) outlined that the primary advantage of the Markov 
method was that of its flexibility in expressing dynamic system behaviour (ref. 8). It 
has, however, several drawbacks. Primarily, the development of the diagram involves 
no logical explanation of the system. This decreases the communication value of the 
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diagram and can also result in diagrammatic errors for large systems which are 
difficult to check or detect. A further disadvantage with the state-transition diagram is 
that it grows rapidly as the number of components in the system increase. For a 
component that can be in one of two states, either working or failed, the number of 
states in the Markov diagram is equal to 2", where n is equal to the number of 
components in the system. Therefore for a system containing only ten components the 
Markov diagram would consist of 1024 states. Not only does the number of 
components in the system increase the size of the diagram and therefore affect the 
computation time, it also increases the complexity of the actual construction. As a 
result of the advantages and disadvantages of the Markov method it has been 
suggested that the technique is most useful when applied to systems containing 
dependencies and of limited size, less than 5,000-10,000 states computer generated or 
less than 50 if manually constructed (ref. 8). 
A common assumption between the Markov technique and the FTA and BDD 
methods is that the failure and repair rates for each component must be constant, 
therefore failure or repair rates cannot vary with time. This assumption is not always 
valid and in such situations a more complex technique, such as simulation, would be 
required. 
1.5.2.2 Petri Net Approach 
Petri nets were introduced in 1962 by C. A Petri. Although originally designed to deal 
with systems exhibiting concurrent behaviour they have over the last 10 years been 
shown to be, among other things, particularly useful for analysing systems that contain 
dependencies. The Petri net models two aspects of system performance, namely 
events and conditions, on a bipartite directed multigraph. The Petri net is composed 
of four parts, a set of places (P; ) representing a condition, a set of transitions (T) 
representing an event, an input function (I) and an output function (0). An example 
of the Petri net structure is depicted in figure 1.7. 
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P1 
INPUT 
PLACE 
I(INPUT FUNCTION) 
Ti 
O(OUTPUT FUNCTION) 
P4 
P2 OUTPUT P3 
PLACE 
Figure 1.7 Petri Net Structure 
The dynamic behaviour of the system is modelled on the Petri net by the use of 
markings. A marking vector, It , 
is an assignment of tokens to the places of a Petri 
net. The tokens are passed from place to place to represent the change of state within 
the system. A token is represented on the Petri net by a dot present in a place node 
and can be transferred to another place once a transition is enabled. A transition can 
be defined as being enabled when all input places that are connected to a transition 
contain at least one token. An example of a marked Petri net is given in figure 1.8 and 
p is equal to : 
µ- (1,0,0,0)T 
It can been seen that transition TI is enabled. The state of the Petri net is therefore 
defined by its marking and any change in marking results in a change of state. 
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Following the execution of TI the token present in place P1 will be removed and 
deposited in each of the output places of TI, i. e. P2, P3 and P4. 
Analysis of the Petri net is achieved, almost always, by finding a finite representation 
for the reachability set of a Petri net. The reachability set can be defined as: 
" the set of all states into which the Petri Net can enter by any possible 
execution " (ref. 9) 
The finite representation of the reachability set is generally portrayed as a reachability 
tree whose nodes represent marking, µ;, and the arcs represent the firing of a 
transition, Ti. The reachability tree, if identifiable, is then used to analyse the Petri 
net. In addition to this Peterson's next-state function (ref. 9) or Murata's matrix 
method (ref. 10) can be used to analyse the behaviour of a Petri net. 
A fault tree structure can also be converted into a Petri net by conversion of each gate 
into appropriate place and transition nodes. Work completed thus far has created a 
Petri net form for every type of fault tree gate and techniques have been devised to 
determine the minimal cut sets and path sets from the bipartite graph. The probability 
of system failure can therefore be obtained directly from the Petri net graph. 
The most useful application of the Petri net model is to computer hardware and 
software. The technique is advantageous in that the diagram strongly symbolises the 
various links between system components. The actual construction of a Petri net from 
a system description is not documented which is a definite disadvantage. The Petri 
net provides no system failure logic description, as with the FTA method, and even 
though it has been suggested that the technique is as efficient as the traditional 
technique of FTA (ref. 11), there is no evidence to support it for the static case. The 
advantage of this technique, over the conventional methods, lies in its ability to model 
dependent and concurrent systems, although the analysis techniques used to achieve 
this are complicated and generally the model is converted to a Markov diagram or 
solved using simulation. The Petri net model could be used to model dependent failure 
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events but would be the least favoured method to do so, due to its confusing 
construction process and limited analysis capability. 
1.5.3 Consequence Identification Tools 
Starting from an initiating event consequence identification tools identify all possible 
system outcomes, regardless of whether they represent good or bad scenarios. 
1.5.3.1 Event Tree Analysis 
A method frequently used when investigating the responses that occur from a system 
given an initial potentially hazardous event is Event Tree Analysis (ETA). The 
method was first applied in the early 1970's and is now the main method 
recommended in the American guide to performance of probabilistic risk assessment 
for nuclear power plant safety (ref. 12)_ The ETA method, unlike the FTA method, 
works by using forward logic where the development begins from a specific failure 
and is followed through to trace all possible outcomes. The tree itself consists of a 
series of nodes and branches listed sequentially. At each node a decision is made as 
to whether the component or sub-system under inspection is functioning correctly or 
not. After all sub-systems/components have been inspected a consequence is reached. 
One of the advantages of this method over that of the FTA technique is that multiple 
consequences can be analysed. 
The first step in constructing an event tree involves the identification of the `initiating 
event', i. e. the event that requires other systems to respond. The functionality or 
failure of the safety sub-systems or components are then considered and all 
consequences determined. Each branch point can be either represented by an 
individual component or by a sub-system. In the event of the nodes being based on 
sub-systems, failure to function is generally obtained via a fault tree structure. 
By assigning a probability to each branch the probabilities of every possible outcome 
following the initiating event can be determined. The probability of each node's 
failure is given by evaluation of the appropriate fault tree, given a sub-system 
representation, or by the single component failure data. The probability of each 
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node's success is obtained via the complement rule, where P(success) =I -P(failure). 
For a particular sequence path then, the probability is obtained by multiplying together 
all branch probabilities present in that path. The overall probability of any particular 
consequence is obtained by summation of path probabilities that produce the 
consequence in question. An example event tree is illustrated in figure 1.9 and the 
frequency of each consequence, for a system containing independent failures, can be 
shown to be: 
P(Consequence 1) _ ý, - 
(1- QSUBI )'(1 - QQ(; R2 
P(Consequence 2) =- 
(1- Qs(, 
RI 
)- (Q. 
suRZ + 
(Qscj, )- ý1- Qsc'ß2 
P(Consequence 3) - A, - 
(QsI, 
Ri 
)' (QsUUB2 
where X; is equal to the frequency of occurrence of the initiating event, i. 
The ETA method is especially useful for systems that have a definite response 
sequence to a given initiating event. The main advantage with the ETA method is that 
it can deal with dependent failures as well as independent failures, and is used mainly 
with safety systems. The main disadvantage of the technique is that as the systems 
become more complex so the analysis required becomes more involved. In addition to 
this not all systems can be described in terms of event trees directly, for example 
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Figure 1.9 An Event Tree 
systems which include the same component performing different functions in the 
same sequence (ref. 13). 
1.5.3.2 Cause-Consequence Analysis 
In 1971 Nielson presented a graphical method for analysing relevant accidents in a 
nuclear power plant (ref. 14). The method he proposed connects the events that cause 
"accidents" with their relevant consequences. The method consists of the union 
between FTA and ETA and is generally referred to as the Cause-Consequence 
Diagram method. The fault tree structure represents the causes of a critical event and 
the event tree represents the link between the causes of the critical event and the 
various consequences that can result. The cause-consequence diagram is structured 
around the decision box symbol, illustrated in figure 1.10, which is an identical 
representation of the `YES-NO' branches seen on the event tree structure. The 
decision box asks whether a certain sub-system or component is functioning as 
desired. A connection point between the fault tree and event tree methods can also 
exist at the NO outlet path of these decision boxes, as the failure causes for sub- 
system i are represented by a fault tree structure, Fti. In the instance that a decision 
box represents a single component the NO outlet path is caused by the single 
component failure probability, Q;. As the component or sub-system will be either 
working or failed the probability of travelling down the YES outlet branch is given by 
I minus the probability of travelling down the NO outlet branch. 
omponent/System 
unctions Correctly 
Q; 
Fti 
ýPo ES 
omponent/System 
unctions Correctly 
0 ES 
Figure 1.10 Decision Box symbol for a Cause-Consequence Diagram 
The procedure for development of a cause-consequence diagram involves 
identification of an initiating or critical event. For example a hazardous event which 
requires rectification or the initiating event in a start-up sequence. Given a critical 
event certain subsystems or components will be activated. The cause-consequence 
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diagram is developed by evaluating the state of the system depending on whether 
these components function correctly or not. The simple light switch circuit system, 
shown in figure 1.11, can be used to illustrate the construction of a cause-consequence 
diagram. 
The light switch circuit functions when an operator depresses the push button, which 
sends a power source to the bulb. The initiating event is therefore that the operator 
depresses the push button. Having identified the initiating event, the next stage in the 
construction process is to identify all possible system consequences. Following the 
initiating event the circuit should close causing a current to be applied to the bulb. 
The cause-consequence diagram is hence completed by considering the functionality 
of the components that control the closure of the circuit and the current through the 
circuit. The cause-consequence diagram for figure 1.11 is shown in figure 1.12. 
Figure 1.12 Cause-Consequence Diagram for the Light Circuit shown in figure 1.11 
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The causes of the circuit failing open is that the push button fails to close the circuit, 
hence a single component failure probability, QPß, is attached to the NO outlet branch 
of the first decision box. The causes of the current failing are that the battery fails to 
produce power, BAT, the bulb has blown, BB, or the fuse is broken, F. These failure 
causes are represented on the fault tree, Ft 1, which is given in figure 1.13. 
No current 
through 
circuit 
No current Bulb Blown 
1 
Iýý 
_ý BB 
i 
i 
Figure 1.13 Fault Tree Ft I for Cause-Consequence Diagram shown in figure 1.12 
Quantification of the cause-consequence diagram, for a system containing 
independent failures, can be achieved via multiplication of each outlets branch 
probability leading to a consequence. The overall probability for any particular 
consequence is obtained by summing all sequence probabilities that lead to the 
particular consequence. For example the probability of light failure, `NL', in figure 
1.12 is equal to: QPB + (1-QPB). (QFU). 
The cause-consequence diagram method can also be applied to systems containing 
dependent failure events and has been used to analyse systems where sequence of 
failures is relevant. Quantification of such systems requires more advanced 
mathematical techniques which are discussed in Chapters 5 and 9. The method has 
greater capabilities than some of the traditional techniques such as FTA, as it can be 
applied to systems containing independent and dependent failures. The development 
of the cause-consequence diagram is logical and shares the attractiveness of the FTA 
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method as it contains a textual description of not only system failure but also all other 
states that the system can attain. As with the FTA method, component weaknesses 
can be highlighted and hence system designs modified. 
The main drawback with the cause-consequence diagram method is the lack of 
development for a generalised analysis procedure that can be universally applied to all 
systems. The technique was researched intensively in the late 1970's but since has 
received little attention and therefore has advanced a minimal amount in the last 20 
years. The technique has definite capabilities yet requires further research in order to 
increase its useability to that of the traditional methods. 
1.6 Summary of Analysis Methods 
The main advantages and disadvantages of each analysis technique described in this 
Chapter are highlighted in table 1.1. 
Method Main Advantage Main Disadvantage 
Fault tree Analysis 1) Very efficient at representing 1) Cannot accurately analyse 
system failure logic systems that contain statistically 
dependent failures 
2) Provides a textual description 2) Inefficient method for large 
systems 
Binary Decision Diagrams Efficient and effective at gaining 1) Cannot accurately analyse 
exact top event probabilities systems that contain statistically 
dependent failures- 
2) Difficult to construct from 
system descri tion 
Petri Nets Models dependent and Analysis procedures are 
concurrent systems. Useful for undeveloped if reachability set 
application to computer cannot be determined 
hardware and software systems 
Markov Model Can analyse systems containing 1) Diagram contains no textual 
dependent failure events. description 
2) Diagram grows rapidly as the 
number of components increase 
Event Tree Analysis 1) Can analyse a number of Analysis can become complex 
different accident scenarios. as system increase with 
2) Can model systems complexity. 
containing both independent and 
dependent failures. 
Cause-Consequence Analysis 1) Can analyse systems Construction and analysis 
containing both independent and procedure underdeveloped as no 
dependent failures. generalised procedures exist- 
2) Retains textual description 
Table 1.1 Summary of Advantages and Disadvantages 
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1.7 Scope of Thesis 
The majority of the methods used in reliability analysis assume independence between 
individual component failures. FTA is the most commonly used technique and 
although the type of logic diagram used in this method is very good at representing the 
system's failure logic, it is not necessarily an efficient or accurate quantification 
technique. Other techniques, such as Markov models, have the capability of dealing 
with dependencies yet are more complex to construct and do not give a textual 
description for the system's failure logic. 
The main problem in reliability analysis is that generally only a small part of any 
system contains components of a dependent nature. To represent the entire system 
using a method that can analyse dependent failures could prove to be computationally 
expensive. It is at times acceptable to assume that the dependencies do not 
excessively alter the result of quantification and for this reason can be assumed as 
independent. However, when the dependencies are `heavy', i. e. when the correct 
functioning of a component is highly dependent on the functionality of another, this 
factor must be accounted for in the analysis in order to produce an accurate result. 
The problem that exists is that no method has been devised that fully documents the 
failure logic of the system and can analyse systems containing both independent and 
dependent failure events efficiently. 
This thesis is concerned with the development of a modelling technique that can 
successfully describe and analyse systems comprising both independent and 
dependent parts. The new method will utilise the most advantageous parts of 
presently existing techniques and will attempt to solve systems with minimal amount 
of computational effort. 
The objectives of the work program are to: 
1) Review existing modelling techniques. Focus mainly on FTA and Markov 
methods due to their popularity but also identify capabilities of other less 
conventional tools. 
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2) Identify main deficiencies in the currently applied techniques and main features 
which would be retained in any future developed model. 
3) Identify how dependencies can be modelled. Attention will focus on standby and 
sequential failures due to their relatively common occurrence in systems. 
4) Develop the computer algorithm of the proposed new modelling technique to 
quantify the reliability of a system design where dependencies feature in 
combination with independent elements. 
5) Thoroughly investigate the application of the proposed new modelling technique 
and the results obtained from the application. 
6) Utilise the proposed method in the traditional design process in order to aid in the 
identification of an acceptable design. 
7) Test the new method/s developed by analysing test case systems. 
8) Apply the new technique/s to real-life systems and discuss the relative 
advantages/disadvantages of the method. 
9) Investigate the potential of developing the method further and highlight any 
further work which would be advantageous. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
2.1 Introduction 
With the increased complexity of industrial systems, engineers need to predict system 
reliability in order to design safe and efficient systems. One way of achieving this is 
to identify the causal relationships between events, which result in system failure- 
Once the effect of certain components has been established the system can be 
redesigned in order to reduce the impact of such component failures. In the last 30 
years various mathematical models have been used to identify the effect of component 
failures on the system's performance. The most frequently used technique for system 
reliability assessment is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and this method has been shown to 
be a very effective reliability analysis tool. 
This chapter aims to describe the construction and analysis procedures of the FTA 
method and highlight its application to the reliability environment. 
2.2 Background of FTA 
In 1961, the fault tree concept was introduced by Watson of Bell Telephone 
Laboratories in connection with a US Air force contract to study the Minuteman 
missile launch control system (ref. 15). In 1965 Haasl gave guidelines for the 
construction of fault tree models (ref. 16) and since the mid 1960's many 
improvements have been completed on the FTA method. The technique is thus a 
well-accepted means of predicting the reliability of a system and can be used to 
improve the efficiency of a system by identifying critical components. The area of 
fault tree construction and analysis is discussed in detail in Andrews and Moss (ref 6). 
The various types of modelling tools used for reliability analysis can be broadly split 
into two types, those incorporating forward logic (inductive process) and those 
involving backward logic (deductive process). An inductive process begins at 
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component level and works forward to produce a list of system outcomes due to 
component failure. Alternatively a deductive process works backward from an 
undesired event to the failures of components which cause it. FTA can be seen as a 
deductive process as the construction process initiates from an undesired event. The 
fault trees are built up by expressing system failure mode in terms of combinations of 
individual component level events and operator actions (ref 6). To construct a fault 
tree the analyst must have a detailed understanding of how the system functions. The 
fault tree development is systematic, going from high level to low level in the system 
structure. 
When using FTA the undesirable outcome is labelled the 'TOP EVENT'. The fault 
tree is then developed by extending branches below the top event, which represent the 
various immediate causes of the top event. The new events are in turn developed and 
the tree events are continually refined until a level is reached which contains only 
component failures or events representing the limit of resolution for which data is 
available. Events found in the final level of the tree structure are known as BASIC 
EVENTS. 
Analysis of a system may involve developing many different fault trees, one for each 
failure mode, as it is imperative for an effective analysis that the definition of the tree 
top events are not too broad or too narrow. If the top events are too broad they may 
involve irrelevant information that does not fit the objectives of the study. Similarly if 
the top events are too narrow all relevant failure information may not be present 
leading to an inaccurate result. 
The development of the fault tree involves the use of Boolean expressions which 
represent the logical operators of OR, AND and NOT. The fault tree structure 
involves two basic elements, GATES and EVENTS. 
2.3 Fault Tree Symbols 
The gate types that are most commonly used in fault tree construction are shown in 
figure 2.1. These gates either allow or inhibit the passage of fault logic up through the 
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tree. If the inputs to a gate occur within the gate specification then the gate will open, 
if not the gate will remain closed. For example in the case of the AND gate in figure 
2.1, the gate specification is that ALL inputs to the gate must occur for the gate to 
open. 
GATE TYPE GATE SPECIFICATION 
AND GATE: 
Allows causality to pass up through 
the tree if at any time all inputs to 
the gate occur 
OR GATE : 
Allows causality to pass up through 
the tree if at any time at least one 
input to the gate occurs 
VOTE GATE : 
Allows causality to pass up through 
k the tree if at least k out of N 
possible inputs occur 
Figure 2.1. Gate Types used in Fault Tree Construction. 
For the scope of this thesis only coherent fault trees will be utilised. Coherent fault 
trees comprise basic events combined with the logic gates AND, OR and 
combinations of these two, i. e. VOTE gates. Non-coherent fault trees contain working 
components and therefore include NOT logic, where a component is considered NOT 
failed. 
2.4 Qualitative Analysis of a Fault Tree Structure 
The fault tree representation of a system illustrates the relationship between 
component failures and an undesired system event. Qualitative analysis of a fault tree 
structure involves the identification of each unique combination, or single occurrence, 
of event failures which cause the top event. 
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The top event can be expressed in an algebraic form by using Boolean algebra, as each 
logical gate has a corresponding Boolean expression (Figure 2.2). Boolean algebra 
can therefore be used in order to obtain an expression for the causes of system failure 
in terms of combinations of individual component failures. 
GATE TYPE BOOLEAN 
EXPRESSION 
TOP 
TOP = A. B 
OB 
i 
TOP 
TOP=A+B 
OB 
TOP 
2 2 
L 
TOP = A. B + A. C +B. C 
Figure 2.2 Table containing equivalent Boolean Expression for Logical Gates. 
Figure 2.2 represents the equivalent Boolean expression for the AND, OR and VOTE 
gates. The dot or product symbol represents logical AND and the OR gate is 
represented algebraically by the `+' symbol. For the VOTE gate in figure 2.2, TOP 
will occur if at least two out of the three inputs occur. 
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By using the Boolean expressions the fault tree failure logic can be translated into an 
algebraic form and the top event is described in terms of combinations of component 
failures. Each single or multiple component failure that causes the top event 
occurrence can be referred to as a cut set. A Cut Set can be defined as: 
'A collection of basic events such that if they all occur the lop event occurs' 
Hence, 
TOP= C, +C2+........ +Cn 
where C; represents cut set i and n is the total number of cut sets in the system. 
For example the top event of the fault tree shown in figure 2.3 is represented by the 
Boolean expression: 
TOP = A. B +A 
The cut sets are therefore: {A}, {AB} 
For even relatively simple systems the number of cut sets can be large. In any system 
the largest cut set will comprise all component failures, however, the system will 
generally be caused by failure of fewer components. This implies that the cut set 
containing all component failures does not require all of the individual components in 
the cut set to fail to actually cause system failure, i. e. all components in the cut set are 
not both necessary and sufficient to cause system failure. The cut sets for the fault 
tree in figure 2.3 depicts this as failure of component A alone causes the top event, 
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Figure 2.3 Example Fault Tree Structure 
illustrating that in the cut set AB, B is not necessary to cause the top event. This 
introduces the concept of a minimal cut set which can be defined as: 
`the smallest combination of component failures which if they all occur cause 
the system to fail ' 
The Boolean expression of the top event is minimal only when all redundancy have 
been removed. A set of Boolean Algebra rules are used to aid in the reduction of the 
top event expression to gain its minimal form (Table 2.1). 
RULE NUMBER RULES 
1 A+A=A 
2 A+1=l 
3 A+O=A 
4 A. A=A 
5 A. 1 =A 
6 A. 0=0 
7 A+A. B=A 
8 A+B=B+A 
9 A_B = B. A 
Table 2.1 Boolean Algebra Rules. 
Rule number one is known as the first IDEMPOTENT rule and aids in the removal of 
repeated cut sets from the system failure expression. 
Rule two and three include the binary constants 1 and 0 which represent event 
occurrence and non-occurrence respectively. 
Rule four represents the second idempotent rule and is used to remove repeated events 
in a cut set expression. 
The seventh rule is the absorption rule, its function is to remove any redundant cut 
sets. It states that if event A alone can cause top event failure then any combination of 
A with any other component results in the removal of the non-minimal cut set. 
By applying these rules to the Boolean expression for the top event, the system failure 
can be expressed in terms of the tree's minimal cut sets. The reduced Boolean 
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expression is often referred to as the SUM OF PRODUCTS form or disjunctive 
normal form, where: 
TOP = MC 1+ MC2 + ........ + MCn MC; = Minimal cut set i 
The 'products' represent the minimal cut sets where: 
MCA = cI. cz......... c cj = failure of component j 
The `sum' represents that the top event will occur if any of the minimal cut sets occur. 
A minimal cut set containing n component failures is referred to as a minimal cut set 
of order n. Generally the lower the order of the cut set the greater the influence that a 
cut set has on the system failure. 
The minimal cut sets for a system are hence found by expressing the top event as a 
Boolean expression and then reducing that expression by using the Boolean algebra 
rules given in table 2.1. 
2.4.1 Obtaining the Reduced Boolean Expression 
There exists two main methods that are used to obtain the logic expression for the top 
event, these are the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. The top-down 
approach is usually used in computer software as this approach reduces the Boolean 
expression at each level, therefore minimising the number of cut sets that need to be 
stored before the final reduction (ref. 6). The bottom-up approach involves tracing up 
through the tree from the bottom left-hand corner, expressing each gate with a 
Boolean expression containing only basic events. Once the top gate is reached the 
Boolean expression obtained from the bottom-up trace is reduced by applying the 
Boolean algebra rules (Table 2.1). The simple fault tree illustrated in figure 2.4 can be 
used to demonstrate the bottom-up approach in detail. 
Bottom-Up Approach 
Starting at the bottom of the tree, left hand side, the first gate encountered is GATE 3, 
which is an OR gate and is therefore equivalent to B+C. 
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GATE 3 is itself an input to GATE 1, which is also an OR gate with GATE 3 and 
component A as its inputs. As GATE 1 is an OR gate a passage can be made through 
GATE 1 as long as one of the inputs to the gate occurs. GATE 1, therefore becomes 
B OR C OR A. By moving up another level the top level is encountered, which is an 
AND gate with inputs GATE 1 and GATE 2. Prior to obtaining an expression for the 
top gate an expression to represent GATE 2 needs to be determined. Following an 
identical procedure as that used for the development of GATE 1 an expression for 
GATE 2 is determined and the top event expression becomes: 
Top=(B+ C+A)_(C+A. B) 
Now that an expression has been obtained to represent the failure of the system it is 
expanded in order to obtain the Sum of Products form and to identify the minimal cut 
sets of the system. By expanding the brackets out the top event Boolean expression is 
obtained as : 
TOP = B. C + B. A. B + C. C + C. A. B + A. C + A. A. B 
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Figure 2.4 Simple Fault Tree Structure of a3 Component System 
By applying rule 4 to C. C, the cut set C is developed. Any cut set which contains 
events in combination with C can now be removed by applying the absorption rule, 
rule 7, which leads to: 
TOP =C+B. A. B + A. A. B 
Redundancies are still present and by applying rule 4 and rule 7, the top event 
expression becomes: 
TOP=C+A_B 
From the sum of products form the minimal cut sets can be extracted as {C} and 
{AB}. 
This example highlights the effort required if the qualitative evaluation of the fault 
tree is performed manually. The need for a computerised procedure to determine the 
minimal cut sets of a real-life system, which may contain hundreds of components, is 
evident. Over the years various algorithms have been devised to determine the 
minimal cut sets of a fault tree structure. One of the most popular, which is utilised in 
many of the software packages, is the MOCUS algorithm developed by Fusell & 
Vesely (ref. 17). 
2.5 Quantitative Analysis of a Fault Tree Structure 
The quantitative analysis of a fault tree structure is based on a probabilistic method 
known as `Kinetic Tree Theory' introduced by Vesely in 1970 (ref 7). The 
underlying assumption of the Kinetic Tree Theory is that all basic events in the tree 
structure occur independently of one another. 
The minimal cut sets of a system are used in the quantitative assessment which 
determine, amongst other measures, the overall system reliability, availability, number 
of expected failures and the rate of failure. Although the overall system 
characteristics are important, component or minimal cut set contributions can also aid 
in the discovery of weaknesses in the system and therefore assist in the redesign 
process. 
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In order to perform the quantitative assessment of a fault tree the likelihood of 
minimal cut set and component occurrence is required. 
2 5.1 Component Failure Modes 
For each individual component it is assumed that the component can only exist in one 
of two states at any one time. The component can either be functioning correctly or 
failed. In a short time interval, dt, it is assumed that only one transition can occur. 
Therefore if a component is in a working state at time t, then the component can either 
remain working or fail in the interval dt. Similarly if the component is failed at time t 
it can either be repaired in dt or remain in a failed state. For any repairable component 
it is assumed that following repair the component is `as good as new'. 
Each component's life cycle is therefore made up of two different elements: the failure 
process and the repair process. Each is described separately in the following section. 
2.5.1.1 The Failure Process 
A failure distribution can be described as an attempt to represent mathematically the 
length of the life of a device (ref. 18). To describe a failure distribution several 
different functions can be used such as a cumulative failure distribution, a probability 
density function (pdf) and in certain cases the failure rate of the device. For the failure 
process the cumulative failure distribution is represented by F(t), the unreliability of a 
component, where unreliability is defined as: 
The probability that the first failure occurs in the time interval 0 to t, given it 
worked at time zero 
To obtain the pdf the following relationship holds: 
f(t) dF(t) (21) 
and hence 
i 
F(t) J f(u)du (2.2) 
0 
34 
The expression f(t)dt represents the probability that a failure occurs in the small 
interval (t, t+dt). 
From the cumulative failure distribution and the pdf of the failure process the failure 
rate, r(t), of a component can be developed via the determination of r(t)dt which 
represents the probability of failure in the interval (t, t+dt) given that the component 
worked continuously from zero to t. In order to obtain an expression for the failure 
rate conditional probability theory is utilised, where 
P(AIB) = 
P(P Bj) (2.3) 
Now if we let A represent a failure in the interval (t, t+dt) and B represent the 
component working at time zero up to time t then r(t) dt = P(AIB). It can be seen that 
B represents the reliability of a component where reliability, R(t), is defined as: 
The probability that a component experiences no failures in the interval 0 to t, 
given it worked at time zero. 
Therefore: 
r(t)dt =f 
(I) t (2-4) 
which equals: 
r(t) =f 
(t) 
(2.5) 
1- F(t) 
For many devices plotting r(t) against time results in the curve referred to as the 'Bath- 
Tub' Curve (Figure 2.5). 
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The bath-tub curve is characterised by three individual phases, a decreasing failure 
rate phase, a constant failure rate phase and finally an increasing failure rate phase 
(ref 19). Integrating equation (2.5) gives: 
F(t) = 1- exp. [_j r(u)du (2.6) 
0 
2.5.1.2 The Repair Process 
In order for a repair to be initiated a failure must have already occurred. The 
cumulative repair distribution for a component is represented by G(t), where G(t) 
represents the probability that a repair is completed before time t given the component 
was in a failed state at time zero. 
Therefore the pdf for the repair process, g(t), is given by 
dG(t) 
g(t) - dt 
(2.7) 
where g(t)dt can be defined as the probability that a repair occurs at time t+dt. 
From the cumulative distribution function and the pdf of the repair process the repair 
rate, m(t), can be developed where m(t) is the probability of repair given that the 
component is in a failed state from time zero to time t. 
As with the failure rate derivation, an expression for the repair rate is obtained: 
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Figure 2.5 'l'he Bath tub Curve 
m(t) - g(t) (2.8) 1- G(t) 
and following integration and rearrangement of equation (2.8) a formula to represent 
the probability that the repair of a component is completed before time t is obtained 
(equation 2.9). 
G(t) = 1- exp 1-' m(u)du (2.9) 0 
2.5.1.3 The Life of a Component: The Whole Process 
For repairable components the unconditional failure intensity, w(t), can be defined as: 
The probability that a component fails per unit time at lime 1, given it worked 
at time zero 
and the unconditional repair intensity, v(t) can be defined as: 
The probability that a failed component is repaired per unit time at t given it 
worked at time zero 
In order to obtain an expression for the unconditional failure intensity of a component 
the probability that the component is working at time t and then fails in the time 
interval dt, must be determined. This scenario can be achieved through two distinct 
ways. Firstly the component works continuously from zero up to time t and then fails 
in the small interval (t, t+dt). This can be evaluated using the pdf for the failure 
process, f(t)dt. The second independent way that can lead to component failure in the 
small time interval (t, t+dt), given it worked at time zero, is that the component fails 
prior to time t but is last repaired at time u prior to time t. This situation is illustrated 
in figure 2.6. The history of a components life prior to u is irrelevant. From figure 2.6 
the last repair occurs in the time interval (u, u+du) and the component then works 
continuously up to time t. The probability that a component is repaired per unit time 
at t given that it worked at time zero is represented by the unconditional repair 
intensity 
, v(t). 
The failure of a component can occur anywhere between u and t, as the 
last repair occurs in the small time interval u+du. The probability of failure between 
times u and t is represented by f(t-u)du and the probability of repair in the time 
interval (u, u+du) is equal to v(u)du. Since the last repair time u can occur at any point 
between 0 and t the probability of the second scenario is given by: 
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j 
v(u)du f (t - u)dt 
0 
The unconditional failure intensity is therefore determined from: 
r 
w(t)dt = f(t)dt +J v(u)du f (t - u)dt 
0 
therefore, 
r 
w(t) = f(t) +f v(u) f (t - u)du (2.10) 
0 
To calculate the unconditional failure intensity an expression for the unconditional 
repair intensity is required. In order for a repair to be initiated a failure must have 
already occurred. Therefore a component must have failed prior to time t and remain 
failed up to time t. This situation is shown in figure 2.7. The failure in the time 
interval (u, u+du), given that the component worked at time zero, is equivalent to the 
unconditional failure intensity of the component, w(u). The repair of the component 
can occur anywhere between u and t, as the last failure occurs in the small time 
interval u+du. 
38 
The probability of repair between times u and t is given by g(t-u) and since the last 
failure time u can occur at any point between 0 and t the unconditional repair intensity 
is given by: 
v(t) =j g(t - u)w(u)du (2.11) 
0 
It can be seen by inspection of equations (2.10) and (2.11) that in order to obtain w(t) 
and v (t) these two equations need to be solved. 
The unconditional failure intensity can be used to determine two important measures: 
The conditional failure intensity, X (t), of a component and the expected number of 
failures W(to, ti) in the time interval to to t1 . The conditional failure intensity can be 
defined as: 
The probability that a component fails per unit time at t given it worked at time t and 
at time zero. 
The difference between this and the unconditional failure intensity, w(t), is that X is 
the failure rate based on those components which are working at time t, whereas w is 
based on the whole population. X(t)dt is the probability of failure between (t, t+dt) 
given the component worked at time t and at time zero. Using equation (2.3), where 
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event A represents failure in the interval (t, t+dt) and event B represents that the 
component worked at time t and at time zero, the conditional failure intensity satisfies: 
)L(t)dt= P((component fails between(t, t+ dt) n P(component works at time t and time zero)) 
P(component works at time t and time zero) 
The above expression can be reduced by noting the fact that event A actually implies 
that the component must be working at time t, therefore 
X(t)dt = 
P(component fails between(t, t+ dt) 
P(component works at time t) 
The probability that a component works at time t represents the availability, A(t), of a 
component. Therefore: 
X(t)dt = 
w(t)dt 
or X(t)dt = 
w(t)dt 
, where 
Q(t) represents component unavailability 
A(t) 1- Q(t) 
Hence, 
fi(t) = W(t) 1- Q(t) (2.12) 
The expected number of failures is defined by: 
W(t, t+dt) = Expected number offailures in the time period (t, t+dt) given that the 
component worked at time zero 
Using expectation (ref. 20) 
W(t, t+dt) _ i. P(i fails during t, t+ dtl worked at 0) 
as only one failure can occur in a small time interval the above expression is reduced 
to: 
W(t, t+dt) = P(one failure in t, t+dt I worked at 0) 
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therefore 
W(t, t+dt) = w(t)dt (2.13) 
The expected number of failures over a certain time span is determined from: 
IZ 
W(tl, t2) =J w(t)dl (2.14) 
11 
As with the failure process, the unconditional repair intensity can be used to calculate 
the conditional repair rate , µ(t), and the expected number of repairs, V(tl , t2). 
The conditional repair rate, µ(t), can be defined as the probability that a component is 
repaired per unit time at time t given it worked at zero and failed at time t and 
expressed mathematically as: 
_ 
P(component repaired bet ween(t, t+ dt) µýtý 
P(component failed at time t) 
N(t) = Q() or µ(t) 1 
V(t) 
(t) 
(2.15) 
The expected number of repairs in the interval (t, t+dt), V(t, t+dt), can be shown to be 
equal to: 
V(tl, t2) =J v(u)du (2.16) 
I, 
2.5.2 Calculating The Unavailability of a Component 
An expression can be obtained for a components unavailability, Q(t), in terms of the 
expected number of repairs and expected number of failures, W(O, t) and V(O, t) 
respectively. 
Q(t) = W(O, t) -V(o, t) 
hence 
(2.17) 
r 
Q(t) =J [w(u) - v(u)]du (2.18) 
0 
The distribution most commonly used in FTA to represent times to failure and repair 
is the Exponential distribution. A feature of this distribution is that it is characterised 
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by a single parameter, X. The distribution assumes that equipment does not age and 
for this reason the failure rate is deemed constant. This distribution, therefore, 
represents the constant, useful life period of a component in the bath tub curve (Figure 
2.5). The relationship X(t) =X now holds and similarly µ(t) = It. With these failure 
and repair rates in place the unavailability can be determined. Implementing the 
exponential distribution gives: 
F(t) =I -e-A` , 
f(t) = Ä. e-a' , 
G(t) =I -e-", g(t) = pe-A` 
Using f(t) and g(t) two coupled equations are obtained from equation (2.10) and 
(2.11). 
t 
w(t) =Ae-u +f Ae-zu->. v(u)du 
0 
r 
v(t) =j µe-1". w(u)du 
0 
These equations can be de-coupled and solved by using Laplace transforms (ref 6), 
which yields the following results: 
W(t) = 
All 
+xe A, +µ Ä+µ 
v(t) _ 
A'µ 
- 
Aju 
e-(x+"`)' 
.1 +µ A, +µ 
From equations (2.14) and (2.16) the expected number of failures and repairs can be 
determined respectively. 
W(O, t) = 
Aµ 
+ 
A2 
(1-e-"z+"`)`) 
A. +µ A+µ 
V(O, t) = 
; L' I-- Aµ (1- e-(z+"" ) A+µ ;. +µ 
Finally equation (2.17) gives the unavailability as: 
Q(t) =µA( I- (2.19) 
This expression represents the situation where the failure of the component is 
revealed, i. e. immediately apparent. Equation (2.19) reduces to 1- e-A` when the 
A 
component is non-repairable and to as t-* 
+o. µ 
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When the failure of a component is unrevealed, meaning that the failure will not be 
detected until an inspection of the component has been initiated, the calculation for 
the component unavailability is different. The unavailability is dependent on the time 
between inspections and is illustrated in figure 2.8. In this case the average 
unavailability is given by: 
xB 
Qnv = 1- 
(1 
A8 
) 
(2.20) 
where 0 is the inspection interval. 
0(t) 
0e 2e 30 
Inspection Interval 
Figure 2.8 Unavailability for an Unrevealed Failure 
2.5.3 Calculating Minimal Cut Set Unavailability and Unconditional Failure 
Intensity 
As with individual component failures the unavailability of a minimal cut set can be 
determined. For minimal cut sets greater than order one the probability of occurrence 
is calculated by using the Multiplication Law (Equation 2.21) for n independent 
events, A;. 
n 
P(A, -Az---An)=[jP(A; ) (2.21) 
The unconditional failure intensity of minimal cut set i, the expected number of times 
the minimal cut set occurs per unit time at time t, can also be obtained. As only one 
failure can occur in the small time interval t to t+ dt, all but one component in the 
minimal cut set must exist failed at time t and the remaining single component must 
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occur in the time t to t+ dt to cause the minimal cut set to occur at this time. This 
represents the unconditional failure intensity of a minimal cut set, wmci, and can be 
expressed as: 
nn 
wR, c1(t)dt =I {w1(t)dt[jq j(t)} i=1 jxi 
J=1 
dividing through by dt yields: 
nn 
wMCi (t) = 
E, 
1wi 
(t)fJ q, (t)} (2.22) 
i=1 jai 
l=1 
2.5.4 Calculating System Unavailability 
Once the minimal cut sets have been found and the failure and repair process for each 
component obtained, the top event probability can be calculated. There exists several 
different methods for obtaining an expression for the top event probability of a system 
(ref. 5), the three most commonly used are the Exact Method, the Minimal Cut Set 
Upper Bound and the Rare Event Approximation Method. 
2.5.4.1 The Exact Method 
The exact solution method is based on the Inclusion-Exclusion Principle, equation 
(2.23), which is generated from basic probability theory. The inclusion-exclusion 
principle relies on the assumption that all components fail independently. 
NNN 
P(7)=I p(MC, )-II p(MC, nmcj)+ +(-1)N°-1P(MC, nmc, n MCN, )(2-23) 
i=1 i=2 j=1 
The expanded inclusion-exclusion formula can also be achieved by first producing the 
structure function for the top event, fi(x), and taking its expectation. The structure 
function for the top event with minimal cut sets i to n is: 
$(x) = 1-ý(1-P. ) (2.24) 
where pi is the binary indicator variable for minimal cut set i such that: 
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1 if minimal cut set i is failed 
p' 0 if minimal cut set i has not occured 
In the case that each minimal cut set is statistically independent, i. e. no minimal cut 
sets share any component, the top event probability equals the expectation of the 
structure function, i. e: 
P(TOP) = E[4(x)] = 4E[x] 
However this case is rare as minimal cut sets often share common component failures. 
Full expansion of equation (2.24) followed by reduction using Boolean algebra rules 
prior to taking the expectation deals with the common failure problem. An 
alternative, more efficient, way of dealing with repeated events is to use Shannon's 
Decomposition formula (ref. 21): 
fi(x) = X«1;, x)+X; W;, x) (2.25) 
where: 
ý(l ;, x)=$(XI ............. 
Xi-1,1, X; +1............ X) represents X; has failed 
W;, x)=$(XI ............. 
Xi-1,0, X; +1,........... X. ) represents X; works 
Taking expectation then gives 
4svs = Q(X1)Q(l;, x) + (1-Q(X1)) Q(01, x) 
where: 
Q(l;, x)=Q(Xj ............. X1 1,1, X1+ 1............ X,, ) represents component i has failed 
Q(0;, x)=Q(Xi ............. X; _I, 
O, X; +1............ X1, ) represents component i works 
2.5.4.2 Approximation Techniques 
In large fault trees where there may be several thousand minimal cut sets the use of the 
inclusion-exclusion expansion is too CPU intensive and for this reason 
approximations have been developed. The inclusion-exclusion expansion adds odd 
numbered terms and subtracts even numbered terms, where each term will be 
numerically less significant than its preceeding term. Therefore truncating the 
expansion after an odd numbered term will produce an upper bound and truncating 
after an even numbered term will produce a lower bound. 
45 
The Rare Approximation Method 
A commonly used upper bound approximation is the Rare Event Approximation 
(ref. 5). The rare event approximation method yields an upper bound of the exact 
answer by using only the first term in the inclusion-exclusion expansion. Equation 
(2.26) illustrates how the probability of the top event is obtained using the Rare Event 
approximation technique. 
N 
P(T) _ P(MC; ) (2.26) 
Minimal Cut Set Upper bound Method 
A more accurate upper bound is given by finding the minimal cut set upper bound, 
equation (2.27). This method, as its title suggests, is based on the systems minimal 
cut sets. The method uses the logic that the system will fail if at any time at least one 
of the minimal cut sets has occurred. By using basic probability theory this situation 
can be expressed by: 
P(T) =1- P(No minimal cut sets occur) 
Thus, if all minimal cut sets, MC;, are independent then the above expression 
becomes: 
n, 
P(T) < 1- P(minimal cut set i does not occur) 
Ný 
P(T) <_ 1-11(1- P(MC; )) (2.27) 
This method produces an exact answer if no components are repeated in any cut set i. 
However if a component is present in more than one minimal cut set then equation 
(2.27) produces an upper bound approximation as the repeated component is 
considered more than once. 
The relationship between the three expressions for Qsys is shown in inequality (2.28). 
EXACT < MINIMAL CUT SET UPPERBOUND <_ RARE APPROXIMATION METHOD (2.28 
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The process of finding the exact solution can be extremely quick for a small fault tree, 
however, for trees that yield a large number of minimal cut sets the process can be 
computationally expensive. In most fault tree software packages the minimal cut set 
upper bound is assumed to produce an accurate result and is implemented instead of 
the exact method. 
2 5.5 Calculating System Unconditional Failure Intensity 
The unconditional failure intensity for a system, wsys(t), can be obtained using 
Birnbaum's Criticality function (ref. 6). The criticality function for component i is 
defined as the probability that the system is in a critical state for component i and is 
determined by: 
G1(9) = Q(11,9) - Q(O , 9) 
where Q(q) is the probability that the system fails and, 
Q(l1, q) = Q(gj..... q; _,, 
l, qi+i....... qn) represents component i has failed 
Q(O;, q) = Q(gi,.... q; _i, 
O, q; +i....... qn) represents component i has worked 
In order to obtain the unconditional failure intensity of the system, due to component 
i, the criticality function is multiplied by the unconditional failure intensity for 
component i. This process is continued for all n components in a system and wsy5(t) 
is given by: 
n 
Wsys(t) = G; (q(t)) - w1 (t) (2.29) 
The system unconditional failure intensity can be used to determine the expected 
number of system failures in a designated time period. The expected number of 
system failures in the time period to to tl is given by: 
c, 
W(to, t1) = 
Jw (t)dt (2.30) 
to 
2.6 Initiating and Enabling Events 
The previously outlined procedure for quantification of a fault tree structure assumed 
that the order in which the events in any minimal cut set occurred was irrelevant. In 
safety systems, the order in which certain failures occur will determine whether the 
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top event happens or not. In general, safety protection systems comprise several 
shutdown options given a hazardous scenario. However if the shutdown components 
have failed prior to a demand then any failure of the system itself will result in a 
catastrophic situation. On the otherhand, if any component not part of the shutdown 
process fails prior to the failure of the shutdown system then a full shutdown will be 
initiated and the hazardous situation avoided. This type of situation is modelled by 
considering failures as either initiating or enabling events (ref. 6). 
Initiating events can be considered as events that place a demand on the safety systems 
to shutdown the system and are formally defined as: 
Events that perturb system variables and place a demand on control/protection 
systems to respond 
Enabling events represent the failure of devices placed in a system to protect against 
hazardous events and are defined as: 
Events that are inactive control/protective systems which permit initiating events to 
cause the top event 
2.6.1 Quantification using Initiator and Enabler Theory 
The expected number of failures, W(O, t), can be used as an upper bound for the 
unavailability of a system. For a system containing initiator and enabling events 
wsys(t) can be obtained via a modification to equation (2.29), where i corresponds 
only to initiating events. 
It is essential that in order to obtain an accurate measure of the chance of system 
failure that initiating and enabling events are identified and the appropriate 
quantification performed. 
2 6.2 Example System Containing Initiator and Enabler Events 
Since the focus of this thesis is to develop ways of modelling systems which feature 
types of dependency, the initiator/enabler theory was applied to an example to 
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highlight its ability to deal with sequential failures. The system chosen contains both 
initiating and enabling events for a simple pressure tank system. The function of the 
system is to control the operation of a pump which pumps fluid from a reservoir into a 
tank. The system configuration is illustrated in figure 2.9 and the component's 
individual functions and rate of failure per hour are represented in table 2.2. 
OPERATOR 
SWIT H 
jO 
MOTOR 
PUMP 
TIM 
PRESSURE RELIEF 
VALVE 
Figure 2.9 Pressure Tank System 
Initially the system is in a dormant de-energised state with the switch closed, pressure 
relief valve closed, operator and pressure gauge available and the timer relay contacts 
open. The system is started by the operator re-setting the timer. The timer relay opens 
when the required amount of time has passed which will insure that the tank is fully 
pressurised. For this example it is assumed that once the timer registers 10 minutes of 
continuous power the timer contacts open breaking the circuit. In the occurrence of 
the timer failing to time out, a pressure gauge is attached to the tank which is 
monitored by the operator. If the pressure gauge reaches a pre-set value the operator 
manually opens the switch which removes power to the pump. In addition to this the 
pressure relief valve, PRV, opens prior to the tank becoming overpressurised. The 
system functions twice daily, i. e. once every 12 hours. 
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Component Function Failure Modes Failure 
Rate, X 
Switch (SW) A safety feature to SWC: Switch 
remove power to failed closed when lxl0-' 
the pump when operator attempt to 
manually opened. open 
Pressure Releases pressure PRV: Fails closed 
Relief Valve from tank prior to 1x104 
(PRV) overpressure 
Operator Inspects Pressure OP: Operator fails 
(OP) Gauge and opens to respond 1x 10-6 
switch if pressure 
exceeds pre-set 
value 
Timer Relay Provides reset for TCC: Timer 
(TIM) each operation. contact fails closed 
Timer opens when tx 104 
tank is full 
breaking circuit to 
the motor 
Pressure Monitors the PG: Gauge Failed 1.5x 10' 
Gauge pressure of the low 
tank 
Motor Pumps fluid into Assumed to be 
tank perfectly reliable 
in this study 
Table 2.2 Component Functions and corresponding Failure Rates 
The fault tree structure for this system is illustrated in figure 2.10 and for this system 
the only initiator event can be identified as the Timer, TIM_ Failure of the Timer 
places a demand on the remainder of the components to protect the tank. The 
remaining components are all enablers. From the fault tree structure it can be seen 
that there exists three minimal cut sets for the pressure tank system, all of which are of 
order three. 
MCI = {TCC. PRV. OP} 
MC2 = {TCC. PRV. SWC} 
MC3 = {TCC. PRV. PG} 
50 
Tank 
Overpressurised 
Power No 
supplied for Release 
>10 mins 
PRV 
Operator fails to 
Timer fails respond to 
to open Timer Posed 
TCC 
(OP 
PG SWC 
Figure 2.10 Fault Tree Structure for Pressure Tank System 
2.6.2.1 Quantification for Pressure Tank Example 
The probability of failure for each individual component is calculated firstly on the 
basis of whether the component is an initiator or an enabler. If the component is an 
initiator then a frequency of failure is required not a probability of failure, and this is 
equal to the failure rate, i. e. wTIM = , TIM. For an enabler the probability of failure is 
dependent on the type of failure, i. e. unrevealed or revealed failure. All the enablers 
in the pressure tank system are unrevealed failure, as the system will function 
correctly whether these have failed to function or not until the initiating event fails, 
placing a demand on them to function. The probability of failure for each of the 
enablers is obtained using equation (2.20) with the inspection interval, 0, equal to one 
year, i. e. 8760 hours. 
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The unconditional failure intensity for each individual component is obtained via 
equation (2.12) and tabulated with the probability of failure in table 2.3. 
Component Probability of Unconditional Failure 
failure, Q Intensity, w 
Switch (SW) 0.04255 9.5745x10-6 
Pressure Relief Valve (PRV) 0.3338 6.66x10-5 
Operator (OP) 4.3672x l 0-3 9.956328x l 0-7 
Timer Relay (TIM) --------- 1x10" 
Pressure 6.54132x 10-3 1 . 49x 10-6 
Gauge (PG) 
Table 2.3 Unconditional Failure Intensity for components in Pressure Tank Example 
To obtain an expression for the unconditional failure intensity of the system equation 
(2.29) is used, where i is equal only to initiating events, and hence an approximation 
to the system's unreliability is found. For this system, 
Q(q) = QTIMQPRvgop + gTIMqPRvqsw + QTlmgPRVQPG - gTlMQPRVqopqsw 
- QTIMQPRvgopqPG - QT[MgPRvqpGqsw + QTIMQPRvgopqswqpG 
The only initiating event is the Timer, therefore, 
WSYS(t) = GTIM(Q(t))WTIM(t) 
The criticality function for the timer is given by: 
GTIM(q) = Q(hTIM, q) - 
Q(OIIM, q) 
where 
Q(I-nm, q) - QPRVQOP + QPRvgsw + qpRvqpG -QPRvgopqsw - qpRvqopqpG 
- qpRvqpGqsw + qpRvqopqswqpG 
Q(ß, 9) =0 
Therefore the unconditional failure intensity for the pressure tank system is, 
WSYS = [QPRVQOP + QPRVgSW + QPRVQPG -QPRvgopqsw - QPRvgopqpG 
- qpRvqpGqsw + QPRvgopqswqPG]"WTIM 
= 0.125x10-12 
The expected number of failures in a year can be calculated using equation (2.30) 
52 
8760 
Wsys(t) =J0.125x10-12 dt 
0 
= 1.095x10-9 
If the unconditional failure intensity is calculated for the pressure tank system, without 
the inclusion of the initiator/enabler distinction, then: 
Wsys(t) = 0.259x10-6 
The error factor that results from the exclusion of initiator and enabler events was 
found to be 236 in a year. Therefore for an accurate analysis it is essential that 
initiators and enablers are identified and the appropriate quantification procedure 
adopted. 
2.7 Summary and Conclusion 
FTA is the most commonly used method for system performance analysis. The 
technique represents the failure logic of the system in a diagrammatic tree structure 
which is not only used as a basis for the analysis but is also essential as a 
communication tool. The method can produce a qualitative or quantitative system 
analysis, both of which can be used to highlight weaknesses in a system design. 
The fundamental disadvantage with the fault tree method is that is cannot accurately 
analyse systems containing dependent failures. The two main dependencies 
investigated in this thesis are that of sequential and standby failures. It has been 
shown that the fault tree method can account for sequential failures, to a limited 
degree, by employing initiator/enabler theory. The example included illustrates the 
inaccuracy that can result if dependent failure events are modelled as independent 
events. The fault tree method has no capability of modelling warm or cold standby 
failures, where the failure of the standby component is dependent on the failure of the 
on-line component. FTA can, however, model hot standby events as the standby 
component has a failure rate which is equal to the on-line component, hence no 
dependency between the two exists. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BINARY DECISION DIAGRAMS 
3.1 Introduction 
For systems containing independent failure events it has been shown that the FTA 
technique produces a logical description of the failure process and can also yield, 
among other things, the systems unreliability. It has been highlighted, however, that 
this technique has limitations even when applied to systems containing independent 
failure events. Qualitatively, if the fault tree is complex then finding the minimal cut 
sets can be CPU intensive. In addition to this the exact top event probability, found 
via the inclusion-exclusion formula, may also be computationally expensive if the 
system contains even a moderate number of minimal cut sets. In the past this problem 
has been solved by using approximations for the top event probability. These 
approximations, however, can be inaccurate if the likelihood of component failure is 
not small. Both problems can be overcome using the development of the Binary 
Decision Diagram (BDD) approach. Although the theory behind the BDD's has 
existed since the late 1930's, the first application to reliability and more specifically 
FTA, was in the mid 1980's by Schneeweiss (ref. 22). 
This chapter aims to describe the theory behind the BDD approach and highlight its 
role in a reliability environment. 
3.2 The Development of the BDD Approach 
In 1938 Shannon's paper on switching circuits showed how electrical circuits could be 
represented using symbolic logic and simplified using Boolean algebra (ref. 21). Each 
circuit was represented as a set of equations which corresponded to the various 
relays/switches in the circuit. The switching function, which symbolised the circuit 
configuration, was then manipulated using Boolean algebra to the form which 
represented the simplest expression for the components in the circuit. In calculus it 
can be shown that any continuous function, with continuous derivatives, may be 
expanded in a Taylor's series. Shannon applied this to the equation of a switching 
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function and produced a formula referred to as `Shannon's Decomposition Formula' 
shown in equation (3.1). 
f(X1, X2,.. X) = X1. f(1, X2,.. Xn) + X, . f(0, X2,.. Xn) (3.1) 
In equation 3.1 the function is said to have been expanded or pivoted about X1 and the 
formula can be used to obtain the exact top event probability of a fault tree structure, 
as suggested in chapter 2. 
In 1959 C. Lee concluded that a binary-decision programming representation of the 
circuit led to a superior computation of the switching function than that of the usual 
Boolean representation (ref. 23). A binary decision program is based on one line of 
instructions for each variable. An example of such an instruction is: 
T x: A, B 
which implies that if the variable x, at address T, is `0' then the instruction at address 
A is followed, else if the variable x is `1' then the instruction at address B is followed. 
Lee's paper showed how a switching circuit could be described exactly by a binary 
decision program. 
In 1978, forty years after Shannon's work with switching functions, S. Aker defined a 
digital function in terms of a `diagram' which told the user the output value of the 
function by examining the values of the inputs (ref. 24). The diagram, referred to as 
the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD), is useful for finding the binary value of a 
function given the binary values of the function's inputs. The BDD is hence 
developed by examining the effect of the input variables on the output function. The 
BDD for the function f=A + B. C is depicted in figure 3.1. 
Inspection of figure 3.1 shows that the input variables are represented by circles with 
two outlet branches. These circles are referred to as non-terminal nodes and the top 
non-terminal node is known as the `ROOT NODE'. The `1' outlet branch from a non- 
terminal node symbolises that the variable equals I and similarly the `0' outlet branch 
symbolises that the variable equals 0. The output or function value is represented as a 
terminal box, know as terminal nodes, which either contain the value `1' or V. 
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f=A+ 
B. C 
/ROOT NODE 
A 
0 
f=B. C 
NON-TERMINAL NODE 
B 
0 
f=C 
0 
C0 
10 TERMINAL NODE 
Figure 3.1 Typical BDD Structure 
It should be noted here that the values `1' and `0' can imply different scenarios, i. e. in 
switching theory they represent that a circuit is opened or closed and in reliability 
theory they represent component failure and functionality respectively. The BDD can 
be seen to be identical to the Binary decision program in that each variable has 2 
options depending on whether it equals `0' or `1'. 
Aker's paper highlighted that the BDD could be derived using different formulations, 
such as using a truth table which holds all possible variable combinations of l's and 
0's. Derivation from a truth table results in the development of a binary decision tree 
with 2"-1 nodes, however Aker showed that a more efficient approach could be used 
in the development of the BDD. Instead of developing a truth table the function's 
Boolean expression is involved in a `top-down' procedure which includes repeated 
application of Shannon's decomposition formula. 
A further observation made by Aker was that the BDD is superior to the Binary 
decision tree, as any node in the BDD may have more than one input branch. This 
feature implies that the size of the BDD can be reduced. For example the BDD in 
figure 3.2a can be reduced by allowing the `1' outlet branch of the non-terminal node 
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representing component B to enter the same non-terminal node as the `0' outlet 
branch, as each branch enters the same non-terminal node representing component D. 
This reduction is illustrated in figure 3.2b. Figure 3.2b can be reduced further by the 
realisation that component B is superfluous or redundant. Regardless of whether B is 
equal to `0' or `I' component D is considered next. Removal of the non-terminal 
node containing B reduces the BDD to the form shown in figure 3.2c. It can therefore 
be defined that: 
A node is superfluous and can be replaced by its output if it possess identical non- 
terminal or terminal nodes on both outlet branches. 
A A 
0 0 1 7 
B C C g 
0 1 0 t 0 1 
0 
1 
1 
D D D D 
1 
D 
0 0 
1 1 1 0 1 0 t 0 
1 a 1 o f a 1 a 1 a (a) (b) 
A A 
0 
1 0 
1 
C 
1 
0 C 
t 
1 
0 
0 1 0 
D 
t 
Q 
1 
D 
0 
(C) t 0 1 Q 
(d) 
Figure 3.2 Reduction of a BDD 
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Being able to reduce the size of the BDD implies that the analysis will be more 
efficient than the binary decision tree. A further reduction in size, and hence in the 
amount of computer memory required to store a BDD, can be made if common 
modules exist. Therefore if two nodes are equivalent then one can be deleted and all 
of the incoming branches to the deleted node directed to the remaining common node. 
For example figure 3.2c contains a common node representing component D. Both 
the `I' outlet branch from the root node and the `0' outlet branch of component C 
stem to the non-terminal node containing D. Removing the node containing D which 
is attached to the node representing C results in the `0' outlet branch from the non- 
terminal node containing C to be directed to the node attached to the `1' outlet branch 
of component A. This reduces the BDD by one non-terminal node and the new form 
is shown in figure 3.2d. 
Aker highlighted that one of the main advantages of this technique was the efficiency 
in which the BDD could be stored in a computer. For each variable only two pieces of 
information are required: where to go if the variable equals `1' or `0'. As with the 
binary decision program, the BDD can be shown to lead to a superior computation of 
a function than that of a Boolean representation. 
3.3 Application of the BDD approach to a Reliability Environment 
The BDD approach was first applied to a reliability environment in the mid 1980's 
where Schneeweiss transformed a fault tree structure into a binary decision tree. From 
this tree it was shown that the BDD was a more concise representation, than that of 
the binary decision tree. Since Schneeweiss's publication many investigations have 
been carried out using the BDD method. One of the most influential was by Randal. 
E. Bryant who represented a function as a BDD but restricted the ordering of the 
decision variables (ref. 25). The ordering is defined as: A<B, where A and B are both 
represented by non-terminal nodes and the effect of A is considered before the effect 
of B. The paper also contains a set of manipulation algorithms for the BDDs. As with 
Aker, Bryant used Shannon's decomposition to represent pivoting about a variable 
present in a function. The work completed by Bryant, Aker and Lee led Rauzy to 
develop an algorithm which achieved increased efficiency for FTA (ref. 26). The 
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method is based on the BDD approach and involves converting the fault tree structure 
to a BDD in order to complete an efficient qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
3.3.1 Conversion of a Fault tree Structure to a BDD Using the Structure Function 
The BDD can be constructed from the structure function, O(N), of a system. Each 
basic event is considered and the effect of component i failing (binary `1') and 
working (binary `0') is identified. The fault tree structure shown in figure 3.3 can be 
used to illustrate the construction process. 
The minimal cut sets for the system can be shown to be: 
MC1={AB}, MC2={CD} 
and using equation (2.24) the structure function is equal to: 
O(X) =I -(I - 
XA. XB). (1 
- 
XC. XD) 
Before the construction can begin the basic events need to be placed in an ordering 
scheme. For this example a top-down, left-right ordering scheme would yield: 
A<B<C<D 
The root node for the BDD, therefore, represents basic event A. A is considered first 
and the effect on the structure function is determined. Following the failure of 
component A, i. e. XA =1, the structure function becomes: 
O(x) =1 -(1 - 
XB). (1 
- 
XC. XD) 
and when A functions correctly, i. e. XA =0, the structure function is: 
59 
Figure 3.3 Simple Fault Tree Example 
0(-V) = 1-(1 - XC. XD) 
The BDD is developed further by considering the effect of the next relevant basic 
event in the ordering scheme. The BDD for the fault tree in figure 3.3 is depicted in 
figure 3.4. By inspection of figure 3.4 it can be seen that there exists a common node 
starting from: 
O(X) =1 -(1 - 
XCAD) 
The final BDD is obtained by removing all redundant and repeated features. The `0' 
outlet branch from the root node, then, is re-directed to the non-terminal node attached 
to the `0' outlet branch of component B. The reduced BDD is given in figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.4 BDD development using the Structure Function for figure 3.3 
Figure 3.5 Final BDD for figure 3.3 
3.3.2 Conversion of a Fault Tree Structure using an If-Then Else Approach 
The approach outlined above is inefficient for large fault trees. The most frequently 
employed approach utilises the If-Then-Else structure (ite), which is derived from 
Shannon's formula. Each non-terminal node in the BDD has an ite structure of the 
form ite(x, fl, f2), implying that if x fails then consider function fl else consider 
function 12. This structure is represented as a BDD in figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6 ITE structure for component x 
Constructing the BDD from a fault tree includes obtaining an ordering of the basic 
events, which will be taken from the top of the tree downwards, and manipulating the 
ite structures for each basic event using the following rules: 
RULE 1: 
when x<y 
If J= ite (x, fl, f2) and H= ite (y, gl, g2) 
then JOH = ite(x, fl OH, f20H) 
where 0 is a binary connective which symbolizes either `+' or `. ' 
RULE 2: 
when x=y 
If J= ite (x, fl, f2) and H= ite (x, gl, g2) 
then JOH = ite(x, flOgl, f20g2) 
In addition to these rules the following properties are used: 
I +H= 1 O+H=H 1. H=H 0. H=0 
The example fault tree given in figure 3.7 can be used to demonstrate the construction 
of a BDD from a fault tree using ite structures. 
Initially an ordering is required. For figure 3.7, reading from the top-down in a left-to- 
right fashion, the ordering is B<C<A. The ite structures for each basic event are: 
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Figure 3.7 Example Fault Tree Structure 
A= ite(A, 1,0) 
B= ite(B, 1,0) 
C= ite(C, 1,0) 
Working from the bottom-up, Rule 1 gives: 
GATE 1= ite(B, 1,0) + ite(C, 1,0) 
= ite(B, 1+ ite(C, 1,0), 0 + ite(C, 1,0)) 
= ite(B, 1, ite(C, 1,0)) 
The ite structure for the TOP event can now be found, using rule 1, to be: 
TOP = ite(B, 1, ite(C, 1,0)). ite(A, 1,0) 
= ite(B, 1. ite(A, 1,0), ite(C, 1,0). ite(A, 1,0)) 
= ite(B, ite(A, 1,0), ite(C, ite(A, 1,0), 0)) 
To construct the BDD the ite structure for the TOP event expression is iteratively 
investigated to determine the expression represented on the `1' and `0' outlet 
branches. The resulting BDD for figure 3.7 is shown in figure 3.8. 
3.4 Qualitative Analysis of a BDD 
Rauzy defined that each path from the root node of a BDD to a terminal node 
containing the value 'I' represented a solution of f. Only the components on this path 
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Figure 3.8 BUD representation of tigure 3. ] 
that exit their nodes on the '1' outlet branch are included in the cut set. For the BDD 
illustrated in figure 3.8, then, the cut sets are: 
C1= {BA} 
C2 = {CA} 
These are also the minimal cut sets for the system. However the BDD does not 
always produce a list of minimal cut sets. To obtain the minimal cut sets either the 
resulting list of cut sets can be reduced using Boolean algebra rules or the BDD can 
undergo a minimisation process. For the scope of this thesis the minimisation process 
of the BDD is not required but is explained in detail in (ref 26). 
3.5 Quantitative Analysis of a BDD 
The probability of the top event occurrence, QTOP, can be expressed by the BDD as the 
sum of probabilities of the disjoint paths through the BDD. The disjoint paths through 
the BDD are the paths that lead from the root node to any terminal node containing the 
value `1'. For quantitative purposes the components exited on the `0' outlet branch 
are included. For component i that lies on a `0' outlet branch, the probability of 
travelling down such a branch is given by Q; , which 
is equal to (1-Q; ). 
The disjoint paths for figure 3.8 are: 
1) BA 
2) BCA 
The top event probability for figure 3.8 is therefore calculated by: 
TOP = QBQA +QB QC QA 
The BDD can also be used to determine other measures of a system's performance, 
such as the frequency of failure of the system and the contribution to failure for 
individual components in the system (ref. 27). Initiator/enabler theory can also be 
included in the calculation procedures (ref. 28). 
3.6 Summary and Conclusion 
The use of BDDs to improve the efficiency of identifying the minimal cut sets of a 
fault tree and calculating the exact top event probability has been proven for large 
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complex systems (ref. 26). Because of this, the method can be seen as superior to the 
conventional methods such as FTA. One pass through the BDD not only produces the 
exact top event probability but can also provide the information required to calculate 
the structural importance of each individual component. The system failure logic is 
still present in the fault tree structure however the quantification process is achieved 
more efficiently by employing the BDD approach. 
As with all of the existing analysis techniques the BDD approach has some 
limitations. The main drawback with this method is that incorrect ordering of the 
basic events can result in an excessively large diagram, which can prove difficult to 
analyse reducing the efficiency of the method- Over the last decade various 
investigations have been initiated to attempt to find a general ordering heuristic that 
will produce a minimal BDD for any fault tree structure (ref. 29). However, for large 
systems, even with poor ordering schemes, the BDD approach produces a more 
accurate analysis than that available via the more traditional methods. 
The two main dependent failure events investigated in this thesis are that of sequential 
and standby failures. As with the FTA method, the BDD method can provide a 
limited representation of a system containing sequential failures and can model hot 
standby failure events. Warm and Cold Standby failures, however, cannot be 
represented or analysed using the BDD approach. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MARKOV METHODS 
4.1 Introduction 
The analysis techniques outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 are effective at dealing with 
systems that contain independent failure events. Although these techniques can be 
used to analyse systems containing sequential failures, the accuracy of the analysis 
relies on the `strength' of the dependencies. One way of avoiding such errors is to use 
a method of analysis that can model dependent failures. As outlined in section 1.5.2.1 
Markov models do not require the assumption of independence and can therefore be 
used to analyse systems containing dependencies such as standby failures, common 
cause failures and sequential failures. 
This chapter aims to describe the foundation and application of the Markov analysis 
method in a reliability environment. 
4.2 The Markov Process 
In the 1950's one class of stochastic process that was used in the industrial sector was 
the Markov Process. From a reliability perspective a Markov process can be seen as a 
mathematical model that is useful in the study of complex systems, where a complex 
system may be seen as one which is subject to certain inspection-repair processes and 
can therefore be in a number of different states other than the simple ones of working 
or failed. The Markov technique describes a system in time and space using the laws 
of probability and can be used to analyse the dependability of repairable systems (ref. 
l2). 
The basic concept of the Markov process consists of two elements, states and 
transitions between states. The Markov process models the system as a state- 
transition diagram where the states are represented as circles and the transitions are 
illustrated as arcs travelling out of and into states. The system being analysed is in 
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one of these states at all times and from time to time moves to a different state. An 
analogy can be used to illustrate the concept of a Markov state-transition diagram: 
Imagine a group of towns, connected by various roads, and a man in a car who is free 
to travel from town to town. The towns in this example are equivalent to the states in 
the Markov model and the car travelling from one town to another corresponds to the 
system making a transition. This system is illustrated as a state-transition diagram in 
figure 4.1. 
The time the man stays in each town is known as the state holding time (ref. 8). All 
towns may not be directly reached from every state. The towns to which driving is 
possible correspond to the set of outgoing transitions each state has that specify which 
other towns are directly reachable from the given town. In figure 4.1 there exists a 
town which is the required destination of the driver, i. e. town 4. Once the driver has 
arrived in town 4 he will not leave. This state is known as an absorbing state and is 
equivalent to system failure in a reliability analysis model. 
One of the underlying assumptions with the Markov method is that in any small time 
period only one transition can occur. In addition to this for the basic Markov 
approach to be applicable the system must be characterised by a lack of memory, that 
is, the future states of the system are independent of all past states, except the 
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Figure 4.1 A State-Transition Diagram 
immediately preceeding one. This is more commonly cited as the Markov Property 
(ref. 30), which was built into the Markov process in order to simplify quantification 
of the state-transition diagram. Without the Markov property the probability of 
arriving at state K by time t would depend on the conditional probabilities associated 
with the sequence of states through which the stochastic process passed on its way to 
state K. The Markov property allows simplification by assuming that the probability 
of arriving in K by time t is dependent only on the state immediately preceeding state 
K, therefore: 
PEXK = KI XK_I = a, XK_2 = b...... XK_n =A= P[XK = KIXK_1 = a] 
The final assumption associated with the Markov analysis method is that system 
behaviour must be the same at any time (ref. 6). This implies that transition i is the 
same at all times in the past and future, i. e. stationary. For any system containing 
dependent failure events the Markov modelling technique can be used to analyse the 
system providing the system possess a lack of memory, has identifiable states and 
stationary transition probabilities. 
4.3 Construction of the State Transition Diagram 
The first stage of a Markov analysis is to draw the state transition diagram. The 
construction of the Markov diagram begins with the identification of the initial state, 
or states, of the system at time t=0. The initial state/s are generally working states 
where each component is assumed to be functioning as desired. Therefore for a 
system comprising two components, A and B, that can be either working or failed the 
initial state would be, A working, B working. The Markov diagram is developed 
further by identifying all possible transitions out of the initial state, where each 
transition i represents the probability of failure for component i, Q; for discrete time 
models, or the rate of failure for component i, A; for continuous time models. This 
process results in the identification of new states. For each new state developed all 
possible transitions are identified, with µ; representing the repair rate of component i. 
The state-transition diagram is deemed complete when no further transitions out of 
any newly developed states can be identified. As the Markov method is used to model 
dependencies, a system containing dependent failure events will be used to illustrate 
the construction process. 
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Consider a two component standby system which, in order to function correctly, 
requires one component to be working on-line. Given the failure of the primary 
component the component in standby is brought on-line. For this system it is assumed 
that a component in standby fails with a rate that is equal to half the failure rate of the 
component when on-line. Due to this assumption this example system is classed as a 
warm standby system (ref. 6). 
The initial state of the system is that one component is working and one component is 
in standby. This is represented on the Markov diagram by two initial states, SI and 
S2: 
AM A: S 
B: S B: W 
S1 S2 
where `W' symbolises a working component and `S' represents a component in 
standby. 
The Markov diagram is developed from these two initial states by identifying all 
possible transitions out of each state. For SI two possible transitions can occur: 
1) The failure of the on-line component A. This results in the standby 
component B becoming the on-line component while component A is 
being repaired. The system therefore moves into the state (A: F, B: W), 
where `F' represents component failure, with the rate A, A. 
2) The failure of the standby component B. The system therefore moves into 
the state (A: W, B: F), with the rate '/z X B. 
Similarly, the transitions out of state S2 can be identified. The Markov diagram now 
becomes: 
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The state-transition diagram is completed following the identification of all transitions 
out of states S3 and S4, and any other new state developed, and is shown in figure 4.2. 
A: W X. 
i 
A. 
" B: S 2 2 B: W 
Si S2 
ÄA 
/Iß 
A: F µA YB B B: W B: F 
S3 Xß AA S4 
AF 
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Figure 4.2 Markov Diagram for a2 Component Warm Standby System 
4.4 Different Types of Markov Models 
There exists four different Markov models depending on the state space of the system, 
S, and the time governing a transition, T. As both S and T can either be discrete or 
continuous the following Markov models exist: 
1) Discrete State - Discrete Time: The state space is discrete, i. e. there exists a fixed 
number of identifiable states, and transitions occur at fixed unit intervals. 
Transitions are represented by a fixed probability. 
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2) Discrete State - Continuous Time: The state space is discrete and the time between 
transitions is a random variable- The transitions are represented by a rate. 
3) Continuous State - Discrete Time: The state space 
is infinite and transitions occur 
at fixed time intervals. 
4) Continuous State - Continuos Time: The state space is infinite and the transition 
can occur at any time. 
For reliability problems the Markov models are limited to those having a countable 
number of states, i. e. models 1 and 2 
4.4.1 Discrete State- Discrete Time Markov Model 
In a discrete time process it is necessary to specify the probabilistic nature of the 
transitions assuming that the time between the transitions is constant (ref. 30). The 
earlier analogy can be used to describe a Markov model that is discrete in time and 
space. In order to simplify the problem only two towns will be considered. The states 
are numbered Si, representing town 1, and S2, representing town 2. Let the 
probability that the man moves out of town 1 to be '/2 and the probability of moving 
out of town 2 to be equal to '/4. The state-transition diagram for this system is 
depicted in figure 4.3. 
112 
1/2 TOWN 1 TOWN 2 
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S1 S2 
1/4 
Figure 4.3 Discrete State- Discrete Time Markov Model 
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Reliability problems are usually of the type that are discrete in state but continuous in 
time and for the scope of this thesis only this type of model will be discussed in detail. 
An in-depth account of the analysis procedures used for the discrete state discrete time 
model can be found in (ref. 30,31,32). 
4.4.2 Discrete State- Continuous Time Markov Model 
For reliability and availability studies of systems with dependent failures the most 
commonly applied Markov model is discrete in space and continuous in time. This 
type of model implies that the transitions between states can occur at any time. As 
only one transition can occur in any small time period transitions now occur between 
short time intervals (t, t+dt) instead of occurring between time n and n+1 as in the 
discrete case (ref. 33). The time between transitions is called the state holding time, 
which for the discrete state continuous time model, is exponentially distributed. The 
exponential distribution holds a prominent position in reliability calculations because 
it describes so well the behaviour of components and systems in their useful life 
period. The transitions for the continuous time model are hence constant rates. A 
single component can be used to describe a Markov model that is discrete in space and 
continuous in time. For a single component there exists two states, one representing 
the component in a working condition and one representing component failure. The 
Markov diagram for a non-repairable component is shown in figure 4.4, where the 
probability of going from a working state to a failed state in a small time interval is 
equal to Adt_ 
iidt 
Figure 4.4 Markov Representation of a Non-Repairable Component. 
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For a repairable component the Markov diagram is modified as state 2, S2, is no 
longer an absorbing state. The probability of repairing a component in a small time 
interval dt is represented by µ dt in figure 4.5. 
Adt 
µdt 
Figure 4.5 Markov Representation of a Repairable Component 
4.5 Quantitative Analysis of a Markov Diagram 
Depending on the type of system being analysed either the reliability of the system, 
Rs(t), or the availability, As(t), requires derivation. Reliability was defined in chapter 
2 as being the probability that the system has not failed at any time from time zero up 
until time t and is usually the measure of interest for non-repairable systems- The 
Markov representation of a non-repairable system contains an `absorbing state' which 
represents system failure. The unreliability of the system is equal to the probability of 
residing in the absorbing state. For repairable systems the measure of interest is the 
system's availability at time t, where availability can be defined as the probability that 
the system is operating at time t. Since the system cannot be in more than one state at 
a time, i. e. each state is mutually exclusive, it follows that the sum of the probabilities 
of being in any subset of the Markov model's states is also a valid probability. 
Therefore to obtain the availability of the system at time t the probabilities of residing 
in a working state are summed together. Alternatively the system's unavailability, 
Qsys(t), can be obtained by the summation of the probabilities of being in a failed 
state at time t. The identification of the working or failed states is problem dependent. 
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These definitions indicate that following the evaluation of a Markov model the 
measure of interest is a probability. In order to analyse a system using a Markov 
approach the probability of residing in state i at time t must be determined. 
4.5.1 Obtaining the Probability of Residing in State i at time t 
The key element in finding a procedure for determining the probability of being in an 
individual state at time t is to concentrate on the change in probability with respect to 
time for each state (ref. 8). To illustrate the procedure of determining the probability 
of residing in state i at time t the Markov representation of a single repairable 
component, given in figure 4.5, can be used. 
The probability that the system is working at time t+ dt is denoted by Psi(t + dt). 
There exists two mutually exclusive ways in which the component can be working at 
time t+ dt: 
i) The component can be working at time t, i. e. residing instate SI, with no 
failure occurrence in the time interval dt. 
OR 
ii) The component can be failed at time t, i. e. residing in state S2, and 
repaired in the interval dt. 
The probability of residing in state Si at time t+ dt is therefore expressed as: 
PSI (t + dt) = PSI (t)'(1- Adt) + PS2 (t) - (µdt) (4.1) 
which equates to: 
Psi (t + dt) -Psi (t) 
dt _ -A, 
Ps1 (t) + YPsz (t) 
As dt -4 O 
Psi(t + dt)-Psi(t) 
- 
dPs1(t) 
dt dt 
Therefore, 
dPs, (t) 
dt = -1PSI 
(t) + YPS2 (t) (4.2) 
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Intuitively, by inspection of equation (4.2), it can be seen that the change in 
probability for state SI is simply the difference between the frequency of coming into 
Si from state S2 and the frequency of going out of Si to S2 in the model, i. e:. 
P1 (t) = [inflow to state i] - [outflow from state i] 
_ [rate of transition to state i from other states j]. [probability of being in state j] 
- [rate of transition from state i to other states j]. [probability of being 
in state i] 
It can be noted that due to the Markov property the probability of residing in state i 
will always by a I" order differential equation (ref. 34). 
Similarly a0 order differential equation can be developed to represent the probability 
of residing in state S2, the failed state, at time t+ dt. 
PS2(t + dt) can be achieved in two mutually exclusive ways: 
i) The component can be failed at time t, i. e_ residing in state S2, with no 
repair in the time interval dt. 
OR 
ii) The component can be working at time t, i_e. residing in state Si, and fail 
in the interval dt. 
The probability of residing in state S2 at time t+ dt is therefore expressed as: 
Ps2(t + dt) = PS2 (t) - (1- µdt) + Pst (t) - (Adt) (4.3) 
which equates to: 
Psz(t + dt)-Pszfit) 
= APR, (t) - ; PP2it) dt 
Therefore, 
dP 
2 
(t) 
dt PPs2 
(t) (4.4) 
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Hence for a system with 2 states, the Markov diagram is represented at time t by a 
system of 2 simultaneous first order differential equations. Generally then, a Markov 
diagram with n states can be expressed at time t by a system of n simultaneous Ist 
order differential equations, one for each state (ref 34). 
The differential equations given in equations (4.2) and (4.4) can be written in matrix 
form, i. e: 
("51 
(t) P S2 (t)) _ 
ýp51(t ) pst Lt)) 
rit 
-µ 
therefore P= PA where the square matrix A is referred to as the differential matrix 
(ref. 31) or the transition rate matrix (ref. 6). The transition rate matrix can be 
formulated directly from the Markov diagram where the element A(i, j) represents the 
transition rate from state i to state j and A(i, i) represents the transition rate out of state 
i, which is always negative. The rows in the A matrix, therefore, sum to zero. The 
matrix representation is generally used for Markov analysis as the transition rate 
matrix can be easily developed from the Markov diagram, avoiding the need to 
identify each states differential equation. The solution of P= PA yields a vector of 
state probabilities at the specified time t. 
Solution of the differential equations is dependent on whether a steady-state solution 
or a transient solution is required. 
4.5.2 Steady State Solution for a Markov Diagram 
A steady-state solution describes the limiting probability of residing in state i after a 
large passage of time. The steady-state or limiting probabilities of an ergodic Markov 
process, i. e. a process where the limiting state probabilities are not dependent on the 
initial conditions, will be non-zero. Limiting state probability can be found for 
availability systems, however they have little significance in reliability systems as the 
probability of residing in the absorbing state is unity. 
For the single repairable component system, the steady-state probabilities for state Si 
and S2 are obtained by solving the equations: 
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0=- /IPP1 (°°) + µP 2 (°°) (4.5) 
0=A. P 1 (°°) - YPsz (°°) 
(4.6) 
U. 5 
dPdt(t) dPdt(t) 
=0 in equations (4.2) and (4.4) as tý 
As equations (4.5) and (4.6) are not linearly independent an additional equation is 
required in order to solve for Psi (t) and Ps2(t). As the system must be either working 
or failed at any time t the additional equation used is: 
Psi(t) + Ps2(t) =1 (4.7) 
Using equation (4.7), equation (4.5) becomes: 
0=- AP', (°°) + µ(1- PSI (°°)) 
µ 
µ 
Similarly, 
A. 
Ps2(°°) - 
.i+ µ 
For a system containing one component this process of finding the steady-state 
probabilities is trivial, which would not be the case for larger systems. It is general 
practice to solve the Markov diagram, for steady-state, using P= PA. 
For a steady-state solution P; (t) =0 hence PA = 0. As the equations are not linearly 
n 
independent the additional equation P; (t) =1 is substituted into PA, which results in 
PA becoming a system of linear simultaneous equations which can be solved using a 
number of different techniques. One of the most popular of the many methods 
available to solve a system of linear simultaneous equations is the Gauss Elimination 
method. 
To illustrate the process of obtaining a steady-state solution a two component cold 
standby system can be utilised. For a cold standby system the components which are 
in standby are assumed to be perfectly reliable, i. e. have zero failure rates. Once 
brought on-line component i fails with the rate A.;. For this system it is assumed that 
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the system will function as long as one component is working on-line. The initial 
states in the Markov diagram are therefore (A: W, B: S) and (A: S, B: W). The Markov 
diagram is developed by identifying all possible transitions out of each newly created 
state. The Markov diagram for the 2 component cold standby system is shown in 
figure 4.6. 
Figure 4.6 Markov Representation for a2 Component Cold Standby System 
The transition rate matrix for the Markov diagram in figure 4.6 is equal to : 
- 
(/LA) 0 A4 0 0 
0 
-(AB) 
0 AR 0 
[A] = 0 µA - (µA + AB) 0 AB 
µB 0 0 -(µB+AB) A,, 
0 0 µB µA (µA + µR 
For a steady-state solution: 
(p, P2 P3 P4 P5) [A] = (0 000 0) 
In order to be able to perform Gauss elimination, to obtain a steady-state solution for 
each state, the A matrix requires modification. The matrix must be transposed and the 
additional equation, P1 + P2 + P3 + P4 + P; =1, included. The system is now 
represented by the following set of linear simultaneous equations: 
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(;. A) 0 0 µ8 
0 P, 0 
0 - (AR) µA 00 P2 0 
AA 0 -U A +Ae) 0 µB " P3 - 
0 
0 ; LB 0 -(µB +AA) µA P4 0 
I 1 1 11 PS 1 
which can be solved using Gauss elimination to give the following steady-state 
probabilities: 
ABUA1LB(AB +! 
A 
+l 
"B) 
K 
ÄAPAY`B (AA + PA + 
J`ß 
) 
P2(ß) _ 
K 
AB2APB(AA +/A +! 
B) P3(') 
_ 
K 
ÄB'APA(ÄB +1"A +/lß) 
P4(ß) _ 
K 
'B 
k4 (A. ÄA +ÄßI""8 +A4 PA ) 
P5(-) 
K 
where 
K_YA7YB; 
LA +PAY`B)AZ +Y`A/"BZ; LA +l"AYB2BZ +PAA9)B2 +AAZAB2 +AB'JißAA 
+µ2µ8AB +PA2; B)A +JLA'I BAA2 +2A, AABµAµB +µB2ABPA +µB'I BAA2 +f1B2ABIA 
As the system functions correctly providing one component is working on-line, the 
system fails when no components are working on-line, i. e. state 5. The steady-state 
unavailability for this 2 component cold standby system is therefore equal to : 
ABk4 (ABA4 + ABPB + k4/ 
A 
K 
Even for this small system the algebraic solution was determined using a computer. 
This highlights one of the difficulties encountered when solving a Markov model, 
even for a steady-state solution. Unless the system is trivial with a small number of 
states in the Markov representation, a computer will be required to solve the 
simultaneous equations. 
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In addition to the steady-state probability for each state, and hence the system, a useful 
measure is the mean time duration in each state. Following the identification of this 
parameter the analyst can identify: 
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) 
Mean Time To Repair (M ITR) 
Mean Up Time (MUT) 
where 
MUT = MTBF - MTTR (4.8) 
The mean time duration that a system resides in a particular state can be obtained 
using the transition rate matrix, A. Consider state i and let T; equal the time of 
residence of i, assuming that entering i occurs at time 0. The probability of entering j 
between t and t+dt is found by utilising the fact that the system was in state i at time 0 
and moved to j in dt. The probability that no transition occurs from state i to any state 
k, where k is not equal to j, prior to t is given by e-°It' and the probability that a 
transition occurs from i to j in dt is given by aye-°v`dt . 
Therefore the probability of 
entering j between t and dt is represented by: 
P 
(I Iea, ")"a-e-°''dt 
k=1 
kzj 
ýv` 
t=I 
= aye ` dt 
- =ae 
a tdt 
As the system could leave from any state i to enter any state j the time duration in state 
i can be found to be equal to: 
Ti = -a,; ea,, 'dt (4.9) 
From equation (4.9) the probability density function fT; (t) can be deduced: 
f, -; (t) = -a,, e°,, ` (4.10) 
The residence time in state i therefore follows an exponential distribution and the 
mean duration in state i is given by: 
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11 
T. 
- a;, Rate of departure from state i 
(4.11) 
Using this definition and denoting T; ' as the mean residence time in other states 
before returning to state i, it can be shown that the asymoptic frequency of 
encountering state i, f1;, is given by equation (4.12) (ref. 12). 
fri= 
-Un - 
Qj(°°) (4.12) 
Using equations (4.11) and (4.12) the MUT, MTBF and MTTR can be obtained for 
any system. For example taking figure 4.2, the Markov representation of a2 
component warm standby system, there exists only one failed state, S5, therefore: 
MTTR = TS = PA +1B 
11 
MTBF - fn 55 - aP5 - 
ý 
and MUT is calculated using equation (4.8). 
The Markov process which contains an absorbing state is not an ergodic process and 
hence the steady-state probability offers little information regarding the system's 
performance behaviour. What can be found by analysing a system containing an 
absorbing state is the Mean time to first failure (MTTFF)_ Billington and Singh (ref. 
39) stated that MTTFF could be calculated using: 
MTTFF = [I-Q]-', where Q represents the probability matrix 
truncated by removal of all rows and columns that correspond to an 
absorbing state. 
For a single non-repairable component the Markov diagram has the form depicted in 
figure 4.4 with the probability matrix, P, equal to 1 
Truncating P due to the 
absorbing state, state 2, results in Q. Hence Q= [I -XI. The mean time to first failure 
is therefore equal to: 
MTTFF = [1-(1-ý)]-I = 
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Alternatively the MTTFF can be found by matrix manipulation (ref. 12)_ Let Ak' 
denote the reduced matrix with only working state transition present then MTTFF is 
given by: 
o Pi(O) Pj(O) 
----- 
Pk(O) 
11 
all alk 
MTTFF =1 II- Ak 
1 akl -- akk 
4.5.3 Transient Solution for a Markov Diagram 
A transient solution describes the probability of residing in a certain state at time t, 
and is useful for analysing systems that are only required to function for a short time 
period, i. e. a safety system which is brought on-line in order to alleviate a hazardous 
event. In order to obtain a general solution which represents the probability of being 
in a certain state as a function of time, the matrix of differential equations, equation 
(4.13), must be solved. 
((t)) = (P(t))[A] (4.13) 
When the initial state of the system, [P(O)], is known it is possible for a true solution 
to be found for equation (4.13). As with the steady-state example there exists a 
variety of techniques that can be used to solve a system of coupled linear differential 
equations. The usual methods employed, in relation to a Markov diagram, can be 
divided into two categories: 
(i) Full Analytical Resolution - through Laplace transformation and 
eigenvalue approaches. 
(ii) Direct Numerical Resolution - through numerical integration of O. D. E 
with step by step methods. 
Full Analytical Resolution 
For the first category a commonly cited technique is the eigenvalue approach which 
involves the identification of the eigenvalues, and subsequently the eigenvectors, of 
the system (ref. 5,35). This method, however, has been shown to be problematic for 
very reliable systems and inaccurate for Markov diagrams with a large number of 
82 
states (ref. 12). Further problems with the full analytical resolution methods were 
highlighted following the comparison between two indirect exponential methods, a 
Laplace transformation method and an integration method (ref. 36). The results of the 
comparison indicated that the O. D. E integration method used was the most efficient 
method, with good accuracy and computing time. The remaining methods, although 
accurate, required an excessive amount of computation due to the characteristics of 
the methods. Developments in the analytical methods have been achieved to a certain 
extent (ref. 37), but numerical integration techniques are presently favoured. 
Numerical Integration Resolution 
Numerical integration techniques provide the probability of residing in state i at time t 
by progressing from the initial situation, [P(O)], in very small time steps. One of the 
most popular methods available to solve first order differential equations is the 
Runge-Kutta method (ref. 6). The main problem surrounding the solution of equation 
(4.13), using integration techniques, is that the transition rate matrix may be sparse 
and contain a degree of `stiffness', i_e. failure and repair rates differ greatly in 
magnitude. Tombuyses and Derought postulated that in order to avoid analytical 
errors a variable stepsize integration technique should be employed, such as an 
implicit trapezoidal rule (ref. 38). 
It should be noted that obtaining a transient solution for any Markov diagram 
containing more than a few hundred states is problematic and in such cases simulation 
will generally be employed in order to produce an accurate solution. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Any system that is characterised by a lack of memory, has an identifiable number of 
states and contains constant transition rates can be modelled using the Markov 
analysis techniques outlined in this Chapter. The Markov analysis method has been 
shown to be particularly useful for modelling systems which contain dependent failure 
events. It can therefore be used to accurately analyse sequential and standby failures. 
For any system modelled a number of reliability measure can be calculated including 
system's unavailability and the mean residence time in each state. 
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The method, however, has limitations. The main disadvantage lies in the size of the 
Markov representation for a system. Even for a relatively small system the Markov 
diagram can become large and complex, which can lead to construction problems. 
Attempts have been made to alleviate this problem by'merging' similar states (ref. 34, 
40), i. e. states containing 2 failed and 1 working components. This reduction 
technique, though, can only be used for systems which contain identical failure and 
repair rates for each component and is therefore not always applicable. 
Analysis of a Markov diagram is efficient for small systems but requires complex 
solution techniques when the Markov diagram is large. A further disadvantage is that 
the diagram holds no logical description of how the system functions or how the 
model was developed and for this reason is not as appealing to engineers as the FTA 
method. 
Although the Markov method has limitations it nevertheless can be used to accurately 
and efficiently describe and analyse small systems containing dependent failure 
events. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CAUSE-CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM METHOD 
5.1 Introduction 
In many industrial systems, where safety is of the utmost importance, it is necessary 
that expedient tools for accident analysis are available and employed at the design 
stage. Such tools must be able to handle large systems in a systematic way and be 
helpful at displaying the factors that are of vital importance for the safety of the 
system. The previous four chapters have outlined several methods which attempt to 
achieve this for systems characterised by different features. This chapter describes a 
method that contains capabilities superior to FTA, BDD and Markov methods for 
sequentially operating systems. 
While investigating a nuclear power plant Nielsen (ref. 14) noticed that a given 
accident can be characterised by a `cause', a sequence of events where the time 
between their occurrence can be an important parameter and finally by a consequence. 
This type of system could be characterised as one with various shut-down mechanisms 
that are initiated given the presence of some initiating event, i. e. a pressure limit is 
exceeded. In order to identify all relevant accidents for a such a system Nielsen stated 
that the tool used must be able to determine the possible causes of the accident event 
and identify the possible consequences given that one or more of the accident limiting 
provisions could fail. 
Previously discussed techniques, such as FTA and Markov analysis, are incapable of 
identifying both the possible causes of an undesirable event AND all the possible 
consequences resulting from it. A technique, however, has been developed that 
possesses the ability to identify the causes of an undesired event and from this event 
develop all possible system consequences. The technique is known as the Cause- 
Consequence Diagram method. The Cause-Consequence Diagram method was 
developed at RISO National laboratories, Denmark, in the 1970's to specifically aid in 
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the reliability and risk analysis of nuclear power plants in Scandinavian countries (ref. 
12). The method was created to assist in the cause-consequence accident analysis of 
the nuclear plants, which involved identification of the potential modes of failure of 
individual components and then relating theses causes to the ultimate consequences 
for the system (ref. 41). The method can be seen as superior to Event Tree Analysis, 
which is also capable of identifying all consequences of a given critical event, as it 
models at component level and therefore is functionality driven and not subsystem 
driven- In addition to this the cause-consequence diagram method can account for 
time delays which is not a feature available in the ETA method. 
This chapter aims to describe the development of the cause-consequence diagram 
method and its uses in a reliability environment. 
5.2 The Cause-Consequence Diagram Method 
In 1971 Nielsen proposed a method for an expedient presentation of the logical 
connections between a "spectrum" of accident causes and a "spectrum" of relevant 
consequences (ref. 14). Nielsen stated that as well as being a tool for illustrating the 
consequences of particular failures the method could also serve as a basis from which 
the probability of occurrence of the individual consequences could be evaluated. The 
consequences evaluated include both the system terminating as intended and an 
incorrect termination- As all consequence sequences are investigated the method can 
assist in the identification of system consequences that might have not been 
contemplated at the design stage. 
The main principle of the technique is based on the occurrence of a critical event, i. e. 
an event that disturbs the balance of the process plant. The identification of the 
critical event is problem dependent and choosing the correct place to start is important 
as there may be many possible initial events, not all of which have serious 
consequences. Identification of a true critical event is imperative for large systems as a 
great amount of work can be wasted by analysing an event that does not directly effect 
the process. Focus should therefore only be made on functional failures of process 
components that directly effect the plant balance. Once a critical event has been 
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identified all relevant causes of the critical event and potential consequences are 
developed using two conventional reliability analysis methods. This situation is 
represented in figure 5.1. 
i CAUSES OF CRITICAL 
EVENT 
CRITICAL EVENT 
CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRITICAL EVENT 
Figure 5.1 Simple Representation of a Cause-Consequence Diagram Structure 
The two reliability analysis tools used in the development of the cause-consequence 
diagram method are the fault tree analysis method, described in chapter 2, and the 
event tree analysis method, outlined in section 1.5.3. The FTA method was used by 
Nielsen in two situations to describe the causes of an undesired event. Firstly the 
technique was used to describe the causes of the critical event. The second function 
for the fault tree method was to describe the failure causes of the accident-limiting 
systems (emergency shut-down systems). The event tree method was used as the link 
between the causes of the critical event and the various consequences that could result. 
The ETA method was used to identify the various paths that the system could take, 
following the critical event, depending on whether certain subsystems/components 
functioned correctly or not. 
The relationship between the two reliability methods is shown in figure 5.2. 
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CRITICAL EVENT 
CONSEQUENCE PART: 
IDENTIFICATION OF 
CAUSE OF ACCIDENT-LIMITING SEQUENCE DEPENDING 
SYSTEMS FAULT TREE ON ACCIDENT-LIMITING 
ANALYSIS SYSTEMS: EVENT TREE 
ANALYSIS 
Figure 5.2 Basic Structure of a Cause-Consequence Diagram 
5.2.1 Symbols for Construction 
The symbols applied by Nielsen for the construction of a cause-consequence diagram 
are depicted in figure 5.3. It can be seen that the symbols used for the `cause' part of 
diagram are simply those used for a fault tree structure. For the `consequence' part, 
though, new symbols were developed. The main symbol used in the construction of 
the consequence diagram is the decision box (figure 5.3). The decision box created by 
Nielsen is an identical representation of the `YES-NO' branches seen on an event tree 
structure. The connection point between the consequence and cause diagrams is the 
NO outlet path of these decision boxes as the failure causes of a system, represented 
by a decision box, are developed using FTA. A further important symbol, in terms of 
identifying the correct consequence, is the delay box. The delay symbol is used in 
systems where timing of event failures is relevant. In the analysis of such systems the 
time that passes between influential sequential failures is important as the knowledge 
of this may help the analyst differentiate between different system outcomes. In 
addition to this the time delay provides a means of taking into account random failures 
which could occur in a time interval following the occurrence of the critical event. 
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SYMBOLS FOR CAUSE DIAGRAM FUNCTION DESCRIPTION 
AND GATE: 
Allows causality to pass up through the tree 
if at any time all inputs to the gate occur. 
OR GATE : 
Allows causality to pass up through the tree 
if at any time at least one input to the gate 
occurs 
SYMBOLS FOR CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM FUNCTION DESCRIPTION 
Direction Of Events: Symbolises the 
direction from one event to the next event 
in a particular sequence. 
Decision Box: Represents the functionality 
O ES of a component/ subsystem. 
Mutually 
exclusive events. 
Delay Symbol: Represents a time interval 
Consequence Box: Holds information 
concerning the accident/consequence 
description 
Comment Box: Holds definition of critical 
event. 
Figure 5.3 Symbols used in Cause-Consequence Diagram 
The overall structure of the cause-consequence diagram method proposed by Nielsen 
in 1971 is depicted in figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4 Cause-Consequence Diagram Structure 
5.2.3 Rules of Construction for a Cause-Consequence Diagram 
Rules for the construction of a cause-consequence diagram were detailed by Nielsen 
in two sections, those for the cause part of the diagram and those for the consequence 
part of the diagram. For the cause part it should be noted that many of the rules 
postulated were similar to those used in the construction of a fault tree structure. The 
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rules outlined by Nielsen for the construction of the cause diagram can be summarised 
as a three step procedure: 
1) Identification of the Top Event: The construction of the cause diagram 
begins with the definition of the undesired event , 
i. e. the system failure of 
interest. 
2) Cause Diagram Development: Using a deductive process the causes of 
the undesired event are discovered and connected by means of logical 
gates. The procedure is repeated until all events have been fully 
developed, i. e. the basic events are reached. 
3) Validation of the Diagram: For each gate used all inputs must be both 
necessary and sufficient to produce the output event. If this is not the case 
then the diagram will not be valid for probability analysis. 
Similarly a set of rules were devised for the construction of the consequence diagram 
which show a certain degree of similarity to those used for the construction of an 
event tree: 
1) Definition of a Critical Event: The starting point is an examination of all 
relevant operating conditions with reference to a definition of a critical 
event, i_e an event that initiates a certain sequence of events to occur. 
2) Consequence Diagram development: A logical clearing-up of 
connections between events and conditions is carried out in order to 
determine possible consequences. For each sub-system/component only 
two states are normally taken into account, correct and incorrect 
functioning. Given a critical event certain subsystems/components will be 
activated. The consequence diagram is developed by evaluating the state 
of the system depending on whether these subsystems/components 
function correctly or not. 
3) Graphical Symbols: The difference between the event tree structure and 
the consequence diagram of the cause-consequence structure is the 
graphical symbols used. Using these symbols forces the analyst to follow 
up and present all possible sequences. 
91 
Nielsen's work was further developed in the late 1970's by Taylor, a researcher at 
RISO. The construction process for a cause-consequence diagram was detailed in 
Taylor's work on creating an effective interlock design for a chemical plant (ref. 42). 
Taylor stated that following the identification of a critical event the consequences of 
that event should be traced along the plant component interconnections. At each step, 
as a new component is encountered, all of the possible further events are evaluated 
depending on the state of the component, i. e. working, failed, open or closed. The 
result is an event tree, the consequence part of the cause-consequence diagram. 
In addition to the rules for the construction of the cause-consequence diagram Nielsen 
outlined a three step procedure for the correct accident analysis of a nuclear system 
and in 1974 extended it to a seventeen step procedure. The cause-consequence 
diagram, or cause-consequence chart, is an integral part of the cause-consequence 
analysis. It should be noted that a cause-consequence analysis represents the entire 
process of identifying the relevant accident causes and their consequences and not 
simply the analysis. 
5.3 Construction Example 
To illustrate the construction of a cause-consequence diagram, using the rules outlined 
in section 5.2, a simplified domestic hot water system depicted in figure 5.5 can be 
used. In this system the gas valve is operated by a temperature measuring device. The 
gas valve operates the burner in a full-on or full-off mode with a constantly lit pilot 
light providing the ignition source. Water temperature control is achieved by the 
controller opening the main gas valve when the temperature drops below the preset 
limit. The burner ignites and heats the water. When the upper temperature limit is 
reached the gas valve is closed. As a safety precaution a relief valve is included in the 
system configuration which opens when the pressure reaches 100psi. In the situation 
where the temperature limit is exceeded the tank pressure will rise and could result in 
tank rupture. It is assumed that the tank will rupture if the pressure exceeds 100psi. 
The component functions and failure modes are listed in table 5.1. 
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COLD WATER 
RELIEF VALVE 
1 
CONTROLLER SENSOR 
MONITORING 
L DEVICE TANK 
" 
GAS 
PILOT LIGHT 
VALVE 
Figure 5.5 Domestic Hot Water System 
COMPONENT FUNCTION FAILURE MODE AND 
EFFECT 
GAS VALVE Provide gas to burner Fails open: Continual Gas 
supply: GVO 
Fails closed; No gas supply: 
GVC 
CONTROLLER Controls the gas valve Failed Low: Closes valve 
when temp is below max: CL 
Failed High: Fails to close 
valve when high temp: CH 
SENSOR Detects temperature of Failed Low: Detects false high 
water water temp: SL 
Failed High: Fails to detect 
high water tem ; SH 
RELIEF VALVE Safety valve used to Failed Closed: High pressure 
decrease pressure in tank in tank but valve fails closed: 
RVC 
Table 5.1 Component Function and Failure Modes for Domestic Hot Water System 
The critical event for the domestic water system is that the pressure exceeds 100psi 
causing the tank to rupture. Having identified the critical event the next stage in the 
construction process is to identify all possible causes of the event. A pressure increase 
to 100psi and above can only be achieved if the water is heated beyond its normal 
maximum temperature. There exists two situations which can cause this event. 
Firstly the gas valve can fail to close when instructed to by the controller and secondly 
the gas valve is not closed due to a failure within the temperature monitoring loop. 
The `cause' diagram depicted in figure 5.6 shows the causes of the pressure exceeding 
100psi. 
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Pressure 
exceeds 
100psi 
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to shut 
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L 
CSý 
CH 
TIZ 
Gas valve 
fails open 
GVO 
Figure 5.6 The Cause Digram for the critical event: 'Pressure Exceeds 100psi' 
Following the identification of the critical event and its causes, the final stage in the 
process of constructing a cause-consequence diagram is to develop the relevant 
consequences of the critical event on the system. For the domestic water system there 
exists only one safety feature, the relief valve. The consequences of the pressure 
exceeding 100 psi therefore depends on the functionality of the relief valve. A 
decision box is created which represents the correct functioning of the relief valve, i. e. 
relief valve opens. Following the NO outlet branch from the decision box indicates 
that the relief valve has failed closed. The effect of the relief valve failing to open is 
that the tank will rupture. Following the YES outlet branch, however, indicates that 
the relief valve has functioned correctly and results in a decreased pressure and no 
tank rupture. The decision box, representing the functionality of the relief valve, and 
its consequences make up the consequence part of the cause-consequence diagram 
(Figure 5.7). 
Relief Valve 
ns 
VO YES 
NR 
TR 
TR: Tank Rupture 
NR: No Rupture 
Figure 5.7 The Consequence Diagram for the critical event 'Pressure Exceeds 100psi' 
94 
The cause-consequence diagram representing the domestic hot water system is hence 
developed by the coupling of the cause diagram, figure 5.6, and the consequence 
diagram, figure 5.7, at the critical event comment box_ Figure 5.8 shows the cause- 
consequence diagram for the domestic hot water system. 
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Figure 5.8 Cause-Consequence Diagram for the domestic hot water system 
5.4 Quantitative Analysis of a Cause-Consequence Diagram 
Besides being used in connection with cause and consequence identification, the 
cause-consequence diagram offers systematic support for probabilistic modeling (ref. 
14). In 1971 Nielsen used a standby pump system to illustrate the analysis of the 
cause-consequence diagram method. The probability that a total loss of flow from the 
pump was calculated using integrals of the probability distribution functions. The 
cause diagram for the critical event was solved using FTA, as were the cause trees 
used to represent the NO outlet branches of the decision boxes. The inclusion of the 
delay symbol meant that some sequences included integration of the probability 
distribution function where a failure could occur in a certain time interval. In order to 
gain an expression to represent the event `No Flow' two calculations were made. 
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Firstly the probability of each sequence leading to the outcome `No Flow' was 
determined using the relevant time delays and integrals of the probability distribution 
functions. Following this all sequences that led to the outcome, `No flow', had their 
respective probabilities of occurrence summed together to yield the total probability of 
the event. The analysis of this dependent system is possible due to the inclusion of the 
delay symbol and the fact that the cause-consequence diagram can model events that 
occur in a particular sequence. Although the main advantage of the cause- 
consequence diagram technique can be seen as its ability to model dependent systems, 
it can also be used as an alternative method to the FTA technique for independent 
systems. 
5.4.1 Quantification of a System Containing Independent Failure Events 
The procedure for analysis of an independent system begins with the assignment of 
probabilities/frequencies to each outlet branch stemming from a decision box. 
Following this the probability of any one sequence is obtained by multiplication of the 
probabilities associated with each decision box in that sequence. The probability of 
any particular consequence is then obtained by the summation of the probability of 
each sequence that terminates in that consequence. This quantification process can be 
seen to be identical to the analysis procedure outlined in chapter 3 for the BDD 
method. To illustrate the quantification process of a system containing independent 
failures the cause-consequence diagram constructed in section 5.3 and shown in figure 
5.8 can be used. The probability of failure is equal to the probability of ending in the 
consequence `TR'. The probability of the sequence path leading to the consequence 
TR can be shown to be equal to: 
P(TR) = P(Critical Event). QRVc 
where the probability of the critical event is given by: 
P(Critical Event) =1-0 -QSH ). (1- Qcti )"(1-QGVO ) 
The probability of tank rupture via the cause-consequence analysis can be shown to be 
identical to that obtained from a FTA. The cause-consequence diagram method offers 
nothing more than an alternative representation of the system which contains 
independent failures. Hickling postulated that neither the cause-consequence analysis 
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method described for an independent system or the FTA method could model time 
dependent accident sequences (ref. 43). Hickling suggested, however, that the cause- 
consequence diagram method had features which could be used in order to model such 
time-dependent systems. 
5.4.2 Quantification of a System containing Dependent Failure Events 
A detailed analysis procedure for a system containing dependent failures was outlined 
in a paper that investigated the system failure for a 2-unit standby system with 
imperfect switching (ref. 41). The system comprised three parts, an operative unit, a 
standby unit and a switching unit, which is used to bring the standby unit into action 
following the failure of the operative unit. The cause-consequence diagram, with no 
repair, is depicted in figure 5.9. In order to find the probability that the system failed 
during the time interval 0 to T the probability of sequence 1,2 and 3 had to be 
determined. It can be noted that the critical event for the cause-consequence diagram 
shown in figure 5.9 does not have a cause diagram to describe its failure causes. This 
is because the critical event, A fails in time tl, can only be caused by A failing. 
The probability that sequence I occurs is given by: The probability that A fails in time 
tj and the operator fails to switch to the standby unit B: 
Psi(T) = k. FA(T) 
where k is the probability that the operator fails to switch and FA(T) is the cumulative 
failure distribution for the component A, where A can fail any time between 0 and T 
to cause system failure during the time interval 0 to T. 
The probability of sequence 2 is given by: The probability that A fails in time tj, the 
operator switches to the standby component B but B has failed while in standby. 
PS2(T) =k 
JJA 
(t, ). SB (t1)dtl 
where k is the probability that the operator performs the switching action successfully 
and is equal to (1-k)_ 
The term f (t) represents the probability density function for time to failure of 
component A and SB(t) is the cumulative failure distribution for the standby unit B. 
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Figure 5.9 Cause-Consequence Diagram for Standby System 
Similarly the probability of sequence 3 is identified. The sequence occurs if 
component A fails in time t1, the operator switches to the available standby, 
component B, which then fails prior to time T. 
Ps3(T) - kJ1n(t. ). (1-SB(11)). FB(T -t, )dt, 
It can be noted that the expression given by Nielsen and Runge for sequence 3 models 
a dependent failure as the order in which the events occur is relevant. Component B 
must be available before it can fail on-line. This dependency was modeled by 
manipulation of the cumulative density function, FB(t), where FB(T-tl) indicates that 
component B fails at some point between time tj and T. This calculation procedure, 
however, cannot be derived from inspection of the cause-consequence diagram for the 
standby system. This highlights one of the fundamental weaknesses with the cause- 
consequence diagram method as an analyst would not know how to quantify the 
system from the diagram alone. In this case the quantification procedure was 
developed independently of the diagram. 
98 
In addition to the non-repairable case Nielsen & Runge investigated the repairable 
case. The analysis of the system was complex and only an approximation to the 
probability of failure was given. It was stated that one of the problems with the 
analysis procedure used was that the procedure did not account for the importance of 
relevant time delays in the system. For example the same probability was given to the 
action of switching regardless of whether it took 1 minute or 3 hours to switch. A 
switching action that takes an extended period of time is equivalent to no switching 
action at all. Such features were not incorporated in Nielsen's quantification of the 
switching system. 
In 1975 Nielsen, Platz and Runge used the cause-consequence diagram method to 
analyse a redundant protection system (ref. 44). The accident analysis performed 
asked the question: "Does a given protection system perform the required function 
under the relevant conditions? ". A cause-consequence diagram was used to provide 
an answer. The protection system analysed was a core spray system in a nuclear 
boiling-water reactor. The system was used to prevent the fuel core from overheating 
given a loss of primary coolant. The system consisted of 2 identical core spray 
systems, A and B, each of 100% capacity. Therefore failure occurred when both core 
spray systems had failed to function. The configuration of the system can be seen in 
figure 5.10. The blacked out valves indicate normally closed motorised valves and the 
valves labelled `c' are non-return valves. 
In each system a pump, (P1, P2) takes suction from the suppression pool and coolant 
there flows to a nozzle through a series of valves. The individual cooling system, A, 
can be considered as 2 subsystems, Al and A2, where Al contains: F2, V 1, P 1, C 1, 
V2, V6, V4, V3 and A2 contains: V5 and C2. Similarly BI contains: F1, V7, P2, C3, 
V8, V9, V10 and B2 contains: VI1 and C4. 
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Two main failure modes were identified that would cause the overall failure of either 
of the two core spray systems: 
i) The system is unavailable when a demand is present. 
ii) The system is available but fails before the required operating time to is 
over. 
The probability of system failure was given as the probability that the system was 
unavailable given a demand for a core spray OR that the core spray is established but 
stops before the required operating time is over. The cause-consequence diagram was 
constructed from the critical event loss of coolant and is given in figure 5.11. For this 
system it was assumed that the subsystem A2 and B2 could not fail once activated, 
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Figure 5.10 Configuration of a Core Spray System 
due to the fact that the components contained within these are passive. The cause- 
consequence diagram was hence constructed by inspecting the availability of A2 and 
B2 first. 
The quantification of Pu, the unavailability of the system given a demand, was 
obtained via the summation of the probability of 4 sequence paths terminating at the 
outcome `NA'. As no dependencies existed between any of the subsystems, Al, A2, 
B1 or B2, Pu was obtained from the cause-consequence diagram as: 
PU = PA2(t)-PB2(t) + PA 1 (t)- PB2 (t) -PB I 
(t) +P 
A2 
(t) 
-PB2(t) - 
PA I (t) 
+PBI(t). PAI(t) Ps2(t)"PA2(t) 
where Pi(t) represents the probability that subsystem i cannot be activated at time t and 
P- (t) implies the complement of Pi(t). 
As a measure for the unavailability of the total cooling system, A and B, the average 
probability of simultaneous failure of A and B within T was determined, therefore: 
lr 
Puav jPa(t)-PB(t) dt =Z 
JP1dt 
T 
The probability that given a demand the core spray system was available but failed 
before time to, Po, required a time-dependent quantification. Nielsen identified 5 
sequences that terminated in the consequence: `Failure of core spray before the 
required operating time'. Po was obtained via the summation of the 5 sequence paths 
probability which lead to the outcome `S' on the cause-consequence diagram. The 
quantification technique used was identical to that used in the switching example 
given in (ref. 42). For example the probability of sequence c, given a demand at time 
t, was shown to equal: 
10 
Probability of Sequence C= PAZ (t) PB2 (t) P8, (t) PA, (t) "j fBI (ti )QAl (t, )dt, 
0 
where sequence C is represented by A2, B2 and B1 being available given a demand, 
with subsystem Al not available and B1 fails before Al is repaired. The term 
fB, (ti)dt. represents the probability that subsystem B fails in the time interval t +ti 
and Q., (t) is the cumulative function of time to repair for subsystem Al therefore 
QM (t, ) represents the cumulative probability that A is not repaired in the time t+ti _ 
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Nielsen concluded that the cause-consequence diagram was a tool that could provide 
efficient qualitative and quantitative analysis. However, as with the switching 
example, the quantification of the cause-consequence diagram was completed 
independently of the diagram and hence an analyst would not know how to quantify 
the system using the diagram alone. 
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Figure 5.11 Cause-Consequence Diagram for the Core Spray System. 
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An alternative quantification technique was postulated by Hickling for analysing time- 
dependent failures. Hickling stated that the cause-consequence diagram had the 
ability to model processes that extended over a period of time by using feedback 
loops, i. e. exit paths from decision boxes are permitted to connect to decision boxes 
which have already been `visited' in a sequence. A system where the order of failure 
is important, i. e. a sequentially operating system, can be modelled using such 
feedback loops. For illustration Hickling presented a plant which comprised of two 
units: a containment system and a leak detection/isolation system. He postulated that 
if the containment system failed prior to the failure of the leak detection/isolation 
system then the isolation system would shut down the plant. However, if the isolation 
system failed first then until the fault is detected and repaired any failure of the 
containment system would cause plant failure. The cause-consequence diagram, 
containing feedback loops, for this system is shown in figure 5.12. By inspection of 
figure 5.12 it can be seen that Hickling uses the YES outlet branch to symbolise 
failure. For this type of construction process the fault trees representing the failure 
cause of the decision box would be attached to the YES outlet branch instead of the 
NO outlet branch as with Nielsen's work. 
Inclusion of the feedback loops implies that the input to a decision box in one period 
of time depends on the output in the previous period of time, i. e. time-dependent 
modelling. Hickling stated for such systems quantification could not be achieved by 
multiplication of the outlet branch probabilities in a given sequence, as before, as 
component failures are no longer independent. Instead each decision box has an 
associated failure rate and the expected number of times by time t that the system 
enters a certain state can be calculated. 
Hickling stated that the expected number of times, by time t, that the system enters a 
dangerous state, ED(t), is found by determining the rate at which the state is entered, 
RD(t), integrated over the time period 0 to t. The failure rate for the containment and 
isolation systems were defined as A(t) and Xi(t) respectively and the rate at which the 
dangerous state was entered was given as: 
RD(t) 
- 
PN(t)"ki(t) 
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and therefore 
r 
ED(t) =j PN(t). Ai(t)dt 
0 
As with the quantification procedure described for the switching standby system, the 
quantification of this system could not be deduced from the cause-consequence 
diagram structure. 
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Figure 5.12 Cause-Consequence Diagram for Containment-Isolation Plant System. 
Hickling also highlighted a less complex analysis where the failure and repair rates 
were deemed constant and the measure of interest became the probability of reaching 
an outcome, i. e. Escape to atmosphere. Using this approach the probability of ending 
in a dangerous state was given by: 
ED(oo) = EN(oo). 
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More usefully, following solution of the coupled equations, the probability of ending 
in the state, escape to the atmosphere, was found to be: 
EEA(°°) 'ý` 
This analysis approach holds similarities to that of the Markov analysis methods. 
5.5 Further Applications of the Cause-Consequence Diagram Method 
Since the development of the cause-consequence diagram method a number of studies 
have used it to perform risk and reliability assessments. In 1977 the method was used 
to analyse an instrumental air system (ref. 45). The cause-consequence analysis 
highlighted that there was a weak link in the `dryer section' of the system and hence 
the method not only performed a quantitative analysis but also identified an 
advantageous design modification. In the same year the method was used to analyse a 
interlock design (ref. 42)_ Interlocks are switch-like devices intended to prevent 
relatively simple procedural errors. By using the cause-consequence diagram method 
it was shown that the inclusion of interlocks produced a safer more reliable system. 
More recently the technique was used for the analysis of an automatic burner system 
(ref. 13). The burner formed part of an experimental rig at the British Gas research 
station in the midlands. The research showed that a cause-consequence diagram was 
capable of dealing with `complex events', i. e. events that may occur in different states 
in the same sequence. The quantification procedure used, however, was not detailed 
in the report. Since the late 1980's no further investigation into the cause- 
consequence diagram technique has occurred. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The user of a completed plant will largely judge its reliability performance on the 
costs resulting from faults in terms of loss of production, damage to the plant and 
injury to staff (ref. 42). It is therefore important to develop systematic methods for 
cause-consequence accident analysis, relating potential modes of failure to the 
ultimate consequences for the system. The cause-consequence diagram method 
outlined in this chapter can be seen to be such a method. One of the advantageous 
features of this method is that all possible event sequences are identified and the 
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analyst is forced to study all eventualities following a given critical event. Although 
this can be achieved via the use of the event tree analysis tool, the cause-consequence 
method can model complex events which sometimes render the event tree technique 
inefficient. The main feature of this model is therefore that it can successfully model 
dependent failure events. 
Several authors have used the technique as the main analysis tool for a safety 
assessment. The inclusion of a time delay symbol allows time-dependent failures to 
be modelled. Two alternative approaches for analysing time-dependent failures have 
been outlined in this chapter. The documentation, however, of the quantification of 
the cause-consequence diagram is limited and a generalised analysis method or even 
rigorous definitions of the meaning of the symbols to enable diagram quantification is 
yet to be developed. In both papers outlined in this chapter the quantification was 
performed independently to the cause-consequence diagram structure. The cause- 
consequence diagram, in its present form, can therefore be seen as a tool which 
provides a thorough documentation of the entire failure logic of the system. 
The cause-consequence diagram method has great potential for analysing dependent 
failure events and due to the construction being based on sequence the technique 
could be used effectively to represent a system that contains sequential failures. The 
technique has also been shown to be capable of representing systems containing 
standby failure events. Developments, however, in the use of the diagram to perform 
quantification analysis is required if this technique is to compete with the traditional 
methods such as FTA and Markov analysis. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS WITH DEPENDENT FAILURE EVENTS 
6.1 Introduction 
For the reliability analysis of industrial systems the FTA technique is generally 
employed. As discussed in section 1.5.1.1 one of the reasons for its popularity is that 
the method represents the failure logic of the system in a tree structure, which 
provides a good documentation of the way the failure logic was developed. In 
addition to this the technique is extremely efficient and accurate when analysing 
systems containing independent failure events. When independence is not satisfied 
alternative approaches, such as Markov methods, are required if an accurate result is 
to be obtained. Markov methods can be utilised to analyse sequential and standby 
failures, however, they do not represent the system failure logic as intuitively as a fault 
tree and are therefore not as appealing to reliability engineers. A further disadvantage 
of the Markov techniques, as outlined in chapter 4, is that the size of the state- 
transition diagram, and therefore the number of equations requiring solution, increases 
rapidly as the number of components in the analysis increases. 
To enable the analysis of systems with dependencies and retain the advantages of both 
the FTA and Markov techniques an investigation into the development of a combined 
model was initiated. The development of such a model was achieved, in part, by 
Dugan & Gulati (ref. 47). Dugan & Gulati embedded a Markov analysis option within 
a fault tree framework thus retaining the structure of the fault tree whilst enhancing 
the accuracy of the result. 
Extending the work initiated by Dugan & Gulati two types of dependent failures have 
been investigated. The two dependent failure types are sequential failures, where the 
order of failure is relevant, and standby failures, where the failure probability is 
conditional on whether the component is in standby or on-line. 
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This chapter describes the development procedure of a new assessment method that 
combines the most advantageous features of both the fault tree method and the 
Markov method. In this way systems containing both independent and dependent 
components can be analysed accurately and efficiently and thus the superiority of the 
new method can be highlighted. The developments discussed in this Chapter are 
summarised in (ref. 46). 
6.1.2 Fault Tree Analysis Program 
Prior to the development of a model to analyse fault trees containing dependent failure 
events a fault tree program was created to analyse independent fault trees. The 
general algorithm depicted in figure 6.1 outlines the procedure of the FTA program. 
'-ats file and `_aqd file are 
created which represent the faul 
tree structure and the failure 
probabilities of the basic events 
respectively 
PROGRAM EXECUTED 
Program reads in '-ats file and 
creates NAMES, OUTEVENT, 
INEVENT, GTYPE, BEVENT 
Program determines minimal cu 
sets using a MOCUS algorithm 
and Boolean reduction 
Probability of TOP event 
occurence is detemined using 
the minimal cut set upperbound 
approximation 
Figure 6.1 Summary of the FTA program 
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Initially the fault tree structure is stored in a *. ats data file. The general layout of an 
*. ats file is: 
No. OF GATE INPUTS BY NAME 
NAME GATE TYPE KVG/NVG INPUTS No. OF BASIC max of 9 inputs 8 
8 Characters Long 2 spaces 4 Characters Long 3 Characters Long 2 Integers Long EVENT INPUTS charc(ers long with 2 
2 Integers Long spaces between 
each 
The `NAME' column corresponds to the label given to a gate or basic event. The gate 
type represents the type of gate under inspection, where only OR, AND and VOTE 
gates were considered. The fourth column is used to represent a VOTE gate where 
KVG indicates the number of gate inputs that need to fail out of the possible NVG 
inputs to cause the VOTE gate to occur. The number of gate inputs and basic event 
inputs are shown in the 5 `h and 6 `h columns respectively with their names given in the 
final column. 
To illustrate the creation of the *. ats file the simple fault tree shown in figure 6.2 can 
be used. 
TOP 
PL 
G1 
AB 
Figure 6.2 Simple Fault Tree Structure 
The *_ats file to represent this fault tree is: 
TOP OR 0 01 1G1C 
GI AND 0 00 2A B 
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Following the execution of the program the *. ats file is read in one line at a time. 
Various arrays are created in order to store the fault tree structure in an integer form 
which is easy to manipulate. The arrays created are listed in table 6.1. 
Name of Array Function of Array 
NAMES (1d Character array) Stores the character label of the gate/basic 
event 
OUTEVENT(1d Integer array) Stores the integer code for all gates. The 
integer code corresponds to the gates 
position in NAMES. 
INEVENT(2d Integer array) Stores all inputs to a gate. The integer 
code corresponds to the events position in 
NAMES. 
GTYPE(1d Integer array) Stores integer code for gate type. OR= 1, 
AND =2, VOTE =3 
I able 6.1 Arrays created to store a Fault Tree Structure. 
For the fault tree shown in figure 6.2 the following arrays would be created: 
TOP 
GI 
NAMES =C OUTEVENT = 
(1) 
2 
INEVENT =I425I GTYPE = 
(1) 
2A J 
B 
As detailed in section 2.4 the qualitative analysis of a fault tree involves the 
identification of the minimal cut sets of the system. The basic events of the fault tree 
structure are determined by comparison of OUTEVENT and INEVENT. Basic events 
are only present in INEVENT whereas all gates, apart from the top gate, are stored in 
both OUTEVENT and INEVENT. Following identification the basic events are 
stored in BEVENT, which is a 1-dimensional integer array. Based on the MOCUS 
algorithm given in (ref. 6) an algorithm was created to identify the minimal cut sets of 
a fault tree. The algorithm functions on the basis that if the fault tree consists of OR 
gates then the number of minimal cut sets will increase whereas if the structure 
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contains AND gates the order of the minimal cut sets will increase. The program sets 
up a 2-dimensional array CUTSETS and stores the inputs to the top event in the array 
using the following rules: 
1) If the gate is an `OR' gate then the gate inputs are stored vertically in the array 
2) If the gate is an `AND' gate then the gate inputs are stored horizontally in the array. 
The array is then scanned from the top row downwards and any gate encountered is 
developed using the rules above. Following the expansion of all gates into their 
respective basic event inputs, the cut sets of a system are represented in CUTSETS. 
The minimal cut sets are identified by removing all repeated basic events in the same 
cut set and then by removing non-minimal cut sets i. e. cut sets in which all 
components do not necessarily all need to fail to cause the top event. 
In order to produce a quantitative analysis the probability of failure for each 
component is required. The probability of failure is entered, as with the fault tree 
structure, via a data file. The *. aqd file is created by the user and is of the form: 
NAME 
Integer Probability (Q) Failure Rate() 
Repair Rate (/1 ) 
15 double precisi 
Inspection Interval Mean time to repair 
8 Characters Long 
Code 15 double precision 15 double precision 
spaces 
(e) Z 
2 integers spaces spaces 8 double precision 8 double precision 
The data file is scanned one line at a time and depending on the integer value in the 
second column, either the probability of failure is determined and stored in the 
element PBEV(i), which corresponds to the component BEVENT(i), or the failure and 
repair rate of the component i is stored in RATES(i, I) and RATES(i, 2) respectively. 
Table 6.2 shows the integer values that can be used in the *. aqd file and the codes 
corresponding action- 
Using the multiplication law from probability theory the unavailability, QMýc;, for 
minimal cut set i is obtained and stored in PROB(i)_ The top event probability is then 
calculated using the minimal cut set upper bound given in equation (2.27). 
Integer Code Code Action 
0 Probability taken from 3` column in data 
file and stored in PBEV(i) 
1 Probability of failure for an unrevealed 
failure calculated using Q= +z and 
( 
2 J 
stored in PBEV(i) 
2 Probability of failure for a revealed failure 
event at steady-state calculated using 
A 
Q=+µ and stored in PBEV(i) 
3 Probability of failure for a revealed failure 
event at time t calculated 
using Q=A (1- e-(ý+')') and stored 
in PBEV(i) 
4 Probability of failure for a revealed failure 
event which is non-repairable, at time t 
calculated using Q= (1- e-A` ) 
5 Failure and Repair rates for component i 
stored in RATES(i, I) and RATES(i, 2) 
respectively 
Table 6.2 Integer Code for *. aqd Data File 
The qualitative and quantitative procedures can be illustrated using the fault tree 
shown in figure 6.2. As shown previously the *_ats file is converted into: 
TOP 
Gi 
NAMES =C OUTEVENT = 12I [NEVENT = 
(2 3 
5) 
A 
B 
The array CUTSETS is identified as: 
1l 
3 
GTYPE = 
(2J 
BEVENT =4 
5 
C 
CUTSETS= 
(3 
45 which 
is equivalent to lA B 
The cut sets are of a minimal form, therefore no reduction is required. The *. aqd file 
is created as: 
A00.004 
B00.0001 
C 00.005 
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Hence, 
0.00s 0.005 PBEV = 0.004 j and PROB = 
(00000004J 
0.0001 
Finally the top event unavailability is calculated as: 
QTOP = 1-[(1-PROB(1)). (1-PROB(2))] =0.005 
6.2 Sequential Failures 
Having created a program that can manipulate a fault tree structure the first of the two 
dependent failures was investigated. The area of sequential failures is not novel and a 
fault tree symbol exists that describes such failures. The Priority-And (PAND) gate, 
shown in figure 6.3, will result in the output event if the input events occur in the 
order in which they enter the gate, i. e. left to right. The top event in figure 6.3 will 
therefore occur if A fails first and B fails next. If B fails first and then A fails, the top 
event will not occur. 
TOP 
A ý/ 
Figure 6.3 The Priority-And Gate for a Fault Tree 
In traditional fault tree analysis this particular gate would be quantified by replacing 
the PAND gate with a normal AND gate, on the basis that this overestimates the 
probability. In order to produce an accurate quantification of the PAND gate a 
Markov model can be used. Following the construction procedure outlined in section 
4.3 the state-transition diagram for figure 6.3 can be developed and is depicted in 
figure 6.4. 
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The state with the simultaneous failure of A and B can be achieved through two 
different routes arriving at state 4 (S4) and state 5 (S5). The situation of A failing 
first, A: Fl, and B failing second, B: F2, is represented by state 4. It is this state that is 
the output event to the PAND gate. For an industrial system it is realistic to assume 
that when all components have failed or when system failure has occurred, all failed 
components will be repaired and the system brought back on-line. This situation is 
not represented by the Markov diagram of the PAND gate illustrated in figure 6.4. In 
order to include this assumption the repair transition rate, out of state 4, the state 
representing system failure, and state 5, the state where all components have failed but 
the top event has not occurred, required derivation. The repair rate for component i, if 
considered constant, is equivalent to the inverse of the mean time to repair (MTTR) 
for component i, i. e: 
MTTRj or 
MTTR; _- 
Similarly, the repair rate for state i is given by the inverse of the mean time to repair 
state i. For state 4 and 5 in figure 6.4, the MTTR depends entirely on the type of 
maintenance team that is assumed to be available for the repair. Given the scenario 
that only one repair man is available the MTTR for state 4 and state 5 is represented 
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rIgure o. 4+ iviarKov representation of a two-input FAND (late 
by the summation of the MTTR for component A and the MTTR for component B, 
i. e. 
MTTRS4 = MITRA + MTTRß 
II 
/A PB 
fin + µR 
PAPB 
The repair rate for state 4 and state 5, for a system with I repair man, is hence given 
by the inverse of the MTTR, i. e. 
__ 
DAUB /APB 
uA+µ6 
µ5 
PA+PB 
Given the scenario that two repair men are available the MTTR for state 4 and state 5 
is represented by the maximum MTTR of component A or B, i. e. 
MTTR4 = Max{MTTRA, MTTRB} 
11 
=Max{-, 
I -} II 
Y`A 
' PB 
J 
The repair rate for state 4 and 5, for a system with two repair men, is given by the 
inverse of the MTTR for state 4 and 5 respectively, i. e. 
94 = Min{µA, µB}, µs = Min{µA, µB} 
A general formula can be derived to represent the situation where all failed 
components are repaired in one time period to produce a transition from a state where 
all components are failed, or a state which represents system failure, to a state where 
all components are working. For a system with only one repair man, the repair 
transition from a state representing all components in a failed mode, or a state 
representing system failure, is given by equation (6.1), where n is equal to the number 
of components in state i and j corresponds to the failed component in state i. For a 
system with n repair men, the repair transition from a state representing all 
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components in a failed mode, or a state representing system failure, is given by 
equation (6.2). 
R 
1_1 µý 
J-1 (6.1) 
-iiµj 
J= 
µ; = Min f g,...... It } (6.2) 
The Markov representation for the PAND gate with 2-input events, A and B, is hence 
transformed from figure 6.4 to figure 6.5, where p4 and 95 are determined using 
equation (6.1) or (6.2) depending on the type of maintenance team assumed for the 
system. 
6.2.1 Construction of the Markov Diagram for a PAND Gate 
Given a PAND gate with n inputs a general procedure had to be developed for the 
correct construction of the Markov diagram, which could be automated and therefore 
transparent to the user. Initially an investigation into the total number of states in a 
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Figure 6.5 New Markov representation for PAND Gate 
Markov diagram for a PAND gate with n inputs was completed. Table 63 shows the 
results obtained by investigating 2 to 6 basic event inputs into a PAND gate. 
Number of Basic Event inputs to PAND 
gate 
Total Number of states in the Markov 
diagram 
2 5 
3 16 
4 65 
5 326 
6 1957 
Table 6.3 Number of States in a Markov Diagram for a PAND gate with 2 to 6 input 
events 
An algorithm was required that, given the number of basic event inputs to a PAND 
gate, could produce the correct state-transition diagram. The development of any 
Markov diagram is a recursive process of identifying the number of failures that can 
occur from a newly created state. It was noted, from the 5 manually produced Markov 
diagrams, that the total number of states could be calculated from knowing the 
number of inputs to the PAND gate. Starting from the initial state, the working state, 
only one component failure was considered at a time and the result was the 
development of the number of new states at the next level. For each new level 
developed the number of failed components present in any one state increases by one. 
Therefore for level i the number of failed components in any state present in level i is 
equal to i-1. A general formula was created, equation 6.3, to determine the number of 
states in a level due to the states in the previous level of the Markov diagram, where 
the initial state resides in level 1 of the diagram. The development process stops when 
all the components in a state are failed, which can be shown to occur at level n+1. 
Number of states = (Number of states at level i-1) *( Number of working components in any 
at level i one state in level i-1) (6.3) 
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The determination of the number of states, at each level, in the Markov diagram is 
represented in figure 6.6. The total number of states, Ntotal, is given by equation 
(6.4). 
Figure 6.6 Development of the number of states in a Markov Diagram at each level 
R+I 
Ntotal = Number of states at level i (6.4) 
To illustrate the process of determining the total number of states the PAND gate 
shown in figure 6.7 can be utilised. 
TOP 
i 
i 
ABCD 
Figure 6.7 Example PAND gate with 4 inputs 
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The number of states at level 1 is equal to 1 as initially all components are assumed to 
be functioning correctly. There are 4 possible components that can fail, hence the 
number of states at level 2 is equal to 4, using equation (6.3). Similarly the number of 
states at level 3,4, and 5 can be calculated: 
Number of states at Level 3= 4*3 = 12 
Number of states at Level 4= 12*2 = 24 
Number of states at Level 5= 24* 1= 24 
Therefore the total number of states, using equation (6.4), can be calculated as: 
Ntotal =1+4+ 12 + 24 + 24 = 65, as shown in table 6.3. 
The failure sequence of the components in each state is identified using a similar 
process to that used for the determination of the total number of states in the diagram. 
An array, STATE, is created which has the dimensions Ntotal by Nbasic, where 
Nbasic is equal to the number of basic event inputs to the PAND gate. Each element 
in STATE(l, j) is initialised to equal 0, which symbolises that a component is working. 
Using the initial state the states in level 2 are created by changing, one at a time, each 
working component found in the initial state into a failed component. The `0' for 
each component is changed to a `1' to symbolise that the component has failed first 
and a new state is developed. For the fault tree in figure 6.7 the STATE array 
representing level 1 and 2 of the Markov diagram can be shown to be of the form: 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
STATE= 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 
which is equivalent to: 
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A: W 
BW 
LEVEL 1 C: W 
D: W 
A: F1 A_W AM :W 
g=W B: F1 B-W :W LEVEL 2 
C=W C: W C: F7 :W 
D: W D D: W D: F1 
The number of states, previously identified for level 2, is then used in the 
determination of the states in level 3. Each state in level 2 is taken one at a time and 
all working components failed, one at a time, to produce the states in level 3. All 
working components are changed from a `0' to a `2' to symbolise that the component 
has failed second. This process is continued and the n+lth level is created by 
changing the working components in the states present in level n from `0' to `n' to 
represent that those components have failed last in the sequence. 
As STATE is being created the transition matrix for the Markov diagram is also 
developed. Whenever a component in any state is changed from a working 
component to a failed component a link is created between the two states and the 
failure rate of the relevant component is stored in the array TRANS(i, j). The ith row 
represents the state where the component was working and jth element represents the 
new state where the component is failed. The failure rate for component i is entered 
via the *. aqd file and stored in the array RATES(i, I), where the first column indicates 
the failure rate. The repair rate of component i is placed in RATES(i, 2), where the 
second column indicates the repair rate of a component i. 
In order to complete the Markov diagram the appropriate repair rates also have to be 
entered into TRANS. The repair rates are not determined when developing STATE 
but are found after the Markov diagram construction is completed. Each state is taken 
in turn and all Nbasic components investigated. For a working state that does not 
contain all Nbasic components in a failed mode, if a component is identified as being 
failed then it is repaired regardless of what order it failed in. The remaining 
components in the same state are then studied as the order of failure may now change 
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with the repair of one of the basic events. Rule 6.1 was developed to ensure that 
following the repair of a failed component the order of failure for the remaining basic 
events was modified correctly: 
Rule 6 1: For a working state with less than Nbasic failed components: 
If any component is repaired then all other components, if their order of 
failure is greater than that of the component being repaired, must be reduced 
by 1. Alternatively if their order offailure is less than that of the repaired 
component then their order offailure is unchanged 
For example say the state under inspection had the form: 
(1 23 0) 
If the first component was repaired then a transition would exist, governed by the 
repair rate of the first component, between the state above and the state: 
(o 12 o) 
For a state which represents system failure or a state containing Nbasic failed 
components the system is brought back on-line by repairing all failed components. 
Rule 6.2 was developed to ensure that the system was repaired correctly. 
Rule 6.2: For a failed state or a state with Nbasic failed components. 
If state i is a failed state or all components in state i are failed, then all 
components are re-set to a working mode, regardless of their order offailure. 
For example say the state under inspection had the form: 
(1 23 4) 
As all components have failed each one is repaired and a transition exists, governed 
by either equation (6.1) or (6.2) depending on the maintenance assumption for the 
system, between the state above and the initial state: 
(0 00 0) 
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The code identifies the state that, following the repair of a component, the system 
would travel into and stores it in the array REPAIR. The array STATE is then 
searched and the state identical to that stored in REPAIR is identified and the 
appropriate repair rate is placed in TRANS. 
In order to solve the state-transition diagram the diagonal elements in TRANS must be 
set equal to the negative of the sum of the remaining elements in the corresponding 
row, as postulated in section 4.5.1. 
To illustrate the process of determining the Markov diagram and the state-transition 
matrix the two-input PAND gate shown in figure 6.3 can be used. As with the 
independent fault tree analysis outlined in section 6.1.2, the fault tree structure is 
entered via a *. ats file. The gate type label for a PAND gate in the *. ats file is set 
equal to PAND and the numerical code used by the program to represent a PAND gate 
is 4. For figure 6.3 the *. ats file has the following form: 
TOP PANDO 00 2A B 
The number of states at level 1 is equal to 1 and using equation (6.3) the number of 
states at level 2 and 3 can be shown to be equal to two respectively. Therefore the 
array level is equal to: 
1 
LEVEL =2 and Ntotal equals 5. 
2 
Initially all elements in the first row of the array STATE are set equal to 0 and using 
the first state, STATE is created and equals: 
00 
10 
STATE = 01 
12 
21 
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where component A is represented by the 1St column and B by the second. The 
transition rate matrix is also filled with the appropriate failure rates: 
o '. A ÄR 0 0 
0 0 0 Ae 0 
TRANS = 0 0 0 0 AA 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
Each row in STATE is then inspected and those that contain failed components are 
repaired, using rule 6.1 or 6.2, and the appropriate repair rate is stored in TRANS. For 
example taking the second row in state: 
(1 0) 
It can be seen that the first element represents a failed component. Repair of the failed 
component leads to the state: 
(0 0) 
which is identical to the state represented by the ls` row of STATE. Therefore the 
repair rate of component A is stored in TRANS(2,1). This procedure is repeated for 
all states and the repair rate from state 4 and state 5 is determined using equation 
(6.2), as 2 repair men are assumed to be available. The transition matrix becomes: 
0 AA A. ß 0 0 
µA 0 0 ;B 0 
TRANS = µB 0 0 0 ; LA 
min{ji , µB} 0 0 0 0 
min{µ, , µB} 0 0 0 0 
The transition rate matrix is completed by setting all the diagonal elements of the 
matrix equal to the negative of the sum of the remaining elements in that row. Hence 
TRANS becomes: 
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-(AA +AB) 
µA 
TRANS = µB 
min{, u4, µ6} 
, 
min {µau, } 
A. 
q 
Al 
0 
00 
00 
0 
Ag 
0 
- (min{µ4, P6}) 
0 
The Markov diagram for this example is shown in figure 6.8. 
0 
0 
0 
- (min {µµ8}) 
Figure 6.8 Markov Diagram for the STATE array describing a two-input PAND gate 
6.2.2 Quantification of a Markov Diagram for a PAND Gate 
The various techniques that can be utilised to quantify a Markov diagram were 
discussed in-depth in Chapter 4. In section 4.5.1 it was shown that the linear 
differential equations could be written in matrix form as: 
fit), P2 fit),..... Pn (t) = [PI (r), P2 (t)....... P,, (0)] [A] 
where A is the state-transition rate matrix, n is equal to the total number of states in 
the Markov diagram and P-0 as t -3 oo . As outlined 
in section 4.5.1, there exists 
several different techniques that can be used to produce a solution for a Markov 
diagram depending on whether a steady-state solution or transient solution is required. 
The numerical technique of Gauss elimination was chosen as the tool to be used to 
analyse the system of linear simultaneous equations, which results when a steady-state 
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solution is required. Prior to the application of the Gauss elimination procedure the 
transition rate matrix requires modification. The matrix must be transposed in order 
to represent the differential equations, all of which become simultaneous equations as 
P -* 0 as t In addition to transposing the transition rate matrix a further 
equation is required before a solution can be determined, as outlined in section 4.5.2. 
The sum of the probabilities of residing in each of the states in the Markov diagram by 
definition must equal unity. The additional equation is therefore: 
PI+P2+.... Pn =1 
As outlined in section 4.5.3, several different techniques can be used to produce a 
time-dependent solution. Such techniques range from the use of eigenvectors to 
numerical analysis methods such as Runge-Kutta. For the purpose of my investigation 
a NAG routine was chosen that could solve a system of stiff first-order ordinary 
differential equations using a variable-order, variable-step method implementing the 
Backward Differentiation Formula (BDF). This method was chosen predominately 
for its application to systems which possess a degree of stiffness, i. e. where the repair 
and failure rate of components differ greatly in magnitude. 
Following the completion of either the Gauss elimination program or the NAG 
routine, the array SOLN(i) is created which either contains the steady-state 
probabilities of being in state i or the probability of residing in state i at time t. The 
final step in the quantification procedure involves the identification of the failed states 
in the Markov diagram. For the sequential failure problem the failed state depends 
entirely on the order of inputs to the PAND gate. To identify the failed state in the 
Markov diagram each state is inspected and the state found which represents the 
components failing in the same order as they entered the PAND gate. Following the 
identification of the failed state, i, the steady-state probability of system unavailability 
or the probability of system failure at time t, is given by SOLN(i). 
The steady-state quantification procedure can be illustrated by using the Markov 
diagram developed for the two-input PAND gate shown in figure 6.8. Let component 
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A and B have failure rates 1x 10-5,2x 104 and repair rates 0.06,0.05 respectively. The 
transition rate matrix then becomes: 
(0.00021) 0.00001 0.0002 0 0 
0.06 - (0.0602) 0 0.0002 0 
TRANS = 0.05 0 - (0.05001) 0 0.00001 
0.05 0 0 - (0.05) 0 
0.05 0 0 0 -(0.05), / 
which is modified to represent the system of linear simultaneous equations used to 
obtain a steady-state solution: 
0.00021 
0.00001 
0.0002 
TRANS =0 
1 
0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0 
-0.0602 0 0 0 0 
0 -0.05001 0 0 0 
0.0002 0 - 0.05 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 
Following the execution of the Gauss elimination program the array SOLN was 
developed and was equal to: 
0.99585 
1.65x10 4 
SOLN = 4x10-3 
6.6x10-7 
8x10 7 
There exists only one failed state for this example and the code identified that as state 
4. The steady-state probability for the two-input PAND gate was therefore equal to: 
Qsys(°°) = SOLN(4) = 6.6x10-7 
The general procedure for analysing a PAND gate with n inputs is depicted in figure 
6.9. 
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Enter fault tree structure in '-ats file and 
failure data in `. aqd file 
Determine the number of states at 
each level using Nbasic and Eqn_ 
(6.3) 
Determine failure characteristics of 
each component in each state using 
LEVEL. Set up TRANS 
Complete TRANS by including repair Modify matrix ready for analysis. H 
Solve for steady-state using Gauss 
transitions using Rule 61 & 62. I Transpose, add row of 1's, column Elimination. Produce steady-state Diagonal terms= -(sum of all other 0, for steady-state solution of unavailability identifying the failed terms in row) state, i, then Qsys = SOLN(i) 
Figure 6.9 Procedure for analysing a PAND gate with n inputs. 
6.2.3 Modification to the Sequential Analysis Procedure 
By inspection of the Markov diagram developed for a PAND gate with 2 input events 
it was noted that there existed 5 states, one more state than the state-transition diagram 
for 2 components where the order of failure is irrelevant. Inspection of table 6.3 
illustrates that by considering the order of failure a further increase in the size of the 
Markov diagram is apparent. The main disadvantage of using the Markov method for 
system analysis is that the size of the diagram increases rapidly as the number of 
components grow. This disadvantage is magnified further when the sequence of 
failure is considered. The Markov technique can be seen to be most efficient when 
dealing with a small number of dependent components, i. e. 2 basic event inputs to a 
PAND gate results in the size of the Markov diagram increasing by one state only. 
It was therefore decided that an investigation should be completed into the 
modification of a PAND gate with more than two inputs. Initially an attempt was 
made to split the PAND gate into smaller fault tree structures which could then be 
analysed separately. It was decided that components entering a PAND gate would be 
analysed in pairs. This clause was included so that following the solution of the 
PAND gate a new `super' event could be easily developed which described the failure 
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characteristics of the subtree containing the sequential gate. In order to develop a new 
super event, which would be an input to an dependent gate, the following reliability 
parameters required derivation: 
The probability of failure for the Top event, QTE 
The failure rate of the Top event, 
ATE 
The repair rate of the Top event, RTE 
Using a two-input PAND gate these parameters can be derived easily. As the 5 state 
Markov diagram contains only one failed state the repair rate for the system, ITE, and 
the probability of failure, QTE, can be obtained directly from the analysis of the 
diagram. The repair rate for a system, as stated in section 6.2, is equivalent to the 
inverse of the mean time to repair (MTTR), i. e. 
1 
its _ MTTRS 
For any Markov diagram the MTTR is equal to: 
MTTR = -1 transitions out of failed state 
As the 5 state Markov diagram for a PAND gate, with 2 inputs, contains only one 
failed state, i. e. state 4 in figure 6.8, the MTTR is given as: 
-1 MTTR = 
a44 
where a44 represents the transitions out of the failed state. The repair rate of the 
system is hence: 
µTE = -a44 (6.5) 
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The probability of system failure for the 5 state Markov diagram is simply the 
probability of residing in state 4 at time t, i. e. 
QTE(t) = Q4(t) (6.6) 
and for steady state this is equal to: 
QTE Q4(oo) (6.7) 
The remaining parameter, XTE , can 
be obtained from pTE and QTE for a steady state 
solution In chapter 2a steady-state approximation for the system's unavailability was 
given as: 
A 
Q_µ 
+A 
Hence an expression for XTE is derived as: 
XTE_QTE'PTE (6.8) 
(1-QTE) 
For a transient solution, XTE is obtained via the derivation of the system's 
unconditional failure intensity, WTE, from the Markov diagram. It can be shown that 
the unconditional failure intensity for a Markov diagram is obtained by multiplying 
the probability of being in a working state i, Q;, by the transition rate which transports 
the system into a failed state, Xj. Therefore, 
n 
WTE- lQiflllj 
=1 
(6.9) 
where n represents all working states that communicate with a failed state, j= 
component which fails to cause transition to failed state. The failure rate of the top 
event, ATE, is then found using equation (2.12). 
A 2-input PAND gate can therefore be expressed as a `super' event using equations 
(6.5)-(6.9). depending on whether a steady state or transient solution is required. To 
illustrate the procedure of taking input events to a PAND gate in pairs figure (6.10) 
can be used. 
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The fault tree structure is modified in order to produce a PAND gate with 2-input 
events. Figure 6.10 is changed to the form: 
Figure 6.11 Conversion of a three-input PAND gate to produce a 2-input 
PAND gate 
For figure 6.11 the PAND gate with inputs A and B is solved first. Following the 
steady-state solution of the 5 state Markov diagram representing the PAND gate with 
inputs A and Ba new event, A% is developed with: 
QA* = Q4(°°) ilA* _ -a44 and 
XA* = 
(1 
- 
QA* 
and figure 6.11 is reduced to the form depicted in figure 6.12. 
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Figure 6.10 PAND gate with three input events 
TOP 
A* C 
Figure 6.12 Reduced form of figure 6.11 following solution of a 2-input PAND gate 
The top event probability is then obtained by the analysis of another 5 state Markov 
diagram which represents the PAND gate with inputs A* and C. Figure 6.10 is solved 
via the solution of two 5 state Markov diagrams. If the fault tree structure had been 
solved as one module then a 16 state Markov diagram would have required analysis. 
The saving in computation for such a small example is minimal, however for larger 
systems a saving would be apparent. It can be shown that the solution of the two, 5 
state Markov diagram is identical to the answer produced via the solution of the single 
16 state Markov diagram. This is, however, only applicable if the events in the 
pairings do not exist elsewhere in the tree structure. 
The code was updated to incorporate the modifications outlined above. Following the 
identification of a PAND gate the left-most pair is analysed first and the super event 
label placed back in the fault tree structure. This process is then continued until there 
exists only 2 basic event inputs into the PAND gate. 
6.3 Combination of Independent and Dependent Failures 
The analysis of an industrial system may require consideration of a mixture of 
independent and dependent failure events. Many systems comprise of a combination 
of the two, however the proportion of the system which contains dependent failures is 
usually small. As only a fraction of the fault tree is usually dynamic transforming the 
entire tree into a Markov diagram in order to derive an accurate result can been shown 
to be inefficient. However by utilising the results highlighted in section 6.3 any 
PAND gate can be solved using Markov analysis and be replaced in the fault tree 
structure as a super event. Providing that the inputs to the PAND gate do not occur 
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elsewhere in the tree structure, the submodule containing the dependent failures can 
be solved separately to the remainder of the tree. 
The general procedure for analysing a fault tree structure containing both independent 
and dependent parts includes finding independent subtrees (ref 47). 
6.3.1 Identification of Independent Subtrees 
The term `Modularization' is used to describe the process of identifying independent 
subtrees. When incorporating modularization for research or software development 
purposes many authors have implemented Dutuit and Rauzy's linear-time algorithm 
(ref. 48), which has been shown to be both efficient and simple to implement. The 
basic principle of the algorithm can be stated as follows: 
" Let v be an internal event, (a gate), and ti and t2 respectively the first and second 
dates of visits of v in a depth-first left-most traversal of the fault tree. Then v is a 
module iff none of its descendants is visited before tl and after t2 during the traversal " 
By definition the root event (TOP) and terminal events (Basic Events) are always 
modules. The algorithm's main features include two depth-first left-most (DFLM) 
traversals: 
The first traversal is to identify the first, second and last time an internal event is 
visited and the relevant counters are set according to the following rules: In the first 
visit to a node the counter first date is set, and in the second visit second date is set. 
Further visits to the node increment the counter last date. Additionally if the counter 
to a node is set then the inputs to the node are not visited and for basic events 
first date and second date are identical 
The second traversal is used to identify the minimum of the first date and maximum of 
the last visiting date for each gate's inputs. For each gate node all inputs to the gate 
are traversed and min date and max date are set. 
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Following the two DFLM traversals each gate node holds five pieces of information 
and each basic event three. The gate `v' is then concluded to be a module iff a) the 
collected minimum is greater than the first date of v and b) the collected maximum is 
less than the second date of v. 
The fault tree depicted in figure 6.13 can be used to illustrate the modularization 
process described in the above section. Table 6.4 shows the count of the first 
traversal, the results of which are depicted in table 6.5. Table 6.6 shows the results of 
the second DFLM traversal. Inspection of table 6.6 highlights that the linear time 
algorithm has determined that the independent submodules are: {TOP, G1, G5, G7}. 
The gate G2 is not independent because the collected maximum (15) is not less than 
the second visit date for G2 (12). G3 is deemed dependent as the collected minimum 
(5) is not greater than the first visit date for G3 (13). Similarly G4 and G6 are 
identified as dependent submodules. 
Step 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
'v' TOP GI G2 G4 D C G4 G5 B H 
Step 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
'v' G5 G2 G3 G6 D E G6 G7 F G 
Step 21 22 23 24 25 
'v' G7 G3 G1 A TOP 
Table 6.4 Counter for first DFLM Traversal 
top G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 A B C D E F G H 
Ist 1 2 3 13 4 8 14 18 24 9 6 5 16 19 20 10 
2nd 25 23 12 22 7 11 17 21 24 9 6 5 16 19 20 10 
last 25 23 12 22 7 11 17 21 24 9 6 15 16 19 20 10 
Table 6.5 Results for figure 6.13 following first DFLM traversal 
Name top GI G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 
min 2 3 4 5 5 9 5 19 
max. 24 22 15 20 15 10 16 20 
module? YES YES NO NO NO YES NO YES 
Table 6.6 Results for figure 6.13 following second DFLM traversal 
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TOP 
--J 
1 
G2 
r 
G3 
G4 G5 
_ 
G7 
-111 
JL 
^J OEE 
1 
00. 
Figure 6.13 Example Fault Tree with Repeated Event D 
This example illustrates the efficiency of the algorithm to highlight independent 
submodules_ 
The highlighted submodules are then solved by using either FTA or Markov methods, 
depending on whether they contain independent or dependent failure events. Once the 
individual subtrees have been solved, the subtree is replaced by a `super' event which 
contains the appropriate reliability parameters. As the fault tree structure can contain 
both independent and dependent parts, the `super' events must contain the required 
reliability parameters for each part. Therefore for each super event the following 
parameters must be obtained: 
The probability of failure for the Top event, QTE 
The unconditional failure intensity for the Top event, WTE 
The failure rate of the Top event, XTE 
The repair rate of the Top event, RTE 
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Following the solution of a PAND gate equations (6.5-6.9) are utilised to calculate 
QTE, tTE, wFE and A. TE . The relationship 
between the frequency, rate and probability of 
failure was outlined in chapter 2 as: 
w; =A 1(1-Q1) 
Hence given the steady-state probability of failure for the top event, equation (6.7), 
and the failure rate of the top event, equation (6.8), the steady-state unconditional 
failure intensity can be obtained via equation (6.10). 
WTE = ATE 1-QTE) ý6.10ý 
Following the solution of a subtree containing independent failures the probability of 
failure, QTE, is obtained using the MOCUS algorithm and the minimal cut set upper 
bound. In order to obtain an expression for the failure and repair rate of the Top 
event, the unconditional failure intensity of the top event is required, wTE. As stated in 
section 2.6.5 the unconditional failure intensity for a system can be obtained via: 
wTE=jG; (q(t))-wj(t) (6.11) 
i=l 
where n is the total number of components in the system and G; (q(t)) is Birnbaums 
criticality function. 
Once wTE and QTE have been obtained A. TE can be calculated using equation (2.12). In 
order to obtain an expression for the repair rate of the top event, LTE, the unconditional 
repair intensity requires derivation. The unconditional repair intensity, VTE, is the 
probability that the system is failed at time t and is repaired in the small time interval 
dt. A formula had to been developed in order to obtain vu from a fault tree structure. 
Birnbaums criticality function was used in the development as: for component i to 
cause system failure the system must be in a critical state for component i and 
component i must fail. i. e: 
G1(Q(t)). Q1(t) 
This expression represents the probability of system failure due to component i, 
therefore the repair of the system due to component i is given by: 
G; (Q(t)). Q; (t). v; (t) (6.12) 
where vi(t) is obtained using equation (2.15). 
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From equation (6.12) a formula can be devised which calculates the unconditional 
repair intensity of a system with n events, vTE(t): 
n 
VTE G1(q(t))-g1(t)-v1(t) (6.13) 
i=1 
Therefore for a system containing 2 basic events, A and B, represented by the minimal 
cut sets {A}, {B}, the unconditional repair intensity of the system due to component 
A is: 
VTE/A = ll-QB)"QA"VA 
and the overall system unconditional repair intensity is: 
VTE _0 -QB). 
QA. VA + (l-QA)"QB"VB 
Having obtained an expression for vTE the repair rate for the top event can be 
calculated using equation (2.15). 
To illustrate the modularization and analysis process for a fault tree containing both 
independent and dependent structures figure 6.14 can be utilised. 
FT-op 
G1 G2 
B G3 B 
G4 F 
I 
DE 
Figure 6.14 Fault Tree containing Independent and Dependent Failure Events 
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The results of the modularization process for figure 6.14 are depicted in table 6.7 and 
6.8. 
TOP G1 G2 G3 G4 A B D E F 
Ist 1 2 6 7 8 3 4 9 10 12 
2nd 16 5 15 13 11 3 4 9 10 12 
last 16 5 15 13 11 3 14 9 10 12 
Table 6.7 Results for figure 6.14 following first DFLM traversal 
Table 6.8 
Name TOP GI G2 G3 G4 
min 2 3 4 8 9 
max. 15 14 14 12 10 
module YES NO NO YES YES 
Results for figure 6.14 fo llowing second DFLI v1 traversal 
By inspection of table 6.8 it can be seen that not all of the gates are independent 
subtrees. Gate 1, GI, is not an independent subtree as the collected maximum (14) is 
not less than the second visiting date (5) for Gl. Also Gate 2, G2, is not an 
independent subtree as the collected minimum (4) is not greater than the first visiting 
date (6) for G2. The remaining gates are independent and G3 and G4 can be solved 
separately, prior to the solution of the top gate. By scanning the fault tree structure it 
can be noted that G3 is a PAND gate and hence dynamic in nature. The inputs to the 
gate are not basic events and as G4 is an independent subtree it is solved first, using 
FTA. The new basic event, D*, is created which has the reliability parameters: 
QD* = QD"QE 
WD* = QE-WD+ QD-WE VD* = QD-QE-VD + QD-QE-VE 
W D. 
VD* 
%D*= 
(1-QD. ) 
1D* 
QD. 
G3 now has 2 basic event inputs and can be converted into a5 state Markov diagram 
and solved to produce the new basic event, F*, whose reliability parameters are 
determined using equations (6.5 -6.9). Following the solution of the PAND gate the 
structure of the fault tree contains no further independent subtrees or dependencies 
and the entire fault tree can be solved using the MOCUS algorithm. The fault tree 
given in figure 6.14 was therefore solved via the solution of two static fault trees and 
one 5 state Markov diagram. This process is noticeably more efficient than converting 
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the entire structure into a Markov diagram, which with 6 basic events occurring 
sequentially, would have had 1957 states. 
6.4 Summary 
The algorithm depicted in figure 6.15 illustrates the process which was developed in 
order to solve a fault tree structure that could comprise of traditional fault tree gate 
symbols as well as the PAND gate. 
F INPUT FAULT TREE STRUCTURE VIA ATS 
FILE AND RELWBILDY 
PARAMETERS VIA. AOD 
FILE 
USE MODULARIZATION 
ALGORITIIYI AND 
IDENTIFY INDEPENDENT 
SUBNIODULES 
I 
SCAN THE LARGEST 
INDEPENDENT SUBTREE 
FOR A PAND GATE 
SOLVE USING 
PAND GATE 
MIOCUS AND ALL 
FOUND 
REPLACE SUBTREES 
SUBTREE AS SOLVED 
SUPER EVENT 
Yes 
Yes 
CONVERT ENTIRE 
PAND GATE IS SUBTREE 
INTO A NARKOV 
TOP GATE TO 
DIAGRAM WITH N 
SUBTREE NUMBER OF BASIC EVENT 
IN SUBTREE RETURN AS 
SUPER EVENT 
STOP 
Yes 
I SOLVE ANY GATE INPUT TO THE PAND GATE THAT 
HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS 
INDEPENDENT 
Yes 
CONVERT ENTIRE 
SUBTREE INTO A MARKOV 
DIAGRAM WITH N= 
ONLY BASIC NUABER OF BASIC EVENT 
EVENT INPUTS IN SUBTREE RETURN AS 
SUPER EVENT 
Yes 
I 
SOLVE USR 
[INGPN 
ALYSIS AND RETURN 
TREE AS SU PER EVEM 
Figure 6.15 Algorithm used to solve Fault Trees containing Sequential and 
Independent Failure Events. 
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A general procedure has been created which has the capability of modelling 
independent and sequential failures on a fault tree structure. Following the 
development of the fault tree diagram for a system the tree undergoes a 
modularization process. The identification method traces though the original fault 
tree, depth-first left-most, starting from the top event. Each gate is then checked to 
determine whether or not it is the largest possible independent subtree, which will be 
either independent or dependent in nature. Once these subtrees are identified they are 
solved using the appropriate technique and their solution integrated back into the tree. 
Several Markov and fault tree models may need to be solved to give the final result. 
The advantage of this combined model is that not only can dependent failures be 
modelled efficiently and accurately, the failure logic of the system is retained due to 
the system being represented on a fault tree diagram. The process created, however, is 
not without faults. The main disadvantage of the new combined model is that if an 
event is present in both independent and dependent parts of the tree then 
modularization is limited. In addition to this the `pair analysis' procedure used to 
solve a PAND gate with more than 2 inputs is also infeasible if any of the inputs to the 
PAND gate are repeated elsewhere in the tree structure. The result of this is that a 
larger portion of the fault tree would have to be converted into a Markov diagram, if 
an accurate answer is to be obtained. Conversion of large parts of the fault tree into a 
Markov diagram, as shown in this chapter, result in a large Markov diagram which 
can be computationally expensive to solve. However this is a theoretical limitation as 
it has not, as yet, been encountered in any real system. 
6.5 Standby Failures 
The first dependency studied was that of sequential failures and a new assessment 
procedure was developed for solving a fault tree structure containing PAND gates 
accurately. The second type of dependency that was investigated was that of standby 
failures. A standby component is included to increase the levels of redundancy within 
a system in an attempt to increase the reliability of the system. A primary component 
may be initiated given a demand or be continuously operating. In the event of the 
failure of the primary component, the standby component is brought on-line. In 
reliability problems three main types of standby components can be encountered: 
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Cold Standby: 
The standby component is classified as `cold' if it is considered perfectly reliable 
when in standby i. e. has a zero failure rate. When a cold standby component is 
brought on-line it operates with a non-zero failure rate and therefore the failure rate of 
the standby component is dependent on the failure of the primary component. 
Warm Standby: 
The standby component is classified as `warm' when it has a lower failure rate when 
in standby than when on-line. The failure rate of the standby component is therefore 
dependent on the functionality of the primary component. 
Hot Standby: 
The standby component is classified as `hot' when the failure rate of the component is 
identical regardless of whether the component is in standby or on-line. No conditional 
dependency therefore exists between the primary component and the standby 
component. For such standby components FTA can be used as the analysis tool. 
The warm standby component is possibly the most realistic and for the remainder of 
this chapter the warm standby case will be discussed in detail. The cold standby case 
will be outlined and the differences between the two cases highlighted. 
6 . 5.1 The New Standby Gate 
Analysis of a system containing standby failure events also required a modelling 
technique that could handle dependencies. As with the sequential failure events, 
discussed in section 6.2, it was decided that the standby components should be 
represented on the fault tree structure yet analysed using Markov methods. To include 
the standby components in the fault tree structure a new gate had to be created. In 
order to determine failure of a system containing n components, each of which are 
either on-line or in standby, the number of components, k, that are required to function 
in order for the system to function must be known. The system will therefore function 
as long as k/n components are operating. The fault tree structure describes the failure 
logic of a system and for this reason the standby gate must also represent failure. For 
any system that requires k/n components to be functioning, the standby gate must 
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indicate that n-k+l components are required to fail to cause system failure. This 
observation led to the development of the warm standby gate illustrated in figure 6.16_ 
SYSTEM 
FAILURE 
w 
n-k+l 
n 
AB 
Figure 6.16 The New Warm Standby Gate for a Fault Tree Structure 
The standby gate has features similar to the normal voting gate and, as with the PAND 
gate, the inputs to the standby gate are brought in, in a left to right ordering. Therefore 
in a system containing 2 components, one of which is required to be functioning 
correctly, the left-most component input would be on-line with the remaining 
components assumed to be in standby. The initial state of the Markov diagram for 
such a system would be: 
AM 
B: S 
S1 
The Markov diagram is constructed by identifying all possible transitions out of all 
newly created states. Following the identification of the possible transitions out of 
state one (Si), i. e. failure of the working and standby components, the Markov 
diagram becomes: 
where ABS represents the failure rate of component B in standby. 
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State two (S2) and three (S3) are then investigated and their possible transitions 
identified. For S2 if A is repaired it is assumed that A is placed into standby as B is 
working on-line. Similarly the repair of component B from S3 is placed back into 
standby as A is working on-line. All possible transitions out of newly developed 
states are identified and the Markov diagram for figure 6.16, with k=l, can be seen in 
figure 6.17. The Markov diagram includes the assumption that repair from a failed 
state, or a state where all components have failed, leads to the initial working state 
with the transition rate µ5 which is determined using equation (6.1) or (6.2), 
depending on the maintenance team assumed for the system. 
Figure 6.17 Markov Diagram for a Standby Gate with 2 components, where k=1. 
The state with the simultaneous failure of A and B is the output event to the standby 
gate, this can be seen as state 5 (S5) in figure 6.17. 
Similarly a cold standby gate was developed, the structure of which is shown in figure 
6.18. 
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SYSTEM 
FAILURE 
c 
n kl 
n 
AB 
Figure 6.18 The New Cold Standby Gate for a Fault Tree Structure 
The Markov diagram for a cold standby system with 2 components is developed in an 
identical manner to that of the Markov diagram for a warm standby system and is 
shown in figure 6.19. The only difference between the Markov diagram for a warm 
standby gate and a cold standby gate is that in a cold standby system the standby 
components cannot fail until they have been brought on-line, i. e. no transition exists 
between state 1 and 3, and state 4 and 2. 
Figure 6.19 Markov Diagram for a Cold Standby Gate with 2 basic event inputs 
6.5.2 Construction of the Markov Diagram for a System with Standby Components 
Prior to the inclusion of the standby gate into a fault tree representation of a system, an 
investigation into the development of the correct Markov diagram for a system 
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containing standby failures was initiated. As stated in section 1.5.2.1 the number of 
states, (Nstate), in a Markov diagram for a system containing components that can 
either be working or failed, is equal to: 
Nstate = 2" 
where n is equal to the number of basic events in the system. 
For a system containing components that can either be working, failed or in standby 
this formula cannot be used to determine Nstate. A new formula, therefore, had to be 
developed. In order to determine the form of the new formula an investigation into 
the size and pattern of the Markov diagram was completed for a standby gate with 3,4 
and 5 component inputs. Table 6.9 shows the results obtained from this investigation, 
where any state in level i contains i-1 failed components. 
System: 
kin 
STATES 
ON 
LEVEL I 
STATES 
ON 
LEVEL 2 
STATES 
ON 
LEVEL 3 
STATES 
ON 
LEVEL 4 
STATES 
ON 
LEVEL 5 
STATES 
ON 
LEVEL 6 
NSTATE 
1/3 3 6 3 1 13 
2/3 3 3 3 1 10 
1/4 4 12 12 4 1 33 
2/4 6 12 6 4 1 29 
3/4 4 4 6 4 1 19 
1/5 5 20 30 20 5 1 81 
2/5 10 20 10 10 5 1 86 
3/5 10 20 10 10 5 1 56 
4/5 5 5 10 10 5 1 36 
Table 6.9 Results from investigation into Markov Diagrams for Standby Systems 
An algorithm was required that given the number of basic event inputs to the standby 
gate, n, and the number of components that need to function in order to work the 
system, k, could produce the correct state-transition diagram. As with the sequential 
gate it was discovered that the number of states at each level of the Markov diagram 
could be identified. Instead of manipulating the number of components that could fail 
in any one state, as with the PAND gate, permutations were used to identify the 
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number of states in each level of the diagram. A permutation is an arrangement of n 
events in a certain order. For a system with components that can either be working, 
failed or in standby, there exists three different group types. By splitting the 
component status into different groups a formula can be used to calculate the number 
of states in any given level due to the number of components in each group. When n 
things can be divided into c classes such that things belonging to the same class are 
alike, while things belonging to different classes are different, then the number of 
permutations of these things taken all at a time is: 
n! 
n,! -n2! . n3ý_. _. n,! 
where nj is the number of things in the jth class. 
(n1+n2+n3+.. 
-+nn=1) 
A general formula was created based on the permutation equation to determine the 
number of states in each level for the new standby gate. 
Number of states at level i= 
n! 
n,! -n2! -n3! 
n, = number of working components in a state in level i 
where n2 = number of failed components in a state in level i 
n3 = number of standby components in a state in level i 
(6.14) 
The determination of the total number of states, Ntotal, is given, as with the PAND 
gate, by equation (6.4). 
To illustrate the process of determining the number of states at each level and the total 
number of states in a Markov diagram for a warm standby gate, figure 6.20 can be 
used. 
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I SYSTEM 
FAILURE 
w 
2 
3 
ABC C 
Figure 6.20 Standby Gate with three inputs, k=2 
For this system k=2 and n=3, therefore the system fails if 2/3 inputs are in a failed 
state. The number of states at level 1 can be found using equation (6.14) and the fact 
that the class of working components contains two components, i. e. n1 = 2, the class 
of failed components contains no entries, i. e. n2 =0 and the standby class contains 1 
component, i. e. n3 = 1. Hence the number of states in level 1 of the Markov diagram 
for figure 6.20 is equal to: 
3! 
Number of states in level 1==3 2! 0! 1! 
For the number of states in level 2 it must be noted that a working component has 
failed from level I and therefore a standby component is brought on-line. Hence, 
n, =2 
n, =1 
n3=0 
and 
3! 
Number of states in level 2==3 2! 1 ! O! 
Similarly the number of states in level 3 and 4 can be shown to be equal to: 
Number of states in level 3=3 
Number of states in level 4=1 
Ntotal is equal to 10 and all the data produced can be seen to be identical to that given 
in table 6.9. 
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The failure characteristics of the components in each state are identified using an 
identical process to that used for the PAND gate. Initially STATE is created with all 
Ntotal by Nbasic elements set equal to `-I'. The label `-1' is used to indicate a 
component that is in standby. The different combinations of k from n are then 
identified and the states in level 1 created. For example take a warm standby system 
containing 3 components, one of which is required to function in order for the system 
to work. In this system k =1 and the initial states in level 1 are created by identifying 
the different combinations of I working component from 3 standby components. i. e. 
(A: W, B: S, C: S) = (0 -1 -1) 
(A: S, B: W, C: S) = (-1 0 -1) 
(A: S, B: S, C: W) = (-1 -1 0) 
Using the initial states, the states in level 2 are created by changing, one at a time, 
each working or standby component found in an initial state into a failed component. 
The `0' for each working component is changed to a 'I' to symbolise component 
failure. The remainder of the components are then examined in an attempt to identify 
a standby component. It is assumed that the first identified standby component will be 
brought on-line and hence the `-1' is changed to a `0' and a new state is developed. 
For the warm standby case, in the event of the failure of a standby component the `-1' 
is changed to a `1' and a new state is developed. For example taking the 3 initial 
states that were created above for the 3 component warm standby system, with k =1, 
the states in level 2 are created as follows: 
(A: W, B: S, C: S) = (0 -1 -1), A fails = (A: F, B: W, C: S) = (1 0 -1) 
(A: W, B: S, C: S) = (0 -1 -1), B fails = (A: W, B: F, C: S) = (0 1 -1) 
(A: W, B: S, C: S) = (0 -1 -1), C fails = (A: W, B: S, C: F) = (0 -1 1) 
(A: S, B: W, C: S) = (-1 0 -1), A fails = (A: F, B: W, C: S) _ (1 0 -1) 
(A: S, B: W, C: S) = (-1 0 -1), B fails = (A: W, B: F, C: S) = (0 1 -1) 
(A: S, B: W, C: S) = (-1 0 -1), C fails = (A: S, B: W, C: F) = (1 0 -1) 
(A: S, B: S, C: W) = (-1, - 1,0), A Fails = (A: F, B: S, C: W) = (1 -1 0) 
(A: S, B: S, C: W) = (-1, - 1,0), B Fails = (A: S, B: F, C: W) = (-1 1 0) 
(A: S, B: S, C: W) = (-1, - 1,0), C Fails = (A: W, B: S, C: F) = (0 -1 1) 
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In the instance that a new state developed is identical to a state previously created, the 
new state is not included in the Markov diagram as it already exists. For the fault tree 
in figure 6.20 the STATE array representing level 1 and 2 of the Markov diagram 
would be of the form: 
00 -1 
0 -1 0 
-1 00 STATE =100 
010 
001 
In order to determine the failure characteristics of the components in the states in level 
3, the states previously identified for level 2 are used. Each state in level 2 is taken, 
one at a time, and all working components failed, one at a time, and any available 
standby components brought on-line to produce the states in level 3. The process of 
failing a working component and activating a standby component, or failing a standby 
component, is continued until the (n+l)`h level where all components will be in a 
failed state. 
As STATE is being created the links between appropriate states are also set in 
TRANS. Whenever a component in a particular state is changed from a working or 
standby component to a failed component a link is created between the two states and 
the failure rate of the component stored in TRANS(i, j). As with the sequential 
problem the failure and repair data is entered via the *. aqd file. The failure rate for 
component i, which is on-line, is stored in RATES(i, I) and the failure rate for 
component j, which is in standby, is stored in RATES(j, 3). In addition to the 
identification of the failure links between states, the repair paths are also determined 
as the Markov diagram is developed. The following rules were devised to ensure that 
the correct repair links were identified and the appropriate rates stored in TRANS. 
1) For a warm standby gate only: If component c is a standby component which 
fails then communication between the state where component c was in standby, i, and 
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the state where component c is failed, j, is two-way, i. e. 
ACS 
PC 
TRANS(i, j)=RATES(c, 3) 
TRANS(j, i)=RATES(c, 2) 
2) For both warm and cold standby gates: If component c is a working component 
which fails then communication between the state where component c was 
working, i, and the state where component c is failed, j, is dependent on whether 
state i contains any standby components: 
i) If state i contains standby components then the communication between 
state i and j will be one-way, i. e. 
ZIC 
TRANS(i, j)=RATES(c, i) 
The repair transition from state j is determined by comparing state j with all 
other existing states and identifying state m where STATE(m, i)=STATEO, i) 
for all components except c and STATE(m, c) -STATE(j, c) = -2 i. e. 
C: W as 
d: S \ d: W 
i/\ 
AC 
PC 
c: F 
d: W 
TRANS(i, j)=RATES(c, 1) 
TRANS(j, m)=RATES(c, 2) 
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For example say that state i was equal to (A: W, B: S, C: S), i. e. 
state i= (0 -1- 1) 
and the component in the first column, A, was failed to produce state j where 
(A: F, B: W, C: S): 
state j= (1 0- 1) 
Repair of component A would now lead to the state where (A: S, B: W, C: S) i. e. 
state m= (-1 0 -1) 
which is not equal to state i but equal to state in, where STATE(m, A)-STATE(j, A) _- 
2. 
ii) If state i does not contain any standby components then the communication 
between state i and j is two-way, i. e. TRANS(i, j) =RATES(c, 1), 
TRANS(j, i) = RATES(c, 2) if state j is not a failed state or does not contain 
n failed components. 
iii) If state i does not contain any standby components, and state j is a failed 
state or contains n failed components then the communication between 
state i and j is one-way, i. e TRANS(i, j) = RATES(i, I). A repair transition 
exists from state j to state in, where state in is the initial working state, 
with the rate µj determined by equation (6.1) or (6.2). 
To illustrate the process of determining the Markov diagram and the state transition 
matrix, the 2-input warm standby gate shown in figure 6.21 can be utilised. 
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Figure 6.21 2-Input Warm Standby Gate, k=1 
As with the PAND gate, outlined in section 6.2, the fault tree structure is entered via a 
*. ats file. The gate type labels for a warm and cold standby gate are set equal to 
WSBY and CSBY and the numerical code used by the program to indicate a warm or 
cold standby gate is 5 and 6 respectively. In addition to this the number of failed 
components, n-k+l, that are required to fail to cause the standby gate occurrence is 
entered in the KVG column of the data file, with the number of inputs, n, entered in 
the NVG column. For figure 6.21 the *. ats file has the form: 
TOP WSBY2 20 2A B 
The number of states at level 1 is equal to 2, using equation (6.14) and the number of 
states at level 2 and 3 can be shown to equal 2 and 1 respectively. Therefore: 
2 
LEVEL =2 and Ntotal = 5. 
1 
Initially all elements in STATE are set equal to -1. The first states are created by 
determining the different combinations of k working components from n standby 
component, hence the two initial states are; 
(A: W, B: S) = (0 -1) 
(A: S, B: W) _ (-1 0) 
Using the newly developed states in each level STATE is created and equals: 
o -1 
-1 0 
STATE =10 
01 
11 
The transition-rate matrix is created simultaneously with the development of STATE. 
For example the state (10) is developed from state (0 -1) due to the failure of 
component A and therefore TRANS(1,3) is set equal to A. A. The state (-1 0) is 
identified as the state which would be attained by the system following the repair of A 
and TRANS(3,2) is set equal to µA. The failed state for this system can be identified 
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as state 5, hence a repair transition exists from state 5 to state 1, the initial working 
state. The complete transition rate matrix is: 
0oý;,, des 0 
00 kls ; Lß 0 
TRANS = 0 µA 0 0 AB 
µß 00 0 AA 
µ5 00 0 0 
The transition rate matrix is completed by setting all the diagonal elements in the 
matrix equal to the negative of the sum of the remaining elements in that row. Hence, 
-(; 
LA +ABS) 0 Al ABS 0 
0 
-(AAS +2 
) A_, 
S 
AB 0 
TRANS = 0 PA - (µ A+ A5) 0 A5 
µB 0 0 -(A4 +µR) A: 4 
µ, 0 0 0 W 
The Markov diagram for this example can be shown to be identical to that given in 
figure 6.17, with the probability of system failure equal to the probability of residing 
in state 5. 
6.5.3 Quantification of the Markov Diagram for a System with Standby 
Components 
Steady-state quantification of the Markov diagram representing the new standby gates 
is achieved as described in section 6.2.2. The array SOLN is produced following the 
completion of the Gauss elimination routine and each state in the Markov diagram is 
examined. A failed state is identified as any state which contains less than k working 
components. Once identified as a failed state the probability of residing in that state is 
stored in FAILEDSTAT. Once all states have been investigated the steady-state top 
event probability is equal to FAILEDSTAT. 
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Having developed an algorithm that could produce the correct Markov diagram and a 
steady-state solution for the new standby gate an industrial system, which contained 
standby components and required a transient solution, was investigated. 
6.6 Application of the Combined Model to an Industrial System with Standby 
Failures 
The system used to illustrate the new warm standby gate was part of a deluge system 
found on an offshore platform, the configuration of which is shown in figure 6.22. 
The system consists of four individual pump streams where two pump streams are 
powered by an electric source and two are powered by diesel. This type of system is 
used in the event of a fire on the platform and is therefore dormant until a demand is 
made on the system. The functionality of each component and their respective failure 
modes and system consequence is given in table 6.10 
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(QP) 
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Figure 6.22 Deluge Pump System 
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Component Function Failure Mode 
Test Valve To test flow of water Failed open: Decreases amount of 
water delivered to rin main 
Pressure Relief Valve To relieve overpressure in pipeline Failed open: Decreases amount of 
water delivered to ringmain 
Isolation Valve To isolate value for maintenance Failed Closed: No water delivered to 
purpose ringmain 
Filter To filter water Blocked: Decreases amount of water 
delivered to ringmain: 
Pump To pump water to ringmain Failed Broken: No water delivered to 
rin ain 
Electric Power Supply To power pumps Failed no power: No water delivered 
to rin ain 
Diesel Power Supply To power pumps Failed no power: No water delivered 
to rin main 
Table 6.10 Functionality and Failure Modes for components in the Deluge Pump 
System 
In this particular example the pump system will fail if at any time less than two pumps 
are functioning, i. e. k=2. Given a demand for deluge the electric pumps will be 
brought on-line and the diesel pumps will be placed in standby. Only in the event of 
either of the electric pumps failing will the diesel pumps be brought into operation. 
Given a demand then, the electric power will start the electric pumps and providing 
the isolation values are open, the pressure relief valve and test valve are closed and the 
filter clear, water will be delivered successfully to the ringmain. 
6.6.1 Fault Tree Construction for the Deluge System 
The main concern for the deluge system is that a sufficient amount of water is 
delivered to the ringmain. The top event for the fault tree was therefore identified as 
`Deluge system fails to deliver a sufficient amount of water'. The top event will occur 
if less than two pump streams are functioning. A warm standby gate for the top event 
was implemented to indicate the number of channels that are required to fail to cause 
system failure. For the deluge system k=2 and n=4, the system will therefore fail if at 
any time three or more pump streams are in a failed state. The top level representation 
for the deluge system can be seen in figure 6.23. 
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Figure 6.23 Top Level Fault Tree Representation for the Deluge System 
The fault tree branches for each individual pump stream were developed by 
identifying all possible causes for pump stream failure. Inspection of the first electric 
pump stream highlighted that the following failures would cause the pump stream to 
deliver an insufficient amount of water to the ringmain: 
Pressure relief valve failed open: PRV 1, Test Valve failed open: TV 1 
Either isolation valve failed closed: ISOL21, ISOL 11, Filter Blocked: Fl 
Pump failed to start: EP I FS, Pump failed whilst running: EP I FR, Electric 
Power failed: EP 
The fault tree structure for electric pump stream 1 was developed using these failure 
observations and is depicted in figure 6.24. 
The fault tree structures representing the remaining three pump streams were 
identified in an identical manner and the fault tree representation of the deluge system 
developed (figure 6.25). 
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By inspection of the fault tree structure representing `Electric pump stream 1 fails' it 
can be seen that the gate governing the failure of the pump, G5, is an exclusive-OR 
gate which indicates that the input events are mutually exclusive, i. e. cannot occur at 
the same time. Unlike the standby example illustrated in section 6.5, the individual 
pump streams consist of components that have the potential to be in standby, 
dependent components, and those that are either working or failed, independent 
components. Conversion to the Markov transition diagram for the dependent 
elements was hence complicated by the combination of these dependent and 
independent components. 
6.6.2 Analysis of the Deluge Pump System 
It was noted that each pump stream had two failure modes. Firstly given a demand the 
pump stream could be unavailable and secondly, once available, the pump stream 
could fail before the required time to had elapsed. Realistically, given a demand the 
deluge system would need to function for a period of about 12 hours, hence to was set 
equal to 12 hours. The causes of the stream failing to start are represented by the 
independent elements of the fault tree structure for the stream, i. e. the pressure relief 
valve open, the isolation valves closed, the test valve open, the pump not starting and 
the filter blocked. It is realistic to assume that if these independent events are 
available at the start of the demand then they will not fail in to, as they are passive 
components. The causes of the second failure mode, pump stream failing once 
running, are represented by the dynamic elements of the tree, i. e. the pumps failing 
once running and the power supply failing. The power supplies in this example are 
common to more than one pump stream and were assumed to be perfectly reliable at 
the time a demand was made on the system. 
An algorithm was required to identify and separate the two failure modes so that 
Markov analysis could be used for the dependent elements and FTA could be used for 
the independent events. The modularization algorithm used for the sequential failures 
identified the following gates as being independent: 
{GTOP, G5, G6, G11, G12, G17, G18, G23, G24}. The result, however, was not strictly 
true as the inputs to G5, G11, G17 and G23 contain the standby components, which 
158 
are dependent on each other. An alternative algorithm was hence required which 
could identify the standby events and any other events which had a direct relationship 
with the standby events. It was defined that the new standby gate would indicate that 
at some point below the gate in the fault tree structure a standby component would be 
encountered. The standby components in the fault tree structure were identified by a 
`$' symbol at the beginning of their label. The $ was used to differentiate between 
these dependent component failures and those of the passive components such as the 
pipeline, whose failure was not dependent upon the primary streams. The power 
supplies were also deemed as dependent failures, as they are repeated events which 
can only fail during to, and removed for inclusion in the Markov model. 
A new algorithm was developed based on these identification symbols. Whenever a 
standby gate was encountered by the program a search was initiated for the standby 
component on each input branch to the standby gate. Following the identification of 
the standby component i, the component was removed from the fault tree structure and 
stored in the array STAN(i). In addition to this any other component i which was 
identified as being dependent was stored in the array DEP(i). For the deluge pump 
system, the removal of the standby events and the repeated events, resulted in the four 
pump streams becoming independent in nature. The independent subtrees were then 
solved using FTA and the probability of each stream failing to start was obtained. The 
removal of the dependent events and repeated events, and the solution of the 
independent subtrees, resulted in the standby gate being the last gate to solve. As the 
standby gate indicates dependent failures the gate was solved using Markov methods. 
6.6.3 Construction of the Markov Diagram for the Deluge Pump System 
The total number of states in the Markov diagram for the deluge system could not be 
determined using the procedure highlighted in section 6.5.2. due to the fact that repair 
was considered unrealistic in a 12 hour period. The construction of the Markov 
diagram for the deluge system was however based on the same principles as that of the 
procedure given in section 6.5.2. The predominate difference was that, for the deluge 
system, there existed only one initial state in level 1 and that was the state that 
symbolised that the system was working. For the Markov diagram, only the 
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components stored in STAN were included in each state. The initial state of the 
Markov diagram therefore represented both electric pumps working and both diesel 
pumps in standby, i. e. 
EP1: W 
EP2: W 
DP1: S 
DP2: S 
S1 
STATE=(O 0 -1 -1) OR 
The states in the second level of the diagram were developed from the initial state by 
changing, one at a time, each working or standby component found in the initial state 
into a failed component. As defined in section 6.5.2: If a working component is 
changed then the `0' is changed to a `1' and the first identified standby component 
brought on-line, i. e. `-I' changed to a `0', and if a standby component is changed then 
the `-1' was changed to a `1'. Therefore taking the initial state for the deluge system 
the states in level 2 were produced by: 
1) Changing EP 1 from a working component(O) to a failed component(1) and DP 1 
from standby component(-1) to a working component (0). 
2) Changing EP2 from a working component(O) to a failed component(1) and DPI 
from standby component(-1) to a working component (0). 
3) DPI from standby component(- l) to a working component (0). 
4) DP2 from standby component(-1) to a working component (0). 
The array STATE, for level 1 and 2 of the Markov representation of the deluge pump 
system, was therefore identified as: 
v 
EP1: W 
EP2: W 
DP1: S 
DP2: S 
S1 
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EP1: W 
EP2: W 
DP1: S 
DP2: S 
S1 
00-1-1 
EPtF EP1: EP1W 
EP2: W EP2: F EP2: W 
100-1 DP1_W DP1: W DPLF 
DP2-S DP2: S DP2S 
STATE =010 -1 = S2 s3 S4 
001 -1 
00 -1 1 
EP1: W 
EP2: W 
DP1: S 
DP2F 
85 
The states in the third level were developed from the second level and so on. In the 
instance that a new state developed was identical to a state previously created, the new 
state was not included in STATE. The Markov diagram for the deluge system was 
developed and is shown in figure 6.26. 
EP1: W 
EP2: W 
DP1: S LEVEL 1 
DP2-S 
S1 
EP1 F (x) EP1: W EP1: W 
EP2: W EP2: W EP2: W 
DPLW DPt: F DP1: S LEVEL 2 
DP2S DPA DP2: F 
S S4 S5 
EP1 F EP1: F EPLF EP1: W EP1: W EP1: W 
EP2: F EP2: W EP2: W EP2: F EP2: F EP2: W 
DP1: W 317 :F DP1: W DP1: F DP1: W DP1: F LEVEL 3 
DP2: W W DP2F DP2 W DP2: F DP2: F 
S6 SS S9 S10 S11 
EP1: F EP1E EP1 F EP1: W LEVEL 4 
EP2: F EP2: F EP2W EP2F 
DP1F DP1: W DP1: F DP1: F 
DP2: W DP2: F DP2: F DP2: F 
S12 S13 S14 S15 
EP1: F 
EP2: F 
DPt: F LEVEL 5 
DP2: F 
S16 
Figure 6.26 Markov Diagram for Deluge Pump System 
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The array TRANS was set up alongside the determination of STATE, however only 
failure links were identified and stored, as repair in a 12 hour period was deemed 
impossible. The TRANS matrix had the following form: 
0 AEPI ''Erz 
2 
AD)PIS ADP2S 00000000000 
00000 i1. z 'DPI 
ADP2S 00000000 
00000 
.t00 
ADPI A. 
DP2S 000000 
000000A, 
E, I 
0 ; LEP2 0 ; LDP2S 00000 
0000000 ýFpl 0 ýFrz ýnrls 00000 
00000000000ß,, 
P1 ýnP2 000 
00000000000 . lt, 20 
Änr2 00 
000000000000 2'FJ'2 AEPI 00 
00000000000 ýFPI 00 ýDp2 0 
0000000000 'ýFPI HOPI 0 
0000000000 0 ýFPI 'ýLP2 
000000000000000 ýDP2 
000000000000000A. 
DpI 
000000000000000A. 
Ep2 
000000000000000 Äll. 
0000000000000000 
The development of the Markov diagram thus far had not considered the effect on the 
individual pump streams due to the failure of the power supplies. The power supply 
components are not standby components but are repeated events which affect the 
individual pump streams during operation and therefore must be included in the 
Markov diagram and the state-transition matrix. The electric and diesel power 
supplies can fail at any time once the system is running. Each state was therefore 
investigated and the effect of either power supply failing was identified. From the 
original fault tree structure of the deluge pump system it was noted that DEP(1), ep, 
was present in the first two branches stemming from the standby gate and therefore 
affected the first two components in the Markov diagram. Similarly it was noted that 
DEP(2), dp, affected the 3`d and 4th components in the Markov diagram. In the event 
of the electric power supply failing, then, the system would move into a state where 
neither of the electric pumps would be functioning. Similarly, failure of the diesel 
power supply would cause the system to move into a state where neither of the diesel 
pumps would be available or functioning. 
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The initial state of the Markov diagram, for the deluge system, can be used to 
illustrate the inclusion of the power supplies in the diagram. In State 1 (S1) both 
electric pumps are working and both diesel pumps are in standby. Failure of the 
electric power supply would result in both electric pumps failing to function and both 
diesel pumps to be brought on-line, which is state 6 (S6) in figure 6.26. Alternatively, 
failure of the diesel power would result in state 11 (S 11), where both diesel pumps are 
unavailable and both electric pumps are working. 
To incorporate the failure transitions, due to the failure of the electric and diesel 
power supplies, each state i was investigated. Each component, c, in state i that was 
affected by the electric power supply was changed. If c was a working component 
then it was changed from a `0' to a 'F and the first identified standby component was 
brought on-line, i. e. `-1' changed to a V. If c was a standby component then it was 
changed from a `-1' to a `1'. All components affected by the electric power were 
changed and the result was a new state which represented the change in the system's 
functionality due to the failure of the power supply. The new state produced was 
stored in NEWSTAT(m). STATE was then scanned and the state identical to 
NEWSTAT(m) identified as state J. A transition therefore exists between state i and 
state j, due to the failure of the electric power supply, i. e. TRANS(i, j) = 
RATES(EP, 1). The procedure was then repeated for the diesel power supply. 
It should be noted that certain states may communicate with the same state twice. For 
example the state (EP 1: F, EP2: W, DPI : W, DP2: S) communicates with the state 
(EPI: F, EP2: F, DPI: W, DP2: W) twice. One transition represents the failure of the 
second electric pump, EP2, and the other transition represents the failure of the 
electric power supply, EP. 
Following the identification of all transitions due to the failure of the electric and 
diesel power supplies the transition-rate matrix changed to : 
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" AFPI IFP2 ADPIS ADP2S AEP ADP 
° AEP2+AFP ADPI ADP2S ° 
AEPI+AEP 
DPI 'DP2S ° 
" ZEPI ; LFP2 ADP2S+; L DP 
"" AEPI EEP2 '1DPIS+ADP 
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ADP 
AEP " 
. its . ADPI ZDP2 SDP 
; LFP2 + AEP ; LOP2 +EDP 
` EFP2 + ZFP EDPI+ADP 
AEPI+AFP ADP2+ADP 
" ZEPI+-IFP ADPI + EDP 
' AFPI 'FP2 A'EP 
` ADP2 +ADP 
' ADPI +; LDP 
1F_P2 +AF_P 
6.6.4 Quantification of the Markov Diagram for the Deluge System 
As with the standby gate analysed for a steady-state solution in section 6.5.3, the 
probability of system failure is given by the summation of the probabilities of residing 
in a failed state. For the deluge system, though, a time-dependent quantification was 
required as the probability of system failure is dependent on whether the system is 
available given a demand and whether it works continuously up to time to. The NAG 
routine outlined in section 6.2.2 was used to perform the analysis 
In order to perform a time-dependent analysis, the probability of starting in each state, 
[PI (0), PZ (0),......., P (0)], requires determination. For the deluge pump system the 
initial states are created due to the availability of the four pump streams. State 1 (Si) 
in figure 6.25 is an initial state where all four pump streams are available. The 
probability of starting in Si is given by the probability that pump stream 1 (PS 1) is 
available AND pump stream 2 (PS2) is available AND pump stream 3 (PS3) is 
available AND pump stream 4 (PS4) is available. The availability of each pump 
stream, given a demand, is represented by the independent subtrees solved previously 
using FTA. Therefore the probability of starting in S 1, given a demand, is equal to : 
P1(O) _ 0l-PPS 1). (1-PPS2). (1-PPS3). (1-PPS4) 
The probability of starting in any one of the 16 states in the Markov diagram of the 
deluge system were identified in a similar manner and are shown in table 6.11. 
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STATE NO. STREAM STATUS 
1234 
INITIAL PROBABILITY 
1 W W S S 
lI-PPSI)*\I-PPS2)*(l-PPS3)*(l-PPS4) 
2 F W W S PPSI*(1-PPS2)*(1-PPS3)*(I-PPS4) 
3 W F W S (l-PPSI)*PPS2*(l-PPS3)*(l-PPS4) 
4 W W F S (I-PPSI)*(1-PPS2)*PPS3*(1-PPS4) 
5 W W S F (1-PPSI)*(1-PPS2)*(I-PPS3)*PPS4 
6 F F W W PPSI* PPS2*(I-PPS3)*(I-PPS4) 
7 F W F W PPS1*(1-PPS2)*PPS3*(I-PPS4) 
8 F W W F PPSI*(I-PPS2)*(I-PPS3)*PPS4 
9 W F F W (1-PPSI)*PPS2*PPS3*(I-PPS4) 
10 W F W F (1-PPSI)*PPS2*(1-PPS3)*PPS4 
11 W W F F (I-PPSI)*(l-PPS2)*PPS3*PPS4 
12 F F F W PPSI*PPS2*PPS3*(1-PPS4) 
13 F F W F PPSI*PPS2*(1-PPS3)*PPS4 
14 F W F F PPSI*(1-PPS2)*PPS3*PPS4 
15 W F F F (I -PPSI)*PPS2*PPS3*PPS4 
16 F F F F PPSI*PPS2*PP53*PPS4 
Table 6.11 Initial Probability for each state in figure 6.26 
Following the application of the time-dependent analysis routine, the probability of 
residing in state i was stored in SOLN(i). The final step in the quantification 
procedure involved the identification of the failed states in the Markov diagram. In 
order to identify the failed states in the Markov diagram each state was scanned and if 
there existed n-k+1 or more failed components in the state then the state was 
considered a failed state and the probability of residing in that state was stored in the 
variable FAILEDSTAT. Following the inspection of all states the failure probability 
for the system was given by FAILEDSTAT. For the deluge pump system the failed 
states were identified by the program as being S 12-S 16. The failure probability of the 
deluge pump system, given a demand, was therefore obtained by FAILEDSTAT, 
which represented the summation of the probabilities of residing in states 12-16 at 
time to. 
Using the failure data given in tables 6.12 and 6.13, and the fault tree structure 
developed in section 6.7.1, the *. ats and *. aqd data files for the deluge pump system 
were created (Appendix I). The failure probability of the deluge system was 
calculated using the combined model, via the solution of four independent fault trees 
and one 16 state Markov diagram, and shown to equal: 
Qsys = 5.126x 10-Z. 
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Component Failure Rate/ 
Probability 
Pump fails to start Q = 9.5x 10-3 
Pump On-line X= 7. Ox 10 
Pump in Standby = 3.5x10 4 
Electric Power = 2.0x10-' 
Diesel Power ). = 1. Ox104 
Table 6.12 Failure Rate and Probability of Failure for Pumps and their Power Supplies 
Component Failure rate Per Hour 
X 
Mean Time 
To Repair i 
Inspection 
Interval 0 
Test Valve 5.5x10-6 24.0 26 wks 
Pressure Relief Valve 3.0x10-5 24.0 26 wks 
Isolation Valves 3.4x10-6 24.0 26 wks 
Filter 6.4x10-5 24.0 26 wks 
Table 6.13 Failure Data for Independent Component Failures 
The general procedure for the construction and analysis of a standby system 
containing independent and dependent component failures is depicted in figure 6.27. 
Enter fault tree structure in'. ats We 
labelling standby components with a$ 
symbol Enter failure data in'agd file 
Trace fault tree branches stemming 
from standby gate and remove all $ 
components and store in STAN. 
removal all dynamirhepeated 
components and store in DEP 
Solve independent subtrees to give 
probability of systemisubsystems 
failing to start 
Construct STATE and TRANS for Complete TRANS by setting all Solve fort using NAGroutine Obtain standby components Identify affect 
of DEP components on each state 
diagonal elements = -(sum of all system failure by summing failed 
and store failure link in TRANS other 
terms in row) states probability of failure. 
Figure 6.27 Procedure for Analysing a System Containing Standby and Independent 
Failures 
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6.7 Combination of Standby Gates with other Fault Tree Symbols 
Analysing the entire offshore platform would have comprised of analysing different 
subsystems including the deluge pump system. Without the use of the new standby 
gate the entire system would have to be analysed on one Markov diagram, if an 
accurate solution was required. In order to use the combined model, i. e. solve 
independent subtrees using either FTA or Markov analysis, the standby gate must be 
solved as an independent subtree and returned as a new super event. As with the 
PAND gate, the independent subtrees are identified using the modularization 
algorithm outlined in section 6.4.1 Following the solution of a standby gate a super 
event is created which is represented by QTE, A. TE,, JTE and WTE, which in the case of 
the deluge system would be time-dependent. The failure probability, QTE, is obtained 
directly from the Markov analysis. The repair rate of the super event cannot be 
obtained directly from the Markov diagram unless there exists only one failed state, in 
which case: 
1TE =-a;; 
, where 
i is the failed state. 
In the situation where the Markov diagram contains more than one failed state, as with 
the deluge system, the unconditional failure intensity, wTE, and the unconditional 
repair intensity, VTE, are obtained from the diagram. wTE is calculated using equation 
(6.9) and the unconditional repair intensity, VTE, is obtained by multiplying the 
probability of being in a failed state i, Q;, by the transition rate which transports the 
system into a working state, gj. Therefore, 
n 
vm = Q; rl µ, where n represents all failed states that communicate with a working 
I-I 
state, j= component which is repaired to cause transition to working state (6.15) 
From QTE, ý, TE and VTE the remaining reliability parameters, li-rE and ? 'TE, are found 
using equations (2.15) and (2.12) respectively. 
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6.8 Summary 
A new standby gate was developed in order to represent standby failures on the 
traditional fault tree diagram. A general procedure was created to convert the standby 
gate with n inputs into a Markov diagram and solve for steady-state. In industrial 
systems it is extremely rare that a system is made up of only standby components and 
for this reason an algorithm had to be developed which could solve a system 
containing both standby and independent failures. A general procedure was created 
which has the capability of modelling independent and standby failures on a fault tree 
structure. Following the development of the fault tree structure the tree was scanned 
and all standby failures and dynamic failures, which were directly linked to the 
standby events, were removed. The removal of the dependent failures resulted in the 
fault tree branches, stemming from the standby gate, becoming independent. These 
subtrees were solved using FTA and the remaining dependencies modelled on a 
Markov diagram. 
A deluge pump system used on an offshore platform was modelled accurately using 
the new combined model. The configuration of the system can be noted to be typical 
of a system containing standby components and hence the procedure used to model 
the deluge system could be implemented as the analysis tool for other systems 
containing standby components. The main advantage with the combined model is that 
there is no need to model the entire system using a Markov diagram to obtain an 
accurate answer. The modelling process, however, is complicated if repair is 
considered feasible. The main problem with considering repair for the deluge system 
would have been that in the Markov diagram the system may be in a particular state 
due to the failure of the passive components and not the dynamic components. For 
example the deluge system could be in the state (EPI: F, EP2: F, DPI: F, DP2: W) due 
to the failure of electric pump 1 and 2 whilst running and the test valve in the first 
diesel pump stream being unavailable at time zero. The Markov diagram construction 
procedure outlined in this chapter would repair the standby diesel pump and create a 
transition to the state (EP 1: F, EP2: F, DP 1: W, DP2: W) . This representation would 
be 
incorrect as the first diesel pump stream could only be brought back on-line if the test 
valve, tv3, was repaired. In order to include the correct repair transitions on the 
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Markov diagram the causes of being in a state would require identification and then 
the repair transitions could be determined. If a modelling technique was required that 
included repair a further investigation into the standby gate combined with 
independent failures would have to be initiated. 
6.9 Conclusions 
Two different types of dependent failures have been investigated and a new modelling 
procedure developed. The basis of the algorithm is to identify and separate 
independent and dependent failures. If separation can be achieved then the 
independent failures are modelled using FTA and the dependent failures are modelled 
using Markov methods. The sequential failures are modelled using the PAND gate 
and following the conversion of the gate to a Markov diagram the dependent failures 
can be replaced back in the fault tree structure as a super event which contains all 
relevant reliability parameters. The standby failures are modelled using the standby 
gate and the $ symbol, and following the solution of all independent failures the 
system can be converted into a Markov diagram based only on the number of 
dependent components in the system. The standby gate can also be integrated on the 
fault tree structure with other subsystems. As with the PAND gate, solution of the 
standby gate is achieved separately and replaced back into the fault tree structure as a 
new super event. 
The development of the PAND gate and the standby gate have made it possible to 
include the dependent failures on a traditional fault tree diagram. Retention of the 
fault tree diagram is advantageous as the failure logic of the system is readily 
documented and the diagram itself is easy to construct from an engineering 
perspective. It can be concluded then, that by using the combined model an accurate 
result can be obtained for systems containing sequential and standby failures. In 
addition to this a solution is obtained efficiently by using a combination of FTA and 
Markov methods. 
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CHAPTER 7 
OPTIMISATION OF A DEPENDENT SYSTEM 
7.1 Introduction 
There are many considerations which affect the decision on the implementation of a 
particular design. The first six chapters of this thesis have concentrated on one of 
these, the analysis of the system and the detem ination of its probability of failure. 
Although it is essential to design a reliable and safe system, especially if system 
failure can mean a catastrophic event, other parameters are also considered such as 
cost. Ideally a manufacturer would aspire to produce the most economical yet 
adequately reliable design. 
1- laving developed an analysis tool that can effectively deal with dependent systems, 
research into the identification of the `best' design possible for a system can be 
initiated. The combined model can be utilised at the analysis stage of the design 
process, which comprises: preliminary design, analysis, appraisal and redesign. 
Once the reliability has been obtained the design can be judged for its acceptability 
and a decision can be made on whether to implement the design or not. 
This chapter describes the development of an optimisation method that can be used to 
identify the `best'; design for a particular system. The fundamental findings 
postulated in this chapter are summarised in (ref. 49,50). 
7.2 Representation of Design Alternatives 
In order to be able to determine the 'best' design a number of design options require 
consideration. Ideally all possible designs should be determined and analysed- This 
implies that a large number of trees would need to be constructed and evaluated before 
a decision upon the best design could be formed. The process of constructing and 
analysing all potential designs would be extremely time consuming, potentially error 
prone and totally impractical for any real system design problem. 
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An advantage of retaining the fault tree structure in the combined model, apart from 
its logical attractiveness, is that all the potential design options can be represented on 
one tree by using house events (ref. 51,52). House Events (Figure 7.1) are used to 
model the existence or non-existence of an event by assigning Boolean values of True 
(1) or False (0). 
H1 ={0,1} 
Figure 7.1 House Event Symbol 
These events can effectively turn branches of the fault tree structure on and off. 
Figure 7.2 can be used to illustrate the use of house events where a valve used in a 
system can be selected from two types. In the situation where type I is chosen HV 1 
would be set equal to true, i. e. 1, and HV2 set to false, i. e. 0, illustrated in figure 7.2. 
Alternatively if type 2 was chosen then HV 1 would be set equal to false and HV2 set 
to true. 
VALVE 
FAILS 
VALVE V 
SELECTED SELECTED 
{VWD FAILS 
I 
AND FAILS 
VALVEI VALVE1 VF 
ILS 
v/LLVEz 
FAILS SELECTED FAILS LEC7ED 
V, V2 
Figure 7.2 Example Fault tree with House Events 
The failure logic for the set of design variations can now be represented on a single 
fault tree structure by using house events. The implementation of house events 
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reduces the number of different fault trees that are required to be constructed to just 
one. For each different design, however, the relevant house events require 
modification and prior to analysis the fault tree structure needs to be reduced to a form 
which contains only gates and basic events. The flowchart depicted in figure 7.3 
shows how any encountered house events will be treated in order to produce the 
reduced fault tree structure. 
Yes Yes 
ýýýý 
No ACTION 2 ACTION 3 
AND GATE 
Yes 
ACTION 1 
ACTION 1= Delete house event input to gate- If this only leaves one input event delete AND gate, 
change input event to be an input to the gate at next level up. 
ACTION 2= Gate output is true. Proceed up through tree structure until an AND gate is encountered. 
Delete this input branch up to AND gate. If this only leaves one input event delete AND gate, change 
input event to be an input to the gate at next level up. 
ACTION 3= Gate output is false. Proceed up through tree structure until an OR gate is encountered. 
Delete input branch up to the OR gate. If this is the only input to the OR gate change to an input event to 
the gate at the next level up. 
ACTION 4= Delete House Event to gate. If this only leaves one input to the OR gate change to an input 
event to the gate at the next level up. 
Figure 7.3 Algorithm for removal of House Events following a design specification 
To illustrate the reduction process the example fault tree in figure 7.2 can be utilised. 
The house event representing the selection of valve 1, HV 1, is equal to I and is an 
input to an AND gate. Following figure 7.3 the house event is deleted and as this 
leaves only one input, the AND gate is also deleted. Similarly, the house event 
representing the selection of valve 2, HV2, is equal to 0 and is an input to an AND 
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gate. The Gate is false and the fault tree structure beneath, and including the gate, is 
deleted up to the next encountered OR gate. The reduced fault tree structure takes the 
form required, where the valve failure is due to the selected valve, i. e: 
V 
FAILSALVE 
1 
V1 
Each design is represented by a set of unique variables which determine the status of 
the house events such that the reduction of the fault tree structure represents the failure 
causes of the design under inspection. Failure causes of any other design can be 
represented by changing the respective values attributed to the individual house 
events. The time required to manually enter all new data for each design, combined 
with the analysis computation time, would prove to be excessive if the number of 
design options was large. To overcome this problem it was decided to embed the 
analysis within a structured optimisation procedure. The design variables are then 
automatically set by the optimisation procedure and the appropriate house events set. 
The reduced fault tree would then be analysed and the reliability/availability of the 
design determined. This process would continue until the optimisation scheme 
converged to an optimal design. 
Andrews (ref. 52) described an approach by which the optimal performance of a safety 
system in terms of its availability was determined using the FTA method. With the 
advances in FTA an updated, more efficient, optimal design search was achieved three 
years later (ref. 51). Andrews and Pattison solved the fault trees by converting the 
structure into a Binary Decision Diagrams (ref. 53) where the house events were 
treated by ascribing probabilities of 0 and 1. A recommendation for the best design 
was produced via an optimisation process. The predominant difference between this 
part of the investigation and previous research was that the tool, used to perform the 
analysis of the system, would be the newly developed combined model implying that 
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the analysis would now be more appropriate for systems with dependencies than 
previous studies. 
7.3 Optimisation Techniques 
As outlined in the introduction, the problem is to determine the best design where a 
number of design options exist. In order to obtain an optimal design, without 
evaluation of all possible designs, an optimisation procedure can be utilised. Many 
types of optimisation techniques exist and which one to apply is dependent on the 
characteristics of the problem. The function we wish to minimise/maximise, f(x), is 
often referred to as the Objective Function and represents the assessment criteria for 
the function. The fundamental problem with optimising a safety system design is that 
the objective function cannot be explicitly defined. This is due to the fact that the 
objective function, which is related to the structure function of the system, changes 
alongside any design variable modification. A detailed account of the current 
optimisation techniques and those applicable to reliability problems can be found in 
the doctorate thesis by Pattison (ref 54). Three main areas were investigated namely: 
Linear Programming, Gradient based optimisation techniques and Random Search 
methods. In summary the following conclusions were postulated: 
1) Linear programming optimisation techniques are inappropriate for application to 
the safety system optimisation problem. The main reasoning for this stems from 
the need to have an objective function to give a strict mathematical formulation of 
the design problem. 
2) Gradient methods are inappropriate for the safety system design optimisation 
problem as the objective function, f(x), and its derivatives, Vf(x), are required to 
exist and be of a continuous nature. 
3) Random search methods rely on function evaluation only and generally pay little 
attention to the structure of the objective function. These techniques can be applied 
to the safety system design problem, however such methods may require more 
computation in obtaining the optimal. 
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From this research it was concluded that most effective class of optimisation 
technique for this type of problem is that of random search. Pattison used a Genetic 
Algorithm to find the optimal design for a High-Integrity Protection System (ref. 54). 
In addition to this various other authors have used a Genetic Algorithm successfully in 
a reliability context (ref. 50,51,55). Painton and Campbell showed that a Genetic 
algorithm performed favorably when compared to the results obtained from an 
enumeration of a configuration space for a PC system (ref. 55). In this paper although 
the problem was not complex it was found that other techniques, namely that of a hill- 
climbing procedure, could not obtain a global optimal solution. 
The technique chosen to perform the optimisation of a system with dependent failure 
events was therefore the Genetic Algorithm. 
7.4 Genetic Algorithms 
A genetic algorithm is a type of evolutionary computation method. Such methods 
employ a search strategy that solves complex problems by simulating evolution via a 
computer algorithm. A common principle governing evolutionary computation 
methods is that each algorithm begins the search from a population of trial solutions. 
Each of the trial solutions is then assessed by a measure of performance and used in 
combination with a selection process to determine which solutions continue into the 
next generation. New solutions can be created via the alteration of the existing 
solutions. Each type of evolutionary computation method functions by concentrating 
on a different aspect of the evolution process. Genetic algorithms concentrate on the 
genetic link between existing and newly formed structures. 
7.4.1 Background 
Genetic Algorithms (GA) were invented by John Holland in the 1970's to mimic some 
of the processes observed in natural evolution (ref. 56). In evolution each species 
strives for survival against complicated and changing environments. According to 
Darwin those organisms better adapted to the environment survive and reproduce. 
Natural selection suggests that the origin and diversification of species results from 
the gradual accumulation of individual modifications. 
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As each species changes to adapt to a new environment so the genetic make-up 
contained within a chromosome is modified. New generations are formed by 
reproduction and new chromosomes are generated due to the crossover of each 
parent's genetic information. Each chromosome is comprised of a number of genes, 
which encode a particular feature of the individual, and occasionally these genes may 
be mutated which results in a new chromosome structure. Each gene can adopt 
several different values in order to describe its characteristics. The value of any 
particular gene is referred to as an allele. 
The work completed by Holland was based on two methods: the encoding of complex 
structures by simple representation (bit strings) and the process of improving such 
structures by simple transformations. Holland began work on algorithms that 
manipulated strings of binary digits. The strings can be viewed as chromosomes and 
the individual bits of the string as genes. Holland awarded each chromosome a fitness 
value depending on its strength in the surrounding environment. An evolution process 
was then developed by performing a number of generations from an initial population 
based on the value of each chromosome at each generation. The selection at each 
generation was biased due to the chromosome value so that those with the best 
evaluation tended to be reproduced more often than those that possess a poor fitness. 
The reproduction strings were then subjected to the genetic operators of crossover and 
mutation and a new generation produced. 
In summary the algorithms developed by Holland combine survival of the fittest 
among string structures with a stochastic structured information exchange to form a 
process similar to that of evolution. The application of GA to an optimisation setting 
was developed, based on Holland's work, by DeJong in 1975 (ref. 60). Following 
these developments GAs have been implemented in a wide range of practical 
optimisation problems. 
Table 7.1 contains a description of the main terms used in GAs and the remainder of 
this chapter. 
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TERM DECSRIPTION 
CHROMOSOME(string) A binary solution string for the problem 
GENE A variable contributing to a solution string, 
represented as a bit 
ALLELE Value of a gene 
POPULATION A set of solution strings 
FITNESS Performance measure given to a solution string 
REPRODUCTION Process of selecting chromosomes/strings based on 
their fitness value 
CROSSOVER Process of mating of two chromosomes/strings 
MUTATION Process of mutating a gene 
Table 7.1 Terms used in GAs 
7.4.2 Methodology 
GAs can vary in complexity depending on which genetic operators are used. For the 
purpose of this thesis the simple genetic algorithm, described by Goldberg (ref. 58), 
was utilised. The general procedure of the simple GA involves the identification of an 
initial population followed by successive applications of the reproduction, crossover 
and mutation operators. Prior to the application of the simple GA certain parameters 
require identification. These are: 
" The representation scheme to be used for the problem. 
"A fitness measure for each string in a population. 
" Definition of the parameters and variables that will control the 
algorithm 
" Definition of a performance measure for each run of the GA 
" Definition of a set of criteria for termination of a run. 
To provide a full understanding of the procedure used to perform a GA each of the 
parameters identified above will be discussed. 
7.4.2.1 The Representation Scheme 
Initially GAs require the natural parameter set of the optimisation problem to be coded 
as a finite-length string over some finite alphabet. For example say the function f(x) _ 
x2 was optimised over the interval [0,31 ], initially the parameter x would be required 
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to be coded into a finite-length string. The length of the string must include the 
maximum value the parameter x can hold, i. e. 31. A string of length 5-bits is required 
as the coded string uses the binary digits I and 0, where 
I111 12= 31 
000002=0 
The representation scheme used for a GA is therefore a binary string. Application of 
the GA to a safety system design optimisation problem requires the system's design 
variables to be coded into a binary string- For a system with several different design 
variables the binary string comprises of contiguous structure of smaller binary strings 
which correspond to the separate variables. 
7.4.2.2 Fitness Measure 
An initial population is set up randomly by placing 0's and l's in each bit position of 
each individual string. Each string in the initial population is then decoded and 
awarded a fitness value depending on the design specifications. The fitness value is a 
measure of the performance of the string in its environment and the GA uses it to 
produce the next generation. In a reliability context the fitness value could be based on 
the reliability of the system. The fitness value is obtained via the evaluation of the 
fault tree. As the reliability value is generally of an inappropriate form for use in the 
algorithm the fitness value is obtained via some mapping scheme. The scheme used 
is dependent on the problem being solved. 
7.4.2.3 Controlling Parameters 
The parameters that control the simple GA are the genetic operators which perform 
reproduction, crossover and mutation. 
The Reproduction Operator 
Reproduction is a process in which individual strings are selected due to their fitness. 
Depending on whether the problem is to minimise or maximise, the strings will be 
reproduced according to the lowest or highest value respectively. The reproduction 
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operator can be implemented in the algorithm in a number of different ways, but the 
most commonly used is that of the Biased Roulette Wheel. The process works by 
allocating a proportion of a roulette wheel to each string according to its fitness value. 
The proportion, Pi, that any particular sting allocates is determined by dividing the 
strings fitness, f;, by the total fitness of the population, i_e: 
- Pi =. 
f' 
(7.1) 
1 f, 
To illustrate the reproduction process the four strings depicted in table 7.2 can be 
utilised. The fitness value for each string is calculated and the roulette wheel is 
developed. 
STRING FITNESS 
VALUE, f; 
PROPORTION OF 
WHEEL, P; 
INTERVAL 
BOUNDARY 
1) 01111100 52.5 0.554 0.554 
2) 01010101 11.5 0.121 0.675 
3) 11110000 25.9 0.273 0.948 
4) 00001100 4.8 0.052 1 
TOTAL 
FITNESS, f; 
94.7 
Table 7.2: Initial Populations Fitness Values and Roulette Wheel Proportions 
By using the biased roulette wheel fitter strings have a higher representation in 
succeeding generations. For this particular example string 1 would have the best 
chance of being represented in the proceeding generation as it occupies the interval 0 
to 0.554 and hence has a 55.4% chance of reproduction. 
The selected strings are then entered into the mating pool and subjected to the second 
operator, crossover. 
The Crossover Operator 
The main function of this operator is to combine good features of the strings created 
during reproduction in the hope of producing a fitter string. The modified strings, 
developed by crossover, may allow new points in the search space to be identified and 
evaluated. The newly reproduced strings are mated in pairs and although various 
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different crossover techniques exist the traditional one-point method will be 
implemented. As its title suggests the crossover is initiated about a single point. For 
each pair of strings a random number is generated, if this number lies between zero 
and the crossover rate, typically say 0.7, then the pair are crossed. The position of 
crossover is also generated randomly. An integer position k along the string length 
less one [1, L-1] is generated, the pair is then crossed between k+l and L inclusively. 
To illustrate the crossover procedure the two eight-bit strings, Si and S2, can be 
utilised. 
S1=01111100 
S2=01010101 
During crossover, the crossover point is generated, in this example four, and the two 
new strings, Si' and S2', are created by swapping over the parts of each string from the 
bit positions 0 to 3. 
S1-01 1 10101 
S2"=01011100 
The combined emphasis of reproduction and the structured, though stochastic, 
information exchange of crossover give GAs much of their power (ref. 58). The 
crossed strings are then subjected to the third and final operator, mutation. 
Mutation Operator 
Mutation has been shown to be a means for reintroducing diversity into the population 
(ref. 56). Mutation has the capability of throwing the search into a new area of the 
search space and when used with reproduction and crossover it acts as an insurance 
policy against loss of important information. 
The mutation operator works by changing individual bits in a string. For each bit in a 
string a random number is generated, if this figure is less than or equal to the mutation 
rate then the bit under inspection is changed. As the strings are represented in binary, 
if the bit under inspection is a0 it is changed to a1 and vice versa. 
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The new population is hence developed and the process of reproduction, crossover 
and mutation is continued until the required number of generations has been 
performed or until convergence has taken place in the population. 
Another parameter that requires identification is the size of the initial population. The 
size can vary and is generally determined by the number of different system designs. 
Large populations provide a greater search of the solution space. It should be noted, 
however, that increasing the size also increases the computation effort required to 
perform the GA. 
7.4.2.4 Performance Measures and Termination Criteria for a GA 
The most popular termination criteria is to state the maximum number of generations 
evolved. In addition to this the GA can be terminated when a certain degree of 
convergence has been portrayed. There exists no general rule for convergence criteria 
as it is problem dependent. Some authors believe application of convergence criteria 
to be problematic as fitness of a population may remain static for a number of 
populations before a superior individual is found (ref. 57). One way of monitoring the 
behaviour of the GA is to record the `best-so-far' string. In addition to this the 
average fitness or unreliability can be used as a measure of convergence for the GA. 
7.5 Application to an Industrial System 
Having outlined the general procedure for the use of a GA, it can now be applied to an 
industrial example, by the use of the combined model and house events, to find the 
best design option. 
7.5.1 Deluge Pump System 
The industrial system used was the offshore platform deluge pump system previously 
modelled using the combined model in chapter 6, section 6.7 (Figure 6.22). To 
reiterate, the function of the deluge pump system is to pump a sufficient quantity of 
water to the ringmain given a demand. For the purpose of this analysis it is assumed 
that the deluge system is required to function continuously for a period of 12 hours. 
For this system different types of pump can be implemented, each with varying 
capacities. The pump system will fail if at any time the capacity of the pumps is less 
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than 100% . The system comprises electric pumps and standby diesel pumps. Only in 
the event of a failure of an electric pump will a diesel pump be brought into action. 
Each electric pump is powered by a common electric power supply and similarly the 
diesel pumps are powered by a common diesel source. The isolation and test valves 
are used for maintenance purposes only and the pressure relief valve is used to 
decrease the pressure in the pipeline. Given a demand for deluge the electric power 
supply starts the electric pumps and the isolation valves should be open, the filter 
clear, the pressure relief valve closed and the test valve closed. 
Even with a relatively small number of different components in a system the total 
number of different design options can be large. The deluge system optimisation 
problem has been restricted to have a relatively small number of alternatives in order 
to produce an exhaustive search solution to compare to that of the GA. The available 
design options are listed in table 7.3 and there exists 520 possible designs. 
Design Options Design 
Variable 
How many pumps, of the same type, NE 
are needed 
(1,2,3,4)? 
What Type of Pump to use PO 
(A, B, C, D, E)? 
Maintenance Test Interval for System 0 
(1-26 Weeks) 
Table 7.3 Design Options for Deluge Pump System 
It was assumed that the number of diesel pumps would be identical to the number of 
electric pumps. Therefore the maximum number of pumps the deluge system could 
contain would be eight, and the least two. For each variation of pump design the cost 
and pumping capacity changed. Individual pump data is illustrated in table 7.4 and 
the remaining component data was given in Chapter 6, Table 6.13. 
Component Capacity Failure Rate Per Hour Cost 
On-line Standby 
Pump A 100% 3.5x10' 1.75x10-4 4500 
Pump B 100% 1.0x 10-5 5.0x 10-6 4700 
Pump C 50% 7.0x10' 3.5x10-4 3200 
Pump D 50% 5.0x10' 2.5x10-' 3300 
Pump E 33.33% 1.0x10-3 5.0xl04 2600 
Table 7.4 Pump Data 
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7.5.2 Component Unavailability 
The causes of each pump stream failing is either that it fails to start or that it fails once 
running. Failure to start is governed by the passive components present on the line, 
i. e. the filter, isolation valves, pressure relief valves and test valves. Ideally when a 
demand is present these static components should be available. For these static 
components failure will only be detected during a maintenance inspection. Such 
failures are classed as unrevealed and their respective probability of failure is 
calculated using an approximation of equation (2.20), given in Chapter 2, which is 
shown in equation (7.2). 
Q, = a, z+eJ 
where: 
Xj = the failure rate of component i 
i= the mean time to repair 
0= the maintenance test interval 
(7.2) 
The probability of each different pump type failing to start was assumed and is shown 
in table 7.5. 
Component Probability of 
failure, Q; 
Pump (Type A) fails to start 0.01 
Pump (Type B) fails to start 0.012 
Pump (Type C) fails to start 0.0095 
Pump (Type D) fails to start 0.011 
Pump (Type E) fails to start 0.012 
Table 7.5 Probability that Pump i Fails to Start 
The failure of the power supply and the pumps failing whilst running are revealed 
failures, i. e. the failures of such components will be immediately apparent, and the 
probability of failure is therefore calculated using equation (2.19) given in chapter 2. 
As these are dependent failures, however, the combined model performs a Markov 
analysis of these components and hence each component requires a failure rate. As 
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the deluge system is only required to function for a 12 hour period each component is 
deemed as non-repairable 
7.6 The Optimisation Problem 
Due to the differing capacities of the pumps not all of the 520 designs were feasible. 
For example those designs which contain pump type E require three pumps to be 
working and therefore a minimum of 4 must be present in the design in order to 
deliver a sufficient water supply. Removing all infeasible designs reduced the total 
number of possible designs to 494. For this particular design problem the limitations 
were set as: 
1) The total system cost must be less than or equal to 18,000 units. This relates to the 
cost of the pumps only. 
2) The average maintenance effort spent each week must not exceed 1 hour. This 
relates to the pumps only and each pump is said to take 2 hours to test at each 
inspection. 
The design problem was specified as: 
'To maximise the reliability of the system within the resource constraints' 
Reliability is the term used to describe the behaviour of the system because with the 
deluge system it is required to work from the time of the demand continuously over a 
time period specified, in this case 12 hours. Including the cost and maintenance 
constraints limited the number of possible designs to 122 and turned the optimisation 
problem into a constrained one. 
7.6.1 Fault Tree Representation of the Deluge Pump System 
A single fault tree structure was constructed using house events to represent all 
possible designs alternatives and is illustrated in Appendix II. Each pump stream has 
a house event attached to the first gate to model whether that particular pump stream 
had been chosen in the present design. The house event symbolises that the pump 
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stream will fail to pump if either the pump stream has not been chosen in the design, 
HPi, or it has been chosen, HPi, but fails to function. This scenario is represented in 
figure 7.4 where the house event, HP2, for the pump stream `electric pump 2' is set 
equal to 1 which represents that the pump stream has not been chosen and HP2 is 
therefore equal to 0. 
ELECTRIC 
PUMP 
STREAM 2 
FAILS 
Electric Pump i Pump 
stream 2I Stream not 
Fails I fitted 
NE<2 
HP2 =1 
StrePump2 Electric Pump am 
stream 2 fass 
LFitted 
NE>2 
HP2=0 
Figure 7.4 House Event for number of Pump Streams in a Design 
In a similar fashion house events were also used with the five different pump type 
options and were set according to the pump type chosen, i. e. the value of PO. Each 
pump stream had each different pump type included however only one house event 
was set equal to true depending on whether PO = 1,2,3,4 or 5. The configuration for 
pump type A is shown in figure 7.5. 
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Pum Type 
A fapils 
Pump Type A Pump type 
fails to pump A is chosen 
FPO1 
THEN 
fails to HPA =1 
Pump 
r2sntg] 
start 
Figure 7.5 House Event for Pump Type A 
7 6.2 Binary String Coding 
In order to utilise the simple GA described in section 7.4 each individual design 
required coding into a binary string. For each of the three design variables a certain 
portion of the string was assigned which was capable of holding the maximum value 
possible for each variable. The number of pumps range from 1 to 4 and hence was 
assigned 2 bits of the binary string. 
There exists five different pump type options for this problem and therefore the 
portion of the string governing the pump type had to accommodate a maximum of 
five. The pump type variable was assigned 3 bits of the coded string. A problem 
became apparent as a 3-bit string has a range from 0 to 7 and the number of different 
pumps varied from 1 to 5. It was decided that the range should be mapped and for the 
bit value x, where x is the value of the bit string, the formula shown in equation (73) 
was devised. 
Cox Pump Type i= ý+ 1(7.3) 
where the value obtained is rounded to the nearest integer. 
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The third design variable, the inspection interval, has a maximum value of 26 weeks 
and was therefore assigned 5-bits of the binary string. Again the maximum bit value 
was greater than the range required for the variable. As with the pump type, a formula 
was devised, equation (7.4) 
25x 
Inspection Interval in weeks = 31 +1) 
(7.4) 
where the value obtained is rounded to the nearest integer. 
The total length of the string for each design therefore comprised of 10-bits (Figure 
7.6), and hence the last ten bits of a 16-bit string was used to store each design. 
000000 -N - -- PO - -- - HE A- 
Figure 7.6 Binary String Composition for Deluge System Design 
7.6.3 Decoding a Design String 
Each of the design variables were decoded from a particular design string by using 
MASK strings and the binary operator IAND, which is an intrinsic FORTRAN 
function- For each different design variable a mask string was developed covering 
only the bits of the string which correlated to the variable under inspection. For 
example the mask string correlating to the inspection interval was created as: 
0000000000011111 
where each bit in the string representing the range of the inspection interval was set 
equal to the binary digit 1 and all remaining bits were set equal to 0. Similarly the 
mask strings for the number and type of pumps were created and all three mask strings 
are shown in table 7.6. 
MASK! (0) 0000000000011111 
MASK2 (PO) 0000000011100000 
MASK3 (NE) 0000001100000000 
Table 7.6 Mask Strings for Each Design Variable 
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Each design string was decoded by logically multiplying, using the IAND operator, 
each mask string with the design string to yield the variable settings for every new 
design. To illustrate the decoding process the following string can be utilised: 
0000000101101110 
To determine the inspection interval the string is multiplied, bit by bit, by its mask 
string: 
(0000000101101110). (0000000000011111) 
=0000000000001110 
The bit value for this string is 14 and using the mapping equation (7.4) the inspection 
interval for the given design string is equal to: 
25.14 l 
integer Part 31 +1I= 
12 weeks 
Similarly the pump type can be shown to equal Type C, using MASK2 and equation 
(7.3), and the number of pumps to equal 4 in total using MASK3. 
A *. hqd datafile was created with each house event HPi initially set equal to one. 
After each string in a population is decoded the *. hqd file is updated and the 
appropriate house events are set. For example the string decoded above would 
produce the changes to the *. hqd data file shown in figure 7.7. 
Once the appropriate house events have been set the fault tree structure is reduced 
using the rules outlined in section 7.2 such that the fault tree comprises of gates and 
basic events alone. The decoded inspection interval is passed into the combined 
model and used to calculate the probability of failure for each of the relevant 
components in the design. 
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Initial Data File *. hqd House events for Pump 
Type C, 4 pumps 
HPI I HPI 0 
HP2 1 HP2 0 
HP3 I HP3 1 
HP4 1 HP4 I 
HP5 1 HP5 0 
HP6 1 HP6 0 
HP7 I HP7 1 
HP8 I HP8 1 
HPA 0 HPA 0 
HPB 0 HPB 0 
HPC 0 HPC I 
HPD 0 HPD 0 
HPE 0 HPE 0 
Figure 7.7 Changes to *. hqd file for design containing 4 Pumps of Type C 
7.6.4 Objective Function Value of a String 
In order to be able to perform the optimisation search each string required a fitness 
value in order to initiate the reproduction process. The determination of each 
individual string's fitness comprised of an analysis to gain a value to represent the 
reliability of the system. For any safety system, such as the deluge system, a high 
reliability would be expected. Fitness values all based on high reliability levels do not 
differentiate between designs when used to guide the reproduction into the next 
generation. A string with the reliability equal to 0.99 would be reproduced with a very 
similar likelihood as a string with reliability 0.95. To resolve this a mapping scheme 
was created whereby 0.99 was rewarded significantly more than 0.95. To distinguish 
between designs, the reliability improvement was rewarded by a non-linear function 
shown in figure 7.8. To determine a formula to represent the function shown in 
figure 7.8 MAPLE was used to fit a function to the following arbitrary four points: 
When x= 0.9 y= 0.0 
When x=0.95 y= 1.0 
When x= 0.965 y= 5.0 
When x= 0.98y=20.0 
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Any system whose reliability was lower than 90% was rejected. 
20-- 
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Figure 7.8 Relationship between Reliability and Fitness Value 
Using MAPLE the relationship between the systems reliability, x, and string fitness 
was found to be: 
324 - 720x + 400x2 when x<0.95 
fit-value: = 13601 - 28671x + 15111x2 when 0.95 < x<0.965 
(7.5) 
30984 - 64698x + 33778x2 otherwise 
Hence given any system's reliability value a corresponding fitness value could be 
awarded using equation (7.5). For any system design which violated either of the 
design specification constraints, the fitness value awarded to that particular string was 
set to zero which eliminated it from influencing the next generation. 
Having developed a means of evaluating the fitness of a string the GA could now be 
implemented. 
7.6.5 Convergence Criteria for the GA 
Prior to the execution of the GA a termination point had to be stated. It was assumed 
that for the GA to be terminated prior to the exhaustion of the maximum number of 
generations set there should exist an indication of convergence by the average fitness 
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given at each generation. Figure 7.9 depicts the convergence pattern expected and 
highlights that as the GA converges to an optimal the difference between the average 
fitness of successive generations decreases. The greatest difference in average fitness 
values between the 20th and 30th generation in figure 7.9 was found to be 0.1. The GA 
was therefore assumed to have converged if the difference between the maximum 
average fitness value and the minimum average fitness value, spanning over ten 
generations, was less than 0.5. 
Figure 7.9 Convergence shown by Average Fitness 
In addition to the convergence criteria based on the average fitness the GA was also 
terminated if either the maximum number of generations were performed or if all the 
strings in a generation represented the same design, i. e. were all identical. Therefore 
there existed three different types of convergence criteria: 
TYPE I: GA terminated due to the difference between the maximum average 
fitness and minimum average fitness <_ 0.5 
TYPE II: GA terminated as all strings in a given population are identical 
TYPE III: Maximum number of generations performed. 
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7.7 Exhaustive Search 
In order to assess the performance of the optimisation of the deluge system using a 
GA it was decided that all designs should be evaluated and the optimal design 
identified. Once highlighted the optimal string could then be compared to that given 
by the GA. As the number of design options for the deluge system was small the 
exhaustive search was completed in the order of minutes. The fitness value for each 
design string was calculated using equation (7.5) and the reliability of each design was 
obtained using the combined model. A summary of the exhaustive search is shown in 
table 7.7. Inspection of table 7.7 highlights that the optimal string was found to be 4 
pumps of Type A, with an inspection interval of 1344 hours (8 weeks). The cost of 
the system is 18,000 units and the average maintenance each week on the pumps is I 
hour. It can be noted that this is on the boundary of the constrained problem. 
Best Design String for each Pump Type, Maintenance test interval and Number of Pum 
TYPE NUMBER 
OF PUMPS 
INSPECTION 
INTERVAL 
FITNESS Reliability 
A 2 672 53.1024 0.996135 
A 4 1344 62.906811 0.999741 
B 2 672 53.66274 0.996350 
C 4 1344 45.930757 0.993266 
D 4 1344 46.11837 0.993344 
E 
N 
4 1344 0.34223 0.929250 
E 6 2016 35.5003 0.988621 
Table 7.7 Summary of Exhaustive Search (Optimal String Highlighted) 
7.8 Genetic Algorithm Implementation 
Two different types of optimisation were performed on the deluge system: A feasible 
region search and a penalty function approach. For each method an initial population 
had to be created. The initial population, size 20, was generated randomly. A random 
number was produced for each of the 10-bits in each string and a0 or 1 placed in the 
string space depending on the value of the random number. Out of the 16-bit string 
only the positions 0 to 9 had to be initialised. 
7.8.1 The Feasible Region Search 
Each string created in the initial population was monitored to ensure that all 20 strings 
represented a feasible design. Difficulties arise due to infeasible points being rejected 
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as reduced information concerning the space is gained. To overcome the fact that not 
all the strings in the initial population may be valid, a clause was incorporated into the 
program. A new subroutine 'Valid' was created in order to check each newly 
developed string in the initial population. Each string was passed through to 
subroutine Valid where it was decoded and the constraints evaluated. If either of the 
constraints were violated then another string was created and the process continued 
until all 20 initial strings were valid. By introducing this clause the initial population 
was set up and contained 20 viable designs. 
The program was set to run for a maximum of 200 generations or until the process 
converged. As postulated in section 7.6.5 the convergence criteria was set such that 
the GA stopped if all the strings in a population were the same or if the magnitude of 
difference between the minimum and maximum average fitness for ten generations 
was less than or equal to 0.5. Prior to the execution of the GA the crossover and 
mutation rates had to be set. It was decided that the crossover rate should be relatively 
high and the mutation rate relatively low. The crossover rate was set high in order to 
increase the chance of information exchange which in turn results in more of the 
solution space being explored and a reduction in the chance of settling for a false 
optimum (ref. 59). Similarly the mutation rate was set low so that diversity was 
occasionally reintroduced into the search. A high mutation rate would lose all the 
structure of the GA and randomise the search. For an initial population of 20 strings, 
each containing 10-bits of information, on average 1-bit per population would be 
changed by setting a mutation rate of 0.005. The algorithm therefore used a mutation 
rate of 0.005 and the crossover rate was set as 0.75. 
At each generation the five fittest strings were stored and compared to the previously 
nominated best five. Proceeding the convergence of the GA the overall five best 
strings were output together with their cost and maintenance requirements. Using this 
information the most appropriate design, in terms of cost and reliability, could be 
identified. The flowchart depicted in figure 7.10 illustrates the procedure followed in 
order to perform an optimisation search using a GA. 
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Figure 7.10 Flowchart to represent GA algorithm 
7.8.1.1 Results and Conclusions for the Feasible Region Search 
In order to support the efficiency of the GA in a reliability design problem the process 
was completed for ten different seeds. Table 7.8 shows the design characteristics for 
the best five designs resulting from each run and table 7.9 depicts the performance 
measures for the overall best design and the GA. 
The results showed that eight out of the ten runs highlighted the best string to be the 
actual optimum gained from the exhaustive search, table 7.7. The two runs, runs 2 
and 5, that failed to highlight the actual optimum both postulated that the best design 
comprised of 4 pumps of type A with an inspection interval of 11 weeks. The 
reliability of this design is 0.99942 and the fitness value awarded for the deign was 
62.0234. The difference between this design and the optimal can be shown to be 3.21 
x104 in reliability terms and 0.883411 in fitness terms. From these observations it 
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was concluded that the difference was negligible and that the implementation of the 
GA in the attempt to optimise the deluge safety system was successful. 
Best Five Strings Found 
GA Run TYPE No. OF 0 Cost Maint Qi 
PUMPS 
1 A 4 1344 18.000 1 hr 0.999741 
A 4 1680 18.000 0.8 hr 0.99960 
A 4 2688 18.000 0.5 hr 0.99888 
A 4 2856 18.000 0.47 hr 0.99870 
A 4 3528 18,000 0.38 hr 0.99774 
2 A 4 2016 18,000 0.66 hr 0.99942 
A 4 2184 18,000 0.615 hr 0.99931 
A 4 2352 18,000 0.57 hr 0.99919 
A 4 2520 18,000 0.53 hr 0.99904 
A 4 4368 18,000 0.31 hr 0.99588 
3 A 4 1344 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
A 4 1512 18,000 0.88 hr 0.999679 
A 4 2016 18,000 0.66 hr 0.99942 
A 4 2184 18,000 0.615hr 0.99931 
A 4 2352 18,000 0.57 hr 0.99919 
4 A 4 1344 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
A 4 1512 18,000 0.88 hr 0.999679 
A 4 1680 18,000 0.8 hr 0.99960 
A 4 1848 18.000 0.72 hr 0.99952 
A 4 2016 18,000 0.66 hr 0.99942 
5 A 4 2016 18,000 0.66 hr 0.99942 
A 4 2184 18,000 0.615 hr 0.99931 
A 4 2352 18,000 0.57 hr 0.99919 
A 4 2520 18,000 0.53 hr 0.99904 
A 4 3360 18,000 0.4 hr 0.99802 
6 A 4 1344 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
A 4 1512 18,000 0.88 hr 0.999679 
A 2 672 9,000 1 hr 0.99613 
A 2 840 9,000 0.8hr 0.99498 
A 2 1008 9,000 0.66 hr 0.99369 
7 A 4 1344 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
A 4 1512 18,000 0.88 hr 0.999679 
A 4 2016 18,000 0.66 hr 0.99942 
A 4 2184 18,000 0.615hr 0.99931 
A 4 3024 18,000 0.44 hr 0.99850 
8 A 4 1344 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
A 4 1680 18,000 0.8hr 0.99960 
A 4 1848 18,000 0.72 hr 0.99952 
A 4 2016 18,000 0.66 hr 0.99942 
A 4 2184 18,000 0.615 hr 0.99931 
9 A 4 1344 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
A 4 1680 18,000 0.8hr 0.99960 
A 4 1848 18,000 0.72 hr 0.99952 
C 4 1344 12,800 1 hr 0.99326 
B 2 1176 9,400 0.57 hr 0.99258 
10 A 4 1344 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
A 4 1680 18,000 0.8 hr 0.99960 
A 4 2016 18,000 0.66 hr 0.99942 
A 4 2352 18,000 0.53 hr 0.99919 
A 4 3528 18,000 0.4 hr 0.99803 
Table 7.8 Five Optimal Strings found for each GA run 
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GA Run Terminated at 
Generation 
Termination 
Criteria 
Cost Average 
Maintenance 
Q; 
1 Gen. 65 Type II 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
2 Gen. 37 Type II 18,000 0.666 hr 0.99942 
3 Gen. 30 Type I 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
4 Gen. 50 Type I 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
5 Gen. 20 Type I 18,000 0.666 hr 0.99942 
6 Gen. 20 Type II 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
7 Gen. 30 Type II 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
8 Gen. 35 Type II 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
9 Gen. 11 Type 11 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
10 Gen. 20 Type 1 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
Table 7.9 Best Design Cost and Maintenance Requirements 
The benefit of retaining the five best strings identified by the GA can be highlighted 
by inspection of the results gained from run 6 in table 7.8. The third, fourth and fifth 
best strings show a saving in cost of 9,000 units, half the allowable expenditure. By 
using a design with only two pumps of type A the cost is reduced by half, yet the 
reliability is reduced by only 3.6lx104. By using the GA optimisation scheme a 
design was identified that is 99% reliable and that provides a saving of 9,000 units. 
The reason behind such a large saving is achieved is due to the fact that the cost of the 
design relates only to the cost of the pumps. Halving the number of type A pumps in a 
design will obviously halve the cost of the design- Nevertheless it symbolises the 
usefulness of retaining more than one optimal solution. In addition to the saving in 
cost, a reduced amount of maintenance was also highlighted in the 4th and 5th best 
strings for run 6. This saving was again related to the decreased number of pumps 
present in the designs. 
To inspect the convergence of the GA the average fitness value at each generation was 
monitored. Table 7.10 shows the initial population average fitness value and the final 
populations average fitness value for each of the ten runs. Inspection of this table 
illustrates the conversion of the GA as all runs tend to the maximum allowable fitness 
value of 62.906811. In order to further support the notion of convergence the 
average fitness at each generation for the runs 2,5 and 8 were plotted, as shown in 
figure 7.11. 
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GA Run Average Fitness value of 
Initial population 
Average Fitness value of Final 
population 
1 16.7839 60.214 
2 9.4663 60.533 
3 15.648 62.8287 
4 17.337 62.558 
5 8.9029 61.25819 
6 5.76347 62.906811 
7 10.3674 58.366 
8 18.469335 61.33832 
9 10.2598 61.27554 
10 10-32756 61.7765 
Table 7.10 Average Fitness of the Initial and Final Population in the Ten GA Runs 
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Figure 7.11 A graph to demonstrate the convergence of 3 different GA runs. 
In summary it can be concluded that the optimisation of the deluge pump system was 
successfully achieved by implementation of a GA: indeed 80% of the trial runs gave 
the optimal string as their optimal solution. This result shows the effectiveness of the 
GA as a number of strings found in the exhaustive search differed only marginally in 
reliability terms. The mapping scheme devised for awarding a fitness value due to a 
string's reliability was therefore adequate at distinguishing between strings that 
differed slightly in magnitude. However, the effectiveness of the mapping scheme 
diminished as the difference in the reliability of a group of strings decreased. The 
mapping scheme was not devised to detect differences in such strings, as in reality any 
design that was 99% reliable would be acceptable. A modification to the mapping 
scheme could have been developed in order to distinguish between strings in the range 
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0.99-0.99741. However, such a change was deemed unnecessary due to the 
successfulness of the GA. 
By retaining the average fitness value at each generation the convergence of the GA 
was monitored. For each run performed the average fitness for the initial population 
and the final population were compared. For each run a trend existed such that the 
average fitness tended towards the maximum fitness value possible, 62.906811. It can 
therefore be concluded from such observations that the GA converged and hence was 
an effective optimisation procedure to use for the deluge pump system design 
problem. 
The effectiveness of the GA can be further supported by inspection of the number of 
generations performed prior to convergence, table 7.9. The average number of 
generations for the 10 runs was 37, with the maximum of 65 generations found in run 
1. The amount of computation required to perform 65 generations, for a population of 
20 strings, was in the order of minutes. The GA therefore produced an optimal result 
with an acceptable amount of computational effort. 
From a practical viewpoint the retention of the five best strings discovered by the GA 
would aid the designer. By having a choice from five optimal designs the most cost 
effective, yet adequately reliable design, can be highlighted and implemented. 
Inspection of the five best strings can also be used to support the effectiveness of the 
GA. 
7.8.2 The Penalty Function Approach 
Although the initial population contained twenty viable strings it was noted that future 
generations could produce infeasible designs which would be rejected therefore 
reducing the information utilised in producing the next generation. One way of 
avoiding rejecting encountered infeasible solutions is to allow the search to enter the 
infeasible region. A penalising strategy allows consideration of the infeasible region. 
Any string that violates the constraints is penalised which reduces the fitness value of 
the string and hence its chance of reproduction. In addition to this it is realistic to 
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assume that a designer would be prepared to exceed the original budget if the benefits 
could be demonstrated by a cost effective improvement in the system's performance. 
In order to consider designs that violate the cost and maintenance constraints a new 
fitness formula had to be developed. It was decided that a penalty should be added to 
represent the degree to which the constraints were violated. Small violation incur 
relatively small penalties and so will be accepted if the improvements in system 
performance can compensate. Large violations are heavily penalised. 
The determination of the fitness of each individual string was modified to incorporate 
a value due to the reliability of the design coupled with a penalty due to exceeding any 
of the constraints. The value due to the reliability of the design was achieved, as in 
the feasible region search, using equation (7.5). In order to obtain a value due to 
exceeding either constraints penalty formulas had to be developed. The penalty forms 
were based on the desired improvement in system performance required to allow the 
constraint violation to be acceptable. 
7.8.2.1 The Cost Constraint 
The maximum cost was set to 18,000 units for which a reasonably reliable system 
would be expected. A reliability in the region of 0.965 would be reasonable for any 
safety system. It was assumed that an increase in cost should be accompanied by a 
similar increase in reliability to warrant exceeding the cost constraint. For this reason 
it was decided that a 15% increase in cost should produce an increase in reliability 
from 0.965 to 0.98. Inspection of the quadratic used to determine a fitness value, 
figure 7.6, indicated that an increase from 0.965 to 0.98 was equivalent to an increase 
of 15 units in the fitness figure. Hence for any design which exceeded the cost 
constraint the following cost penalty value was obtained: 
Pencost = ((Cost of Design - 18,000)/2700) * 15 
where 2700 is equal to 15% of 18,000 and 15 is the value obtained from the quadratic 
formula. 
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7.8.2.2 The Maintenance Constraint 
As a formula had already been devised to penalise excessive system cost it was 
decided that the maintenance penalty formula should also be related to cost. The 
maximum allowable maintenance time is an average of 1 hour per week. This is 
equivalent to 52 hours on average a year and if it costs 100 units an hour then the total 
cost per year would be 5200 units. For this amount of money a system with a 
reliability of 0.965 is again used to gauge the performance expected. As with the cost, 
an increase of maintenance activity would only be tolerated if the reliability itself was 
significantly increased. Therefore for any design which exceeded the maintenance 
constraint the following penalty value would be obtained: 
Penj, 'ait = ((Average maintenance each week - 1.0*5200.00)/780) * 15 
where 780 is equal to 15% of 5,200 and 15 is the value obtained from the quadratic 
formula. 
7.8.2.3 The Overall Fitness Value of a String 
The fitness value for each string was therefore calculated using: 
Fitness = Fitness due to reliability - Pen, 0St - Penmaint 
Having shown that the GA produces better results when all initial strings in a 
population are valid, the subroutine Valid was incorporated in order to remove all 
infeasible designs. Due to the penalty formulas this included only the designs where 
there were not enough pumps to achieve 100% capacity. 
The exhaustive search was completed again with the inclusion of the penalty forms 
however the optimal string still remained as: 
Pump Option =A 
Number of Pumps =4 (2 electric, 2 diesel) 
Maintenance Interval =8 weeks 
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The reasoning behind this is that the optimal produced when not including the penalty 
formulas has a reliability of 0.999741. Increasing the maintenance from every 8 
weeks to every 7 weeks incurs an additional cost of 1,859 units but only increases the 
reliability by 5.2 x10-5, not enough to warrant the additional cost- For this particular 
system the penalty formulas have little effect due to the extraordinary high reliability 
of designs which do not violate any constraint. 
7.8.2.4 Results and Conclusions for Penalty Function Approach 
The program was executed for 10 different seeds, using a crossover rate of 0.75, a 
mutation rate of 0.005 and the maximum number of generations to be 200. As with 
the feasible region search, the best five strings discovered by the GA were identified. 
Table 7.11 shows the design characteristics for the best five designs resulting from 
each run and table 7.12 depicts the performance measures for the overall best design 
and the GA. 
The results showed that five out of the ten runs highlighted the best string to be the 
actual optimum gained from the exhaustive search, table 7.7. The remaining five 
strings highlighted best designs all with reliability values greater than 0.998. It can be 
seen that the GA produced very near optimal designs, even though it may have not 
highlighted the actual optimal. For this system a number of the designs proved to be 
highly reliable which may have affected the performance of the GA in locating the 
actual optimal However, it cannot be disputed that the GA did succeed in locating a 
highly reliable area of the search space. 
The benefit of retaining the five best strings identified by the GA can be highlighted 
by inspection of the results gained from run 7 in table 7.11. The fifth best strings 
shows that a small increase in cost, 800 units, produces a system design with a 
reliability of 0.99974. In the deluge system the increase is not significant as a design 
already exists which produces the system reliability of 0.99974 for 800 units less. 
This example, nevertheless, identifies the use of penalties in the discovery of designs 
in the infeasible region which may yield an advantage in reliability for a small 
additional cost. 
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Best Five Strings Found 
GA Run TYPE No. PUMPS 0 Cost Maint Q. 
1 A 4 1344 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
A 4 1512 18,000 0.88 hr 0.999679 
A 4 1680 18,000 0.8 hr 0.99960 
A 4 1848 18,000 0.72 hr 0.99952 
A 4 2688 18,000 0.5 hr 0.99888 
2 A 4 2016 18,000 0.66 hr 0.99942 
A 4 2352 18,000 0.57 hr 0.99919 
A 4 2520 18,000 0.53 hr 0.99904 
B 4 2016 18,800 0.66 hr 0.99944 
B 4 2520 18,800 0.53 hr 0.999075 
3 A 4 1344 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
A 4 1512 18,000 0.88 hr 0.999679 
A 4 2016 18,000 0.66 hr 0.99942 
A 4 2184 18,000 0.615hr 0.99931 
A 4 2352 18,000 0.57 hr 0.99919 
4 A 4 1344 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
A 4 1512 18,000 0.88 hr 0.999679 
A 4 1680 18,000 0.8 hr 0.99960 
A 4 1848 18,000 0.72 hr 0.99952 
A 4 2352 18,000 0.57 hr 0.99919 
5 A 4 2016 18,000 0.66 hr 0.99942 
A 4 2184 18,000 0.615 hr 0.99931 
A 4 2352 18,000 0.57 hr 0.99919 
A 4 2520 18,000 0.53 hr 0.99904 
A 4 3360 18,000 0.4 hr 0.99802 
6 A 4 1680 18,000 1 hr 0.99960 
A 4 3360 18,000 0.4 hr 0.99802 
B 4 1680 18,800 0.8 hr 0.99962 
A 2 3528 18,000 0.38hr 0.99498 
A 4 3696 18,000 0.36 hr 0.99369 
7 A 4 2016 18,000 0.8 hr 0.99942 
A 4 2184 18,000 0.615 hr 0.99931 
A 4 3024 18,000 0.44 hr 0.99850 
A 4 3192 18,000 0.42 hr 0.99827 
B 4 1344 18,800 1 hr 0.99974 
8 A 4 1344 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
A 4 1680 18,000 0.8hr 0.99960 
A 4 1848 18,000 0.72 hr 0.99952 
A 4 2016 18,000 0.66 hr 0.99942 
A 4 2184 18,000 0.615 hr 0.99931 
9 A 4 1344 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
A 4 1680 18,000 0.8hr 0.99960 
A 4 1848 18,000 0.72 hr 0.99952 
B 4 1344 18,800 1 hr 0.99974 
B 4 1680 18,800 0.8 hr 0.99962 
10 A 4 1680 18,000 0.8 hr 0.99960 
A 4 2016 18,000 0.66 hr 0.99942 
A 4 2352 18,000 0.53 hr 0.99919 
A 4 3024 18,000 0.44 hr 0.99850 
A 4 3360 18,000 0.4 0.99802 
Table 7.11 Five Optimal Strings found for each GA run 
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GA Run Terminated at 
Generation 
Termination 
Criteria 
Cost Average 
Maintenance 
Q; 
1 Gen. 30 Type I 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
2 Gen. 21 Type II 18,000 0.666 hr 0.99942 
3 Gen. 30 Type I 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
4 Gen. 60 Type I 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
5 Gen. 30 Type I 18,000 0.666 hr 0.99942 
6 Gen. 12 Type II 18,000 0.8 hr 0.99960 
7 Gen. 46 Type II 18,000 0.666 hr 0.99942 
8 Gen. 30 Type II 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
9 Gen. 13 Type II 18,000 1 hr 0.999741 
10 Gen. 24 Type II 18,000 0.8 hr 0.99960 
Table 7.12 Best Design Cost and Maintenance Requirements 
As with the feasible region search, the convergence of the GA can be illustrated by 
comparison of the initial population average fitness values and the final populations 
average fitness values for each run. Table 7.13 shows the initial and final populations 
average fitness value and confirms that convergence occurs in all ten runs. 
GA Run Average Fitness value of 
Initial population 
Average Fitness value of Final 
population 
1 19.1959 62.5578 
2 9.46663 61.5455 
3 15.648 62.828 
4 17.337 55.9115 
5 8.9029 61.358 
6 13.8432 52.3345 
7 15.896 57.27796 
8 24.1579 60.53315 
9 10.2598 58.3415 
10 15.9642 61.35836 
Table 7.13 Average Fitness of the Initial and Final Population in the Ten GA Runs 
In summary it can be concluded that the inclusion of the penalty forms in no way 
hindered the effectiveness of the GA, even though only 50% of the trial runs gave the 
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optimal string as their optimal solution- The remaining 50% of the runs highlighted 
designs with reliability values exceeding 0.99 and therefore for each run a highly 
reliable string was identified by the GA. The reason why the optimal string was only 
given in 50% of the trials can be postulated, as with the feasible region search, as the 
inability of the fitness value mapping scheme to differentiate between highly reliable 
strings. The reason for a reduced percentage, in comparison to the feasible region 
search, of the number of trial runs that identified the optimal string is due to a larger 
search space being explored by the GA. In the penalty function approach previously 
infeasible strings could have been included in the initial population. The GA could 
then have converged prior to the optimal string being searched. This suggestion can 
be supported by the type of termination criteria used in the 5 runs where the optimal 
string was not identified. For 4 out of those 5 runs the GA terminated due to all the 
strings in a population being identical, convergence criteria type II. This implies that, 
in comparison to the other strings in the same population, one string was significantly 
fitter and eventually dominated the entire population. As there exists a large number 
of highly reliable strings in the deluge system any one identified by the GA would 
have a high likelihood of resulting as the GAs optimal solution. 
As with the feasible region search the average fitness value of the initial population 
was compared to the average fitness value of the final population. The GA for each 
trial run showed a trend implying convergence which suggests that the inclusion of the 
penalty formulas did not disturb the effectiveness of the GA. 
The average number of generations for the 10 runs was 29, slightly less than that 
observed for the feasible region search. The reason for this reduction is again a result 
of a larger search space being explored. For the feasible region search there existed 
122 valid design options. For the penalty function approach there existed 494. The 
feasible region search, therefore, had a greater chance of the initial population 
containing a large number of highly fit strings. Alternatively, the penalty function 
case had a high chance of the initial population containing only a few highly fit 
strings. Any population dominated, in terms of fitness, by a few strings will converge 
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rapidly to the area of the search space occupied by those strings, hence reducing the 
number of generations required. 
The motivation for the inclusion of penalty formulas in the GA is to allow a larger 
search space to be explored in the hope of identifying a better solution to the problem 
and to better mimic the real decision making process. In the deluge pump system 
more reliable solutions were identified. However, due to the exceptionally reliable 
optimal string in the feasible region of the search, these were heavily penalised. 
Although the inclusion of a penalised fitness value did not change the result of the GA 
for the deluge system, it can be a powerful tool in the optimisation of a design 
problem. 
7.9 Summary of Conclusions 
1) The use of a simple Genetic Algorithm provided an effective means of 
determining an optimal design. 
2) By using penalised formulas more reliable designs were considered, although the 
effect was minimal for the deluge system. For systems which do not comprise of 
such a high percentage of extremely reliable designs in the feasible search space 
the effects would have been more prominent. 
3) The Genetic Algorithm approach was attached to the combined model and tested 
effectively and successfully on a deluge pump system. 
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CHAPTER 8 
APPLICATION OF THE CAUSE-CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM METHOD TO 
STATIC SYSTEMS 
8.1 Introduction 
Following the literature review on the cause-consequence diagram method an 
investigation into the technique and possible developments was initiated. The 
fundamental fault with the cause-consequence diagram method was highlighted as its 
non-generalised set of construction and quantification rules. An investigation was 
hence initiated into the development of a generalised set of construction and analysis 
rules for the cause-consequence diagram method. 
This chapter highlights the developments made in the cause-consequence diagram 
method for systems containing independent failure events. 
8.2 Application to Static Systems 
Cause-consequence analysis is most frequently applied to dynamic systems where the 
system state changes with time. It is the changing state of the system during phases 
such as the start-up or shut down, which makes alternative methods difficult to apply. 
Systems which are considered as static, where the system state at an instant in time is 
important, are generally analysed using techniques such as FTA or Markov modelling. 
Prior to considering dynamic systems the capability of cause consequence analysis for 
static systems is investigated. 
8.2.1 Symbols used for Construction 
The basic and most commonly used symbols for cause-consequence diagram 
construction in this section are illustrated in table 8.1. 
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SYMBOL FUNCTION 
The Decision Box represents the functionality of 
rim a component/system. The NO box represents 
qi 
failure to perform correctly, the probability of 
0 ES which is obtained via a fault tree or single Ft1 
component failure probability q; 
Fault Tree Arrow represents the number of the 
Ftl fault tree structure which corresponds to the 
decision box 
The initiator triangle represents the initiating V 
event for a sequence where A. indicates the rate of 
X= occurrence 
Time delay I indicates that the time starts from 
the time at which the delay symbol is entered and 
continues up to the end of the time interval in the 
delay symbol 
OR gate symbol: Used to simplify the Cause- 
Consequence Diagram when more than one 
decision box enters the same decision box or 
consequence box 
Consequence Box represents the outcome event 
due to a particular sequence of events. 
Table 8.1 Cause-Consequence Diagram Symbols and Functions 
8.2.2 Rules for Construction 
The cause-consequence diagram technique has been applied to a static system and 
shown to yield the same results as those produced by the solution of the equivalent 
fault tree. On the basis of this study general rules have been devised for the correct 
construction of the cause-consequence diagram given a static system. The use of the 
cause-consequence method in this manner has significant implications in terms of 
efficiency of the reliability analysis and can be shown to have benefits for static 
systems. The algorithm for static system analysis is as follows: 
Step 1 Component Failure Event Ordering 
If order of failure is irrelevant, which is the case in a static system, then the cause- 
consequence diagram can be initiated by considering any of the components in the 
system. The analysis of the cause-consequence diagram should yield identical results 
regardless of the component or variable ordering, however the actual diagrams may 
vary in size. The first step of the cause-consequence diagram construction is therefore 
deciding on the order in which component failure events are to be taken. To ensure a 
logical development of the causes of the system failure mode it was decided that the 
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ordering should follow the temporal action of the system, for example the systems 
activation for the function required. 
Step 2 Cause-Consequence Diagram Construction 
The second stage involves the actual construction of the diagram. Starting from the 
initiating component the functionality of each component or sub-system is 
investigated and the consequences of these sequences determined. If the decision box 
is governed by a sub-system then the probability of failure will be obtained via a fault 
tree diagram. 
Step 3 Reduction 
If any decision boxes are deemed irrelevant, for example the boxes attached to the NO 
and YES branches are identical and their outcomes and consequences are the same, 
then these should be removed and the diagram reduced to a minimal form. Removal 
of these boxes will in no way affect the end result. This is illustrated in figure 8.1 
where failure (F) occurs due to either of the two paths that terminate in the failure 
consequence. On one path the component A works, on the other it fails proving that 
the state of component A represented by the decision box is irrelevant. 
Similarly figure 8.2 illustrates another example of this situation. 
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Figure 8.1 Redundant Decision Box 
9 
Component A 
Functions Correctly 
O YES 
System Failed 
F 
Figure 8.2 Identical Consequences 
When a redundant decision box is identified, reduction is achieved by removing the 
box and entering the next decision/consequence box encountered in its place. Each 
decision box is inspected and when no further redundancies exist the cause- 
consequence diagram is deemed minimal. 
Step 4 System Failure Quantification 
The probability of each consequence for a static system is determined by summing the 
probability of each set of events which lead to this particular outcome. Each sequence 
probability is obtained by simply multiplying the probabilities of the component 
events represented by the branch, as illustrated in Hickling (ref. 43). This is possible 
as each sequence of events is mutually exclusive (ref. 14) and the probability of 
component failure events are assumed independent. The 4 step procedure can be 
represented in a flowchart as shown in figure 8.3. 
I Decide On 
Ordering Due to 
Temporal Action 
of the System 
Construct Cause- 
Consequence 
Diagram by 
considering 
functionality of each 
sub-system/ 
component 
CMy 
Irrelevant 
Derision -No- ANALYSIS 
Boxes? 
Yes 
Reduce Cause- 
Consequence 
Diagram by removal 
of redundant boxes 
Figure 8.3 Flowchart for Cause-Consequence Diagram Construction 
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8.3 Example 1: Three Component System 
The cause-consequence diagram approach for static systems is demonstrated by 
application to a very simple system example. In the approach it is shown why the 
method has potential advantages in comparison to a conventional fault tree study for 
larger systems. The example system contains three components A, B and C and 
system failure is caused by either A and B failing together or C failing alone. The 
system failure causes are illustrated as a fault tree structure in figure 8.4. 
TOP 
Gl 
AB 
Figure 8.4 Example Fault Tree 
The cause-consequence diagram was constructed and analysed using the algorithm 
developed. 
Steps 1 and 2 Component Failure Event Ordering and Cause-Consequence 
Diagram Construction 
The ordering chosen was that of A, B, C and the cause-consequence diagram was 
constructed by inspecting the failures of those components in that order (Figure 8.5). 
Step 3 Reduction 
Boxes 3 and 4 are both irrelevant and were therefore removed. This process reduced 
the cause-consequence diagram, the final form being illustrated in figure 8.6, and as 
no further redundancies existed the diagram was minimal- 
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V 
omponent A1 
unctions Correctly 
O YES F: System Failure 
W: System Works 
omponent B2 Component B 
Functions 3 
4b O ES 4b O ES 
omponent C omponent C omponent C omponent C 
prunctions 4 unctions unctions 6 unctions 7 
qc OI YES O ES I q` O ES 0 ES 
12 
6666 
78 
FFWFW 
Figure 8.5 Cause-Consequence Diagram for three component system 
komponent A 
unctions 
qO YES F: System Failure 
W: System Works 
Component omponent 
Functions 
qb O ES NO IYE 
L4I5 
iOW 
omponent C 
unctrons 
qc NO ES 
23 6 
W 
Figure 8.6 Reduced Cause-Consequence Diagram 
Step 4 System Failure Quantification 
The probability of system failure is equal to the sum of the probability of the 3 
sequence paths that lead to the consequence V. Therefore since the paths are 
mutually exclusive: 
Probability of Failure = P(Path 1) + P(Path 2) + P(Path 4) 
qA. qB + qA-(1-gB). qc+ (1-gA). qc 
= qA. qB + qA-qc - gA. qB"qc + qc-qn-qc 
= qA. qB + qc- qA-qß-qc 
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The fault tree quantification, using the exact method, calculated the top event 
probability to be identical to that obtained by the cause-consequence diagram 
approach. After studying the reduced form of the cause-consequence diagram it was 
noted that it was equivalent to the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) for the fault tree 
in figure 8.4, with the variable ordering A<B<C (Figure 8.7). The top event 
probability can also be obtained directly from the BDD by multiplying the 
probabilities down the paths that lead to the terminal 1 node (ref. 61). 
AB+C 
A 
10 
BC 
0ýo 
i0 
C 
0 
i0 
Figure 8.7 BDD with variable ordering A<B<C 
8.3.1 Repeated Events 
If the four stage procedure developed to construct and analyse a cause-consequence 
diagram is to be considered as a generally applicable approach it must be capable of 
dealing with the events which occur more than once in the fault tree diagram. This 
section shows that the cause-consequence diagram method can deal with repeated 
events in a more efficient way to that used for FTA. Using the cause-consequence 
diagram method there exists no need to obtain the Boolean expression of the top event 
and then manipulate it to produce a minimal form prior to analysis. The cause- 
consequence method deals with sequences of events which either occur (fail) or not 
occur (work). The probability of a particular outcome is obtained by summation of 
the probability of all paths that lead to the outcome. 
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8.3.1.1 Example System with Repeated Events 
The system investigated was taken from (ref. 43) and included a RELAY as the 
repeated event. The closure of a valve can either be achieved by automatic control or 
by an operator manually closing the valve, the Relay is common to both these 
subsystems. The fault tree for this sub-system is illustrated in figure 8.8. 
L 
VALVE NOT 
CLOSED 
ORATOR NO AUTO 
FAILS TO 
CLOSE VALVE CLOSURE 
OP RELAY DETEC RELAY 
Figure 8.8 Fault Tree for Valve Closure. 
Using a bottom-up approach and Boolean reduction the minimal cut sets for the top 
event, failure to close Valve, were found to be: 
{OP. DETECT) 
{RELAY} 
The exact top event probability is given by: 
P(TOP) = qop-QDET + qREL - qop-gDET-QREL 
The cause-consequence diagram can be drawn in a number of ways depending on the 
component ordering chosen, however as this system is a static system ordering was 
irrelevant to the analysis and the diagram was constructed and analysed using the 
previously outlined steps. 
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Step 1 Component Failure Event Ordering 
The ordering decision was made by considering the temporal patterns of the system. 
With this system the automatic control would be activated primarily followed by the 
activation, if necessary, of the manual valve operation. For this reason the ordering 
was chosen to be Automatic control, Operator control. 
Step 2 Cause-Consequence Diagram Construction 
The cause-consequence diagram was constructed by considering the effect of each 
sub-system working or failing (Figure 8.9)_ 
Figure 8.9 Cause-Consequence Diagram for variable ordering Automatic Control, 
Operator Control 
Step 3 Reduction 
Decision box 3 was identified as being irrelevant as the consequences attached to both 
outlet branches were identical. The removal of box 3 reduced the cause-consequence 
diagram to its minimal form, depicted in figure 8.10. 
utomatic Loop 
Fn EO YES 
VC = Valve Closed 
3 
VO = Valve Open 
Aerator 
re s2 VC 
Ft2 O 
12 
VO VC 
Figure 8.10 Reduced Cause-Consequence Diagram 
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Ftl F12 
EAutomatic Operator 
L 
Loop is to bop fails to 
close valve close valve 
DETECT RELAY OP RELAY 
Figure 8.11 Fault Trees for Repeated Event Cause-Consequence Diagram 
Step 4 System Failure Quantification 
The probability of the valve not being closed is equal to the probability of the single 
path that leads to the consequence' VO'. By inspection of Ftl and Ft2, which 
represent the failure of the automatic loop and the operator loop respectively, it was 
noted that both trees contained the failure of the Relay (Figure 8.11). Applying the 
traditional method of multiplication of each decision box probabilities would prove to 
be incorrect as the probabilities are not independent since the failure of the Relay 
appears in both. To overcome this problem each component could be considered 
separately so the ordering would become DETECTOR, RELAY, OPERATOR and the 
corresponding cause-consequence diagram constructed, as shown in figure 8.12. This 
procedure is straightforward for such a small system but would quickly prove to be 
highly impractical for any real life system which could potentially contain hundreds of 
basic events. An alternative method had to be devised in order to deal with the 
repeated events without considering each basic event failure separately. 
ETECTOR 
ESPONDS 1 
qDET-- O IYES 
J VO = Valve Open 
VC = Valve CWSed 
Y ELAY 
RATES 2 RATES 3 
gREL O ES -IEL O ES 
ERATOR ERATOR RATOR PERATOR 
ESPONDS 4q ESPONDS 5 ESPOND 6 SPONDS 
'10 O ES ES qOP ES qop ES 
11 2 3ý 
O 
5ý 6 TV 
O 
Figure 8.12 Cause-Consequence Diagram for ordering Detect, Relay, Operator 
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As the failure of the Relay appears in both fault trees then both sub-systems would fail 
if the Relay itself failed. It was therefore decided to extract the dependency by 
considering the repeated event separately. The repeated event was extracted and 
placed in a decision box preceding the first decision box that contained the common 
failure event. The original cause-consequence diagram, figure 8.10, was then 
duplicated on each outlet branch stemming from this new decision box as illustrated 
in figure 8.13. The result of this process was that the fault trees governing the failure 
of the automatic loop and the operator loop had to be modified by setting the failure of 
the Relay to TRUE or FALSE depending on whether the NO or YES paths, 
respectively, were followed. 
elay Functions 
gREL- O YES 
VO = Valve 
Open 
VC = Valve 
Closed 
omatic Loop tic Loop 
esponds esponds 
OSp qDET 0S 
36 
for Loop afar Loop 
espmds VC esponds VC 
'0 ES ° qO O ES 
12a5 
VO VC VO VC 
Figure 8.13 Extracted Common Failure Event 
By setting the probability of failure of the Relay to 1, in the fault trees representing 
events below the NO outlet branch from the 'Relay functions' decision box, the top 
event probability of Ft1 and Ft2 became unity. Setting the probability of failure for 
the Relay to 0, for the fault trees representing the event below the YES outlet branch, 
lead to the top event probability of Ftl and Ft2 becoming single failure fault trees, 
where Ftl became qDET and Ft2 became equivalent to qop. The decision boxes that 
had a probability of 1 on the NO branch were removed as failure was certain and the 
reduced cause-consequence diagram was developed, as shown in figure 8.14. 
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ELAY 
PERATES 
gREL O ES 
6TticLoop 
gDET 
es onds VO = Valve Open 
ES VC = Valve Closed 
4 
VC 
peratorLoop 
es onds 
qO O ES 
3 
VO VC 
Figure 8.14 Minimal Cause-Consequence Diagram for Repeated Event System 
The probability of the valve not closing could now be calculated as all failures were 
independent. The probability is equal to the summation of the probability of ending in 
the consequence 'VO', which was achieved via two mutually exclusive paths, path I 
and path 2. Hence, 
Prob(failure to close valve) = P(Path 1) + P(Path 2) 
qREL + (1-QREL). QDET-qop 
= qREL + QDET"QOP - qDET. qop. qREL 
This is the same probability as that obtained from the FTA technique. As with the 
previous examples it was shown that the cause-consequence diagram with ordering 
automatic loop, operator loop following extraction of the common failure event, was 
equivalent to the BDD with variable ordering REL<DET<OP (Figure 8.15). 
In the circumstances where several such dependencies exist the technique needs to be 
applied for each event. By extracting the common failure events, duplicating the 
cause-consequence diagram on each outlet branch of the new decision box and using 
TRUE and FALSE failure logic more than one common failure event can be dealt 
with. 
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Figure 8.15 BDD with variable ordering REL<DET<OP 
8.4 Algorithm for Restructuring Cause-Consequence Diagram With Common 
Failure Events 
In order to be able to deal with a common failure event a way of identifying the 
existence of such an event within the cause-consequence diagram was required. The 
names of two basic event symbols used in any fault tree will be the same if and only if 
the events they refer to are identical. It was therefore assumed that if a basic event had 
the same label as another then these were deemed the same event. Given the cause- 
consequence diagram each fault tree structure can be scanned in turn and any identical 
basic events, on the same path, identified. The common failure event must exist on 
the same path for it to cause quantification problems, for this reason every path out of 
each decision box was scanned starting from the top decision box, box I. 
8.4.1 Scanning the Cause-Consequence Diagram 
Initially the cause-consequence diagram is stored using three arrays, IFAIL, IWORK 
and Q, where IFAIL(i) contains the label of the event attached to the NO outlet branch 
of decision box i, IWORK contains the label of the event attached to the YES outlet 
branch of the decision box and Q holds the failure logic of the decision box. For 
identification purposes the decision boxes were assigned numbers ranging from 0 to 
99 and the consequence boxes were assigned numbers from -1 to -99. A simple two 
box cause-consequence diagram is illustrated in figure 8.16 with corresponding fault 
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tree structures depicted in figure 8.17. Taking the simple cause-consequence diagram 
illustrated in figure 8.16 the following arrays are created: 
IFAIL = 
(2) (-3) Ft l L 
iIWORK = -2 
Q 
Ft2 
FT1 FT2 
A B A C 
Figure 8.17 Fault Tree Structures for Cause-Consequence Diagram in figure 8.16 
These arrays are used to scan the cause-consequence structure by implementing an 
algorithm similar to that utilised for reliability block diagram minimal path 
identification (ref. 6). Three arrays are used to store information required for path 
identification, IPOINT, IPREV and BRANCH. IPOINT stores information about the 
next event in the path, IPREV stores information about the previous event in the path 
and BRANCH indicates whether the NO or YES branch has been followed. These 
three arrays allow a path to be traced forward through the diagram. The tracing for a 
particular path stops when a consequence is reached. Once a path has been identified 
the decision boxes encountered in the path, stored in IPOINT, are placed in the array 
IWORK = Q= 
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Figure 8.16 A Simple Cause-Consequence Diagram 
IPATH. Using the array BRANCH the number representing the decision box in the 
array IPATH is set to either a 1, if the NO branch is traced through, or a 2, if the YES 
branch has been traced though. Once the path has been identified the array IPATH is 
used to determine if any common failure events are in the cause-consequence diagram. 
If no common failure events are present then the next path is scanned by backtracking 
using IPREV and BRANCH. 
Figure 8.18 represents the flowchart of the above procedure and figure 8.16 can be 
used to illustrate its application. 
Sd MROX4START 
NPATH49TART 
SET UP IFUL. NYORLO 
lPa . WREV. 
CFE = Common Failure Event 
URNilHJPATN 
BRAW-HM60Rk BRA" 
Yes Yes 
II 
BRANCN(NBOXrt BRANCN(NBOXý2 
ICOLýFAqýNBOX) ICUL-NVORK(NBOX) 
IPWUse 
b dmdne NO or 
L>07 YES branch is traced down Store in (PATH 
affaY Yes 
K1thkom 
Yes STOP ALL 
I PATHS 
SCANNED 
K 
nE -WREVýSJ4 
ýPREVpDDX O 
IPUINTvW4= OL 
X`/ 
ANY CFE 
IPaxT(NUOxpo 
NBOX4COL PRESENT N 
>-No A" 
\ PATH 
Y Yes 
1 
Figure 8.18 Algorithm for Path Identification for a Cause-Consequence Diagram 
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2 (-3) Ft l 
IFAIL = 
-1 
IWORK = 
L2J Q= 
Ft2 
NBOX is the number of the decision box presently under investigation, initialised as 
1. 
NBOX =1 
BRANCH(l)O, :. -BRANCH(1)=1 
ICOL=IFAIL(I)=2 
IPOINT(1)=2, IPREV(2)=1, NBOX=2 
NBOX=2 
BRANCH(2) O, :. BRANCH(2)=l 
ICOL=IFAIL(2) -1 
IPOINT =2 IPREV =0 BRANCH =1 01 
IPOINT starts at decision box I and moves to decision box 2, but 2 does not connect 
1 
to another box so IPATH =1, as both decision boxes have BRANCH(i)=1. The 
path is then checked for any common failure events. 
The next path is checked: 
NBOX =2 
BRANCH(2)=I,:. BRANCH(2)=2 
ICOL=IWORK(2)= -2 
IPOINT = 
(2) 
IPREV =0 BRANCH =(I IPATH =1 0122 
Path is checked for common failure events. 
NBOX =2 AND BRANCH(2)=2 :. 
Backtracking: 
ITEMP = 1, IPREV(2) = 0, IPOINT(2) = 0, BRANCH(2) = 0, NBOX 1 
IPOINT = 
(2) 
IPREV =0 BRANCH =(l) 000 
NBOX =1 
BRANCH(])=], :. BRANCH(I)=2 
ICOL=IWORK(])= -3 
IPATH(2) 
Path is checked for common failure events. 
Backtracking: 
ITEMP = 1, IPREV(2) = 0, IPOINT(2) = 0, BRANCH(2) = 0, NBOX =1 
NBOX =1 BRANCH(1)=2 :. STOP ALL PATHS SCANNED 
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It should be noted that only one path is considered at a time since after each 
extraction, if a common failure event is present, the structure of the cause- 
consequence diagram will change. 
8.4.2 Common Failure Event Identification and Extraction 
Once a path has been identified each fault tree on the path is compared to determine if 
any common failure events are present. Any event with the same label appearing in 
one or more fault trees is considered a common failure event. If a common failure 
event is discovered then the fault trees that it is part of are stored in the array FTREE. 
This process is completed so that following extraction the relevant fault trees can be 
identified and modified. AT is placed in the array element that is equal to the fault 
tree number, for example if Ft3 contains the common failure event then FTREE(3) is 
set equal to 1. 
Given the scenario where more than one common failure event is encountered on the 
same path it was decided that the primarily extracted event should be the one which is 
present in the largest number of decision boxes on the path. If no difference occurs in 
the number of decision boxes that the common failure events are present in then the 
event found in the highest decision box in the cause-consequence diagram will be 
extracted first. 
Following the identification of which common failure event to tackle the event is 
extracted from the fault trees and set as a new decision box event at the highest point 
in the cause-consequence diagram which has all dependencies below it. The new 
decision box, NEW BOX, is set equal to TOT BOX +1, where TOT BOX represents 
the total number of decision boxes in the cause-consequence diagram. The probability 
of failure of the common failure event is stored in Q(NEW BOX). The cause- 
consequence diagram is then duplicated on each branch starting from the new decision 
box. 
The decision boxes stemming from the NO branch of the new decision box retain their 
original numbering and IPATH is used to identify which decision boxes in the cause- 
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consequence diagram to use. The duplicated diagram attached to the YES branch of 
the new decision box, however, have all decision boxes renumbered starting from Tot- 
Box and IPATH is again used to aid in the development of the duplicated decision 
boxes and corresponding fault trees. The fault tree structures attached to the 
renumbered decision boxes are also renumbered starting from the last fault tree 
number and stored in the array Q. A '2' is placed in FTREE to symbolise that the fault 
trees containing the common failure event are on the path stemming from the YES 
branch of the new decision box. This information is used at a later stage ývhen 
modifying the fault trees which contain the common failure event. The procedure of 
extracting a common cause event from a cause-consequence diagram can be illustrated 
as a flowchart (Figure 8.19). The simple cause-consequence diagram illustrated in 
figure 8.16 and the fault trees Ftl and Ft2 depicted in figure 8.17 can be used to 
demonstrate the extraction process.: 
TOT_BOX =2, LAST FT =2 IPATH = 
(1) 
Any Common Failure Events Present? 
IPATH indicates that the first path follows the NO branch of decision box 1 and the NO branch of 
decision box 2. The fault tree structures governing these two boxes are Ftl and Ft2. By inspection of 
the Ftl and Ft2 it can be seen that a common failure event is present, that of component A. 
Ftl and Ft2 are recorded in FTREE 
, where aI 
in the element FTREE(i) indicates that Fti contains the common failure FTREE 
JI) 
1 
event and is on the path attached to the NO branch of the new decision box 
TOT BOX = 3, NEW BOX =3 
IPATH is traced and ICOL is set equal to the position of the first non-zero term in the array. 
ICOL = I, Q(3) = QA 
Duplicate diagram below new decision box, :. IFAIL(3) = IFAIL (ICOL)=1 
Renumber decision boxes on YES branch, IWORK(3) =4.. IFAIL(4) = 5, IWORK(4) = -3, 
Q(4) = Ft3, FTREE(3) =2 and IFAIL(5) _ -1, IWORK(5) _ -2, Q(5) = Ft4, FTREE(4) =2 
2 -3 Ftl 
-1 -2 Ft2 
.. 1 
IFAIL =I (WORK =4Q= QA FTREE =2 
5 -3 Ft3 2 
-1 -2 Ft4 
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boxes=TOT BOX 
Number of faul 
trees=LAST FT 
CFE = Common Failure Event 
Compare fault 
C o-eessýordm 
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IPATH- 
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Yes 
Store which fault 
trees contain the 
CFE in FTREE 
TOT BOX=TOT BOX 
+1 
NEW BOX=TOT BOX 
Scan IPATH for first 
non-zero tens. 
ICOL=1st non-zero 
term 
Extract CFE and 
place in new 
decision box, 
NEW BOX 
Attach single 
component failure to 
NO branch for CFE 
Q(NEW BOX)=Qde 
Duplicate the CCD 
on each brand 
Renumber boxes 
steering from YES 
branch starting from 
TOT BOX+1 
Renumber Fault trees 
attached to decision Place a'2' in 
boxes of duplicated FTREE(i), where i 
diagram steering from equals the number 
YES branch starting of the fault tree 
from LAST FT -1 
Figure 8.19 Flowchart for Extraction of Common Cause Events 
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The cause-consequence diagram changes structure and becomes: 
omponent A 
Iworks 3 
M NO YES 
FC Ft, 
8.4.3 Removal of Common Failure Event from Fault Tree Structures 
Having developed a single decision box for the common failure event the decision 
boxes that contained the event prior to extraction need updating depending on whether 
the common failure event functions or fails to function. The common failure event is 
set to 1 (TRUE) in fault trees following the NO branch from the new decision box, as 
this indicates failure, and 0 (FALSE) in the fault trees following the YES branch to 
signify the component functioning. This process is achieved by utilising the array 
FTREE. FTREE is scanned and whenever a'1' is encountered the common failure 
event in the corresponding fault tree is replaced with the Boolean variable 'I'. 
Similarly when a'2' is encountered the common failure event is replaced with a'0' in 
the fault tree structure. 
The structure of each fault tree that contained the common failure event prior to the 
extraction process will have changed. Hence after every extraction each fault tree 
structure, which has been modified, will be required to be reorganised in order to 
remove all TRUE and FALSE variables. The total number of elements in FTREE are 
counted in order to ensure that only the fault trees originally containing the common 
failure event are examined. The total number of fault trees in FTREE is stored in the 
variable TOT TREE. FTREE is then scanned and the first non-zero term found. 
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ITREE is set equal to the position of this element and the counter, NCNT, is 
incremented by 1. The fault tree is inspected and, depending on the Boolean variable 
encountered, is dealt with accordingly. The same tree is scanned until no further 
Boolean variables exist and the process is completed when all fault trees containing 
the common cause failure event have been modified. 
Therefore in order to eliminate all TRUE and FALSE variables the algorithm shown 
in figure 8.20 is implemented: 
V 
Scan FTREE for 
nexd non-zero 
element=ITREE 
NCNi=NCNT-t 
I 
Scan fault tree 
number [TREE 
/My 
attach 
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< found 
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to gates 
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Proceed up through Proceed up through 
tree until an AND tree until an OR gate 
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to the gate, change 
input event to be an 
input event at the 
ned level up 
Figure 8.20 Algorithm for removing Boolean Variables from Fault Tree Structures 
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The cause-consequence diagram represented in f igure 8.16 and previously used to 
demonstrate the scanning and extraction process can also be used to illustrate the 
removal of the common failure events from the relevant fault trees. Following 
extraction the cause-consequence diagram takes on the form illustrated in figure 8.21, 
which in matrix form is as follows: 
2 -3 Ftl 
-1 -2 Ft2 
IFAIL= 1 IWORK= 4 Q= q, 
5 -3 Ft3 
-1 -2 Ft4 
The fault trees, Ft I -Ft4, are depicted in figure 8.22. 
omponentA 
Works 3 
qA NO YES 
Subsystem t ubsystem 1 
works t works 4 
Ft1 Ft3 
NO YES NO YES 
ubsystem 2 ubsystem 2 
works 2 works 5 
EI) 
FQ NO YES Ft4 NO YES 
c7 c2 cý ý 
Figure 8.21 Cause-Consequence Diagram following extraction of component A 
Ft7 
I 
Ft2 Ft3 Ft4 
Cl 
C 
CC) ö6o B 
Figure 8.22 Fault Trees for Cause-Consequence Diagram in figure 8.21 
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NCNT = 0, TOT TREE =4 
Scan FTREE for next non-zero term = FTREE(1) 
ITREE = 1, .. inspect Ftl, NCNT =1 
Boolean Number =1 TOP = TRUE 
ITREE =1 
Next non-zero term in FTREE =2 .. inspect Ft2, NCNT =2 
Boolean Number =1 TOP = TRUE 
ITREE =2 
Next non-zero term in FTREE =3 .. inspect Ft3, NCNT =3 
FT3 
l b B Boo ean Num er =0 Ft3 = 
ITREE =3 
Next non-zero term in FTREE = 4, . . 
inspect Ft4, NCNT =4 
LL__ 
Boolean Number = 0, Ft4 =0 ITREE =4, NCNT = TOT TREE .. STOP. 
The cause-consequence diagram changes to the structure shown in figure 8.23. 
omponenlA 
Works 3 
NA NO YES 
ubsystem 1 ubsystem 1 
works 1 works 4 
NO YES 
Ft3 
NO YES 
ubsystem 2 bsystem 2 
works 2 c3 works 5 c3 
NO YES Ft4 NO YES 
c1 c1 c2 
Figure 8.23 Modified Cause-Consequence Diagram following Extraction of 
Component A 
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The probability of travelling down the NO branch of decision box 1 and 2 is unity and 
hence these boxes can be removed to produce the minimal form (Figure 8.24) of the 
cause-consequence diagram following the inspection of one path. 
8.5 Algorithm for Construction and Analysis for a Static System 
The algorithms developed thus far, figures 8.3,8.18,8.19 and 8.20, can be combined 
together to produce one algorithm which can construct, modify and analyse any static 
system. Having dealt with a particular path the overall structure of the cause- 
consequence diagram will have changed if any common failure events were present- 
By duplicating parts of the cause-consequence diagram onto new decision boxes the 
left-most path may include new common failure events. For this reason the search for 
additional common failure events is initiated from the top decision box of the cause- 
consequence diagram. Therefore given that a common failure event has been 
identified, extracted and the relevant fault trees modified, the search will begin again 
from Restart Box, the top decision box after each loop of the algorithm. Initially 
Restart Box will be set to 1 but following any decision box begin entered higher than 
decision box one, Restart-Box will be reset equal to the number of the new top 
decision box. The search is completed when all paths have been traced starting from 
the top decision box and no further common failure events exist. The cause- 
consequence diagram can then be analysed by multiplication of the probability of 
travelling down a particular path as all boxes will be caused by independent failures. 
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Figure 8.24 Reduced Cause-Consequence Diagram 
8.6 Application to an Industrial System 
As an example, the technique has been applied to the simple high pressure protection 
system depicted in figure 8.25. The basic functions of the components present in the 
high pressure protection system are shown in table 8.2. The function of the system is 
to prevent the passage of a high-pressure surge. The high pressure originates from a 
production well and the equipment to be protected are vessels located downstream on 
the processing platform. 
The first level of protection is the emergency shutdown (ESD) sub-system. This 
comprises of 3 pressure sensors, for which 2 out of 3 must indicate a high pressure to 
cause a trip. Three shutdown valves, a Master, a Wing and an ESD valve activate to 
trip. If a high pressure surge is detected then the ESD system acts to close the Master 
valve, the Wing valve and the ESD valve. To provide an additional level of protection 
a second sub-system is included, the high-integrity protection sub-system (HIPS). 
This sub-system also comprises of 3 pressure sensors, 2 to trip, and 2 isolation valves 
labeled HIPSI and HIPS2. The HIPS works in an identical manner to the ESD but 
has independent pressure sensors. The pressure sensors for each sub-system feed 
information into a common computer. The fault tree structure for the HIPS system is 
depicted in figure 8.26. 
A fault tree analysis was completed and the qualitative analysis of the HIPS system 
produced 1274 minimal cut sets. Using the failure data given for each component the 
top event probability was calculated using the minimal cut set upperbound 
approximation and shown to equal 2.216x 10-2. 
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Figure 8.25 High-Integrity Protection System (HIPS) 
Component Function Failure Modes Mean Maintenance 
Repair Test Interval 
Time Time 
Master Valve To stop high pressure Valve fails 1.14x10-5 
surge passing through open: VM 36.0 4360 
system 
Wing Valve To stop high pressure Valve fails 1.14xI0-5 
surge passing through open: VW 36.0 4360 
system 
ESD Valve To stop high pressure Valve fails 5.44x 10-6 
surge passing through open: VE 36.0 4360 
system 
HIPSI Valve To stop high pressure Valve fails 5.44x10-6 
surge passing through open: VH 1 36.0 4360 
system 
HIPS2 Valve To stop high pressure Valve fails 5.44x10-6 
surge passing through open: VH2 36.0 4360 
system 
Solenoid To supply power to Fails Energized: 
valves SM, SW, SE, SH1 5.0x10-6 36.0 4360 
, SH2 
Relay Contacts To supply power to Fails Closed Rl- 0.23x10-6 
solenoids RIO 36.0 4360 
Pressure Indicates the level of Fails to record 
Sensors pressure to the actual pressure: 1.5x10-6 36.0 4360 
computer PI-P6 
Computer Reads information Fails to read or 
sent from pressure act on 4360 
sensors and acts to information: C 1x105 36.0 
close appropriate 
valves 
Table 8.2 Component Functions for HIPS System 
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Figure 8.26 Fault Tree Structure for HIPS System 
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8.6.1 Cause-Consequences Diagram Construction and Extraction 
The cause-consequence diagram was constructed and analysed following the 
algorithms given in figure 8.3,8.18,8.19 and 8.20. 
Steps I and 2 Event Ordering and Cause-Consequence Diagram Construction 
The ordering was based on the action of components which could perform the task 
required by the system i. e. Master Valve, Wing Valve, ESD Valve, HIPSI Valve, 
HIPS2 Valve. The cause-consequence diagram was constructed by considering the 
functionality of each valve and their effect on the system. Following the removal of 
all redundant decision boxes the minimal cause-consequence structure was created 
(Figure 8.27). The fault trees developed for each decision box are illustrated in figure 
8.28a and 8.28b. 
tq, P- 
st- Valve 
uts 1 
Ftl 
NO YES 
uts 2 SD 
Ft2 
NO 
IYES 
ESD VL SD 
Eta 
yES 
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O 
4 
FM 
yES 
SD 
IPS2 Valve 
huts 5 
Ft' 
NO YES 
SD: = Shutdown 
SD HP: = High Pressure Surge 
HP 
Figure 8.27 Cause-Consequence Diagram for HIPS System 
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Figure 8.28a Fault Trees for Cause-Consequence Diagram for ESD Sub-System 
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Figure 8.28b Fault Trees for Cause-Consequence Diagram for HIPS Sub-System 
The next stage involved the scanning process, starting from decision box 1, the first 
path was found to be: 
Decision Box 1' Decision Box 2 --ý> Decision Box 3 cý> Decision Box 4 
--ý'> Decision Box 5 -v> HP 
Having identified a path IPATH was utilised in the determination of any common 
failure events. TOT BOX and LASTFT were set equal to 5 and the fault trees 
corresponding to decision boxes 1,2,3,4 and 5 were compared. By inspection of Ftl 
to Ft5 it was noted that the computer failing to read or act on high pressure 
information was common to all five fault trees. In addition to this the failure of the 
ESD Pressure Sensors P1, P2, P3 (3 occurrences) and HIPS pressure sensors, P4, P5, 
P6 (2 occurrences) were also identified as being common failure events. However, as 
the failure of computer was common to more decision boxes it was extracted first. 
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The common failure event was extracted and placed in a new decision box preceeding 
the first box containing the computer, decision box 1. The fault trees Ftl, Ft2, Ft3, 
Ft4 and Ft5 were stored in FTREE and TOT_BOX was incremented by 1, hence 
NEW_BOX was reset to equal 6. As the new decision box preceeded the original top 
decision box, Restart Box, was also reset equal to 6. The common failure event of 
the computer failing was placed in decision box 6 and the cause-consequence 
diagram, starting from decision box 1, was then duplicated on the NO and YES outlet 
branches. The decision boxes and relevant fault trees were renumbered following the 
YES outlet branch of decision box 6, and the fault tree numbers were stored in 
FTREE. Therefore, FTREE = (1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2,2,2)T and TOT TREE = 10. The 
failure of the computer was set to TRUE following the NO branch (Figure 8.29a) and 
FALSE following the YES branch (Figure 8.29b). 
The first non-zero term in FTREE was found in FTREE(1) and hence Ftl was stored 
in the variable ITREE and inspected for any Boolean numbers. Figure 8.29a shows 
that the top event, Master Valve Fails open, is certain. This was due to Ftl containing 
a '1' attached to an OR gate and no AND gate in the remainder of the tree structure. 
Ftl Ft2 Ft3 
Master Valve Fass Valve Fails Open 
Open wng Pen ESD Valve Fails Open 
Figure 8.29a Fault Trees Ftl, Ft2 and Ft3 following the NO branch of the common 
failure event decision box 
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The procedure was repeated until all relevant fault trees contained only gates and basic 
events and the cause-consequence diagram changed to that described in the following 
diagram: 
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Figure 8.29b Fault Trees Ft9, Ft10 following the YES branch of decision box 6 
The cause-consequence diagram was then reduced by removing all redundant decision 
boxes, boxes 1-5 (Figure 8.30). 
tee, on Info 6 
QC NO YES 
1 aster Valve 
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Figure 8.30 Reduced Cause-Consequence Diagram following Computer Extraction 
The cycle was then re-started, with 
IFAIL = (2,3,4,5, -1, -1,8,9,10,11, -1)T 
IWORK = (-2, -2, -2, -2, -2,7, -2, -2, -2, -2, -2)T 
Q=(Ftl, Ft2, Ft3, Ft4, Ft5, qc, Ft6, Ft7, Ft8, Ft9, Ft10)T 
scanning began from RestartBox, i. e. Decision Box 6: 
Restart_Box =6 IPATH = (0,0,0,0,0,2,1,1,1,1,1)T 
TOT BOX = 11, LAST FT = 10 
Comparison of fault trees 7,8,9,10 and 11 found the Common failure events P1, P2, 
P3 P4, P5 and P6 .P1 was extracted as it was common to the highest decision box a found in 3 decision boxes on the path. 
FTREE = (0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1)T 
TOT BOX =12, NEW BOX = 12 
First non-zero term in IPATH = IPATH(7), therefore ICOL =7 Q(12) =Qpi 
FTREE = (0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2,2,2)T , TOT_TREE = 15 
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The relevant fault tree structures were modified and following the second extraction of 
a common failure event the cause-consequence diagram changed as shown in figure 
8.31. 
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Figure 8.31 Cause-Consequence Diagram following Second Extraction 
The cycle was again re-started with 
Fe 
HIPS1 Valve 
O s, _ 1 
NO YES 
IFAIL = (2,3,4,5, -1, -1,8,9,10,11, -1,7,14,15,16,17, -1)T 
IWORK = (-2, -2, -2, -2, -2,7, -2, -2, -2, -2, -2,13, -2, -2, -2, -2, -2), 
r 
Q-(Ft 1, Ft2, Ft3, Ft4, Ft5, qc, Ft6, Ft7, Ft8, Ft9, Ft10, gp1, Ft11, Ft12, Ft13, Ft14, Ft15)T 
The scanning process started from decision box 6 and following completion of one 
full cycle of the algorithm the cause-consequence diagram had changed, as depicted in 
figure 8.32. 
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Figure 8.32 Cause-Consequence Diagram following the Extraction of a third Common 
Failure Event 
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The algorithm was repeated until all paths leading from the top decision box had been 
scanned and no further common failure events were present. The final cause- 
consequence diagram was developed via the extraction of seven individual common 
failure events, C, P1, P2, P3, P4, P5 and P6. The fault trees corresponding to the 
Master, Wing, ESI) and HIPS valves were reduced to the form depicted in figure 8.33 
and the final cause-consequence diagram is given in figure 8.34. 
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Figure 8.33 Reduced Fault Tree Structures for the Master, Wing, ESD and HIPS 
Valves 
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Figure 8.34 Minimal Cause-Consequence Diagram for the HIPS System 
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8.6.2 Analysis 
The probability of a high pressure surge could now be obtained by summing the 
probabilities of ending in the consequence HP, which was reached via 37 independent 
paths. Therefore 
Probability (High Pressure) _ P(Path i) 
Component failures on the safety system are unrevealed and tested and repaired on 
scheduled maintenance. Their failure probabilities are given by equation (7.2). The 
system unavailability was calculated to equal 2.216x 10-2. The figure is identical to 
that produce by the FTA method. This result does not reflect poorly on the cause- 
consequence diagram method, it merely emphasizes the fact that this particular system 
can be failed by a single component, the computer. The remaining minimal cut sets 
are of order 4 or more and therefore have little effect on the overall system 
unavailability. For a system that contained a large number of small order minimal cut 
sets it can be stated that the cause-consequence diagram method would yield a more 
accurate result than that obtained via FTA. 
8.7 Comparison to the Binary Decision Diagram 
By inspection of the final cause-consequence diagram produced for the HIPS system it 
was noted that the structure was identical to the BDD structure of the system with the 
variable ordering COMPUTER<P I <P2<P3<MASTER VALVE<WING 
VALVE<ESD VALVE<P4<P5<P6<HIPSI VALVE<HIPS2 VALVE (Figure 8.35). 
It can be noted that some of the nodes actually represent independent sub-systems, 
such as the ESD valve and Master valve, which implies that modularization has 
occurred. Modularization is used to aid in the efficiency of quantifying large fault 
trees (ref. 63) and involves identifying and solving independent submodules in the 
fault tree structure. The cause-consequence diagram method completes partial 
modularization firstly due to the fault trees governing the decision boxes and secondly 
due to extraction of any repeated events which results in the fault trees attached to the 
decision boxes becoming independent sub-modules. 
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Figure 8.35 BDD representation for HIPS System 
The top event probability was obtained directly from the BDD and was identical to 
that produced by the cause-consequence analysis. 
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8.8 Advantages of New Algorithm 
The conventional technique of FTA has been shown to be inefficient when the tree 
itself is complex (ref. 47). If the fault tree has many minimal cut sets approximations 
are utilised, as determining the top event probability using equation (2.23) would 
require extensive calculations. The approximations used, however, rely on the basic 
events having a small likelihood of occurrence and when this condition is not satisfied 
numerical errors can be significant. One way of avoiding such errors is to use 
Shannon's theorem (ref. 62). The structure function for the top event, 4(x), is pivoted 
with respect to the most repeated variable using 
fi(x) = X; ß(1;, X) + X; 4(01, x) 
where Xi is the most repeated variable and 
Ci, x) = 
(01, X) = $(Xl, xi-,, O, Xi, ],.. x) 
This process is repeated until all repeated events have been manipulated. The 
expectation of the structure function can then be taken yielding the top event 
probability- 
The most attractive feature of the BDD method is that it is created from the fault tree 
structure into a format which encodes Shannon's decomposition. Each variable is 
taken and the effect of it failing and functioning on the structure function is obtained. 
Shannon's formula can be written as X101 + X, 02, if 0 is a Boolean function which is 
identical to the ite structure ite(X1,01,02) where 01 and 02 are Boolean functions with 
X1 =1 and X, =0 respectively. The exact failure probability can be determined 
directly from the BDD in a very efficient calculation procedure involving the 
summation of the probability of all paths that terminate in a 1. 
One of the disadvantages with the BDD, as outlined in chapter 3, is that it cannot be 
obtained directly from the system description and is obtained via the fault tree 
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structure. During the conversion process the BDD loses all the causality information 
that is represented in the fault tree structure. As all the cause-consequence diagrams 
developed are identical to the BDD with the same variable ordering then there is no 
need to convert the fault tree of the system to the BDD structure, hence reducing the 
effort required with the conventional approach. As the BDD is a more efficient 
analysis tool than the fault tree method then so is the cause-consequence diagram 
method. By applying the cause-consequence technique directly to the system 
description the failure causality is not lost, making the method attractive. 
The algorithm developed outlines clear rules for construction and analysis of any 
static system. By inspection of the algorithm created it was noted that it performs a 
process similar to Shannon's decomposition. The extraction process and duplication 
of the relevant part of the cause-consequence diagram is similar to the pivoting 
process used in Shannon decomposition. The difference, however, lies in the fact that 
only the boxes containing the common failure event are manipulated and not the 
whole structure function, which is the case with the fault tree method. Following the 
extraction of any repeated event the fault trees governing the decision boxes are 
independent which implies that a form of modularization is conducted. 
8.9 Algorithm to Extract Independent Submodules 
In the case of the HIPS system it may have proved beneficial to extract P 1, P2 and P3 
as a whole structure rather than extracting individual components. On such a small 
system the difference in efficiency would be minimal but for a larger system with 
several repeated submodules the savings could be large. An algorithm was therefore 
required which could deal with repeated independent submodules and their extraction. 
8.9.1 Identification of a Common Failure Submodule 
Analysis of large fault trees has been shown to be computationally expensive and 
many attempts have been made to develop techniques that reduce the size of the 
structure. One of these techniques is MODULARIZATION, which involves 
identification of independent subtrees that are then solved separately and the results 
placed back into the fault tree structure as new basic events. A module of a fault tree 
can be defined as a subtree whose terminal events, i. e. basic events, do not occur 
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elsewhere in the tree (ref. 48). It was decided that the identification process of these 
modules could be used in order to highlight independent submodules in each fault tree 
structure attached to any decision box. Following the identification of a sequence path 
on the cause-consequence diagram each Submodule associated with the relevant fault 
tree structures on the path could be compared to establish if any identical submodules 
existed. The comparison should begin with the smallest submodules and then 
increase in size until no identical submodules can be found. By following this 
procedure the largest common submodule would be identified and extracted. For 
example Ft 1, Ft2 and Ft3 below have a common subtree starting from gate G 1. G2 
and G3 are also common subtrees but not the largest independent module therefore the 
search would continue until G1 had been identified as being the largest common 
module. 
8.9.2 Modularization of a Fault Tree 
It was decided that the modularization algorithm described in section 6.4.1, and used 
to find independent subtrees in a fault tree structure containing independent and 
dependent failure events, would be used to identify common submodules in the 
cause-consequence diagram. 
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8.9.3 Identification and Extraction of Common Submodule 
Initially the cause-consequence diagram is stored in the arrays IFAIL, IWORK and Q, 
as described in section 8.4.1. The failure logic for each decision box is held in Q and 
it is this array which is used to aid in the identification of any common submodules. 
Using algorithm 8.18 the cause-consequence diagram is traced and various paths 
identified. Following the identification of a path, IPATH is used to indicate which 
fault tree structures are present in the path. Each individual fault tree is then 
modularized using the algorithm outlined in section 6.4.1 and each submodule is 
compared to all other submodules in the same path. As soon as the largest submodule 
structure is discovered to be identical with another submodule in a different tree the 
comparison process stops. The submodule is then stored in the 1-d array SUB, where 
the ith entry holds the i`h basic event in the independent submodule. Following the 
identification of a common submodule the fault trees that contain the module are 
stored in FTREE so that following extraction the relevant fault trees can be modified. 
Following the identification of a common Submodule the module is extracted from the 
fault tree structure and set as a new decision box at the highest point in the cause- 
consequence diagram which has all dependencies below it. The procedure is then 
identical to that developed in 8.4.2 for a single common failure event. If a path is 
scanned and no common submodule exists then each individual event is compared to 
determine whether there exists any common failure events. If a common failure event 
is identified then the extraction process outlined in 8.4.3 is followed, otherwise the 
next sequence path is scanned and each fault tree modularized and compared. The 
process continues until all paths have been traced and no dependencies remain in the 
diagram. 
8.9.4 Application to the HIPS System 
The common submodule algorithm can be applied to the HIPS system to illustrate two 
points. Firstly that the modularization technique is efficient and secondly that the 
technique reduces the size of the cause-consequence diagram required for analysis. 
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8.9.4.1 Cause-Consequence Diagram Construction and Minimisation 
The cause-consequence diagram for the HIPS system is replicated in figure 8.36 with 
the relevant fault trees depicted in figure 8.37a and 8.37b. 
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Figure 8.36 Cause-Consequence Diagram for HIPS System 
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Initially the cause-consequence diagram was stored as: 
2-2 Ftl 
3 -2 Ft2 
IFAIL =4 IWORK =-2Q= Ft3 
5 -2 Ft4 
-1 -2 Ft5 
Starting the scanning process from decision box 1 the first path identified was: 
Decision Box 1 Decision Box 2 Decision Box 3 Decision Box 4 
-==ý> Decision Box 5 -=, > HP 
Having identified a path, IPATH was used to determine which fault trees to 
modularize. Ftl, Ft2, Ft3, Ft4 and Ft5 were all modularized. The modularization of 
Ftl is depicted in figure 8.38 and shows that all gate nodes were found to be 
independent modules. 
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Step 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
'v' TOP GI SM G2 G3 R1 R2 G3 G4 C 
Step 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
'v' G5 PI P2 P3 G5 G4 G2 GI VM TOP 
Counter for first DFLM traversal 
top GI G2 G3 G4 G5 C SM RI R2 VM P1 P2 P3 
Ist 1 2 4 5 9 11 10 3 6 7 19 12 13 14 
2nd 20 18 17 8 16 15 10 3 6 7 19 12 13 14 
last 20 18 17 8 16 15 10 3 6 7 19 12 13 14 
Results following first DFLM traversal 
Name TOP G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 
min 2 3 5 6 10 12 
max. 19 17 16 7 15 14 
module? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Results following second DFLM traversal 
Figure 8.38 Modularization Process of Ftl 
Following the identification of all the submodules they were compared and the first 
common submodule was highlighted to be G5 of Ftl. Gate G5 comprised of the 
pressure switches P1, P2 and P3 which were common to decision boxes 1,2 and 3. 
The submodule was extracted and the diagram duplicated on both NO and YES outlet 
branches. The extracted submodule was set equal to unity in the fault trees it was 
present in following the NO outlet branch and zero in the fault tree structures attached 
to the YES outlet branch (figure 8.39). The redundant boxes were removed, Boxes 1- 
3, and the cause-consequence diagram reduced to the form shown in figure 8.40 with 
the fault trees Ft6-Ftl 1 depicted in figure 8.41. 
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Figure 8.39 Extraction of Common Pressure Sensor Submodule 
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Figure 8.40 Reduced Cause-Consequence Diagram for HIPS System 
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Figure 8.41 Fault Trees Ft6-Ftl 1 for figure 8.40 
The cycle was then re-started with Restart-Box equal to I using the arrays: 
IFAIL = (2,3,4,5, -1,4,8,9,10,11, -1)T 
IWORK = (-2, -2, -2, -2, -2,7, -2, -2, -2, -2, -2)T 
Q=(Ft l, Ft2, Ft3, Ft4, Ft5, Ft6, Ft7, Ft8, Ft9, Ft 10, Ft11)T 
IPATH was identified as IPATH = (0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0)T and therefore fault trees 4,5 
and 6 were modularized and compared for any common submodules. A common 
submodule was found in Ft4 and Ft5 and comprised of the three pressure sensors 
P4, P5, P6 and the computer logic C. The common submodule was extracted and the 
relevant part of the cause-consequence diagram duplicated on each outlet branch. 
Following the removal of all redundant decision boxes the cause-consequence 
diagram took on the form illustrated in figure 8.42. 
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Figure 8.42 Cause-Consequence Diagram following the Extraction of a Common 
Submodule 
The scanning procedure was repeated and following the extraction, on the right-hand 
side of the diagram, of a common submodule containing P4, P5, P6 and the extraction 
of the single common failure event C (the computer failure), the cause-consequence 
diagram was reduced to the minimal and independent form which is depicted in figure 
8.43. 
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Figure 8.43 Final Cause-Consequence Diagram for the HIPS System 
8.9.4.2 Analysis 
The probability of a high pressure surge could now be obtained by summing the 
probabilities of all independent paths which terminate in the consequence HP. The 
cause-consequence diagram for the HIPS system using the algorithm for extracting 
individual events only consisted of 37 such paths, section 8.6.2, but by using the 
modularization approach the number of paths to sum was reduced dramatically to only 
5. The system unavailability was calculated to equal 2.216x 10-2, which was identical 
to that produced by the BDD for the HIPS system and the cause-consequence diagram 
analysed previously with the 37 failure sequences. 
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The effort that is required to complete the modularization process has been shown to 
be minimal (ref. 48) and results in extensive savings in both the size of the diagram 
and computation required to analyse it. 
8.10 Summary and Conclusion 
An algorithm has been developed that given any static system will produce the correct 
cause-consequence diagram and calculate the exact system failure probability. This is 
achieved without having to construct the fault tree of the system yet retains the failure 
logic of the system. The cause-consequence diagram is reduced to a minimal form by 
firstly removing any redundant decision boxes and secondly by manipulating any 
common failure events which exist on the same path. The common failure events can 
be extracted as common submodules or individual events. The extraction of common 
submodules has been shown to be computationally more advantageous than removing 
each event in the submodule separately. 
The minimised cause-consequence diagram is then analysed using a BDD analysis 
procedure. The advantages of the cause-consequence diagram are two-fold: firstly the 
diagram can be constructed directly from the system description and secondly that any 
dependencies are dealt with on an individual basis. The effort that is required to 
convert a fault tree into a BDD is avoided. 
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CHAPTER 9 
APPLICATION OF THE CAUSE-CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM METHOD TO 
A MULTI-PHASE SYSTEM 
9.1 Introduction 
Cause-consequence analysis is most frequently applied to model systems during 
phases where the state of the system is changing with time. Systems that feature start- 
up and shut-down phases can be included in this category and are often difficult to 
analyse using traditional methods. In order to generalise the cause-consequence 
diagram method further, such that it can be applied to many types of systems, an 
investigation into the use of the technique with a multi-phased system was initiated. 
9.2 System Description 
The system chosen to be investigated, which contained a start-up and a shut-down 
sequence in addition to its operational phase, was a pressure tank system (ref. 64). 
The function of the system is to control the operation of a pump which transports fluid 
from a large reservoir into a tank. The system configuration is illustrated in figure 9.1 
and the components individual functions and failure modes are represented in table 
9.1. 
Initially the system is considered to be in a dormant state and therefore de-energized. 
The switch S 1, the relay contacts KI and K2 are all open when in the dormant state 
and the timer and pressure switch contacts are closed. Depressing the switch SI 
provides power to the coil of KI which results in the closure of the KI contacts. KI 
self latches when Si opens when released and power is also supplied to K2 resulting 
in K2 contacts closing which starts the pump motor. It is assumed that the tank takes 
30 minutes to fill and once the pressure threshold is reached the pressure switch 
contacts open, de-energizing K2 which results in the removal of power from the pump 
motor. After a period of time the tank becomes empty and the pressure switch closes 
which energizes K2. The pump restarts and the filling process commence again. The 
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tank is filled twice daily and the system is inspected at 6 monthly intervals for 
dormant failures. 
In the event of the pressure switch failing to open a safety feature is included in the 
form of the Timer relay. Power is applied to the timer relay following the closure of 
the KI contacts which initiates a clock. If the clock registers 30 minutes of 
continuous pumping then the timer relay contacts are opened which results in a break 
in the circuit to K1 and system shutdown. 
K1 
Y 
III 
J-- 
I KEU1Y TM 
SWRCN51 
amFT vuvE *E I 
Figure 9.1 Pressure Tank System 
For quantification purposes the probability of component failure was obtained via 
equation (9.1) for a revealed failure and equation (9.2) for an unrevealed failure. 
Q= 1-e-'`t (9.1) 
QAV = AI + (9.2) 
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i M !l 
Component Function Failure Modes Effect on Failure Type 
System 
Switch, SI To apply power to coil of SIC: Switch failed closed Circuit remains Unrevealed 
KI relay energized but 
can be broken 
by K2 
SlO: Switch failed open No Power to Revealed 
energize 
circuit 
Relay K1 Electrically self-latched KID: Relay fails de- No Power to Revealed 
applying power to relay energized Circuit 
of K2 
K1CC: Contact fails Circuit remains Unrevealed 
closed energized but 
can be broken 
by K2 
KICO: Contact fails open No Power to Revealed 
Circuit 
Relay K2 Delivers power to the K2D: Relay fails de- No power to Revealed 
Motor energized Motor 
K2CC: Contact fails Continuous Revealed 
closed power to motor 
K2CO: Contact fails open No power to Revealed 
Motor 
Timer Relay Provides emergency TIMCC: Timer contact Circuit Unrevealed 
(TIM) shut-down in event of fails closed energized but 
pressure switch failing PRSW can 
open 
TIMCO: Timer contact No power to Revealed 
fails open motor 
Pressure Switch De-energizes coil of K2 PSWC: Fails closed Continuous Revealed 
(PRSW) when tank is full power to motor 
PSWO: Fails Open No power to Revealed 
motor 
Fuse To prevent power surge F: Fails Broken No power to Revealed 
motor 
Power Supplies I Supplies Power to Relays PS1, PS2: No Power No power to Revealed 
&2 and Motor Motor 
Motor Pumps fluid into tank M: Fails Broken No power to Revealed 
um 
Table 9.1 Component Functions and Failure modes 
93 Cause-Consequence Diagram Construction 
The algorithm developed for the construction of a cause-consequence diagram for a 
system containing independent failures, outlined in chapter 8, was used to construct 
the cause-consequence diagram for the pressure tank system. 
Step I Component Failure Event Ordering 
The ordering of the components for the construction of the cause-consequence 
diagram was selected by considering the temporal patterns of the system. For the 
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pressure tank system the switch, Si, is depressed followed by it opening. KI 
energizes and powers K2 which powers the pump. Following 30 minutes of operation 
the pressure switch should open. In the event that the pressure switch fails to open the 
timer should time out and the timer contacts opened. Given the pressure switch opens 
K2 contacts should de-energize, removing power from the pump. In the instance 
where the timer is required to break the circuit containing KI, KI contacts should de- 
energize removing power from K2 which results in the removal of the power supply to 
the pump. The ordering was therefore chosen to be: 
Si, K1, K2, PRESSURE SWITCH, TIMER RELAY, K1, K2 
It can be seen that the components KI and K2 both occur twice in the ordering 
sequence. This is the result of the system containing two different phases and hence 
some components perform different actions in each different phase. The components 
KI and K2 are both required to close in the start-up sequence and open in the shut- 
down sequence. 
Step 2 and 3 Cause-Consequence Diagram Construction and Reduction 
The cause-consequence diagram was constructed by considering the affect of each 
component, in the chosen order, on system performance. In order to illustrate the 
control of the pressure switch on the system a feedback loop could have been attached 
to the end of the normal filling sequence. In order to highlight the features under 
inspection in this chapter, i. e. different system phases, only one filling sequence was 
investigated, the cause-consequence diagram of which is shown in figure 9.2. The 
corresponding fault trees are illustrated in figure 9.3. 
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Figure 9.2 Cause-Consequence Diagram for Pressure Tank System 
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Figure 9.3 Fault Trees for Pressure Tank Cause-Consequence Diagram 
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Step 4 System Failure Quantification 
The probability of the tank becoming overpressurised is equal to the sum of the 
probabilities of the six paths that lead to the consequence labelled 'O'. By inspection 
of the cause-consequence diagram it was noted that dependencies existed that 
rendered simple techniques, which are used to obtain the product of each event 
probability to yield the path probability, inappropriate. Such dependency can be seen 
in the form of the common failure event 'Power supply l' (PS 1), which is present as a 
cause in both fault tree 7 (Ft7) and 8(Ft8). This event was extracted following the 
previously developed algorithm, presented in section 8.4, and the relevant changes 
made to the cause-consequence diagram. The updated cause-consequence diagram is 
depicted in figure 9.4 and the modified fault trees in figure 9.5. 
1 doses 
Fn OE 
z 
Frz 0 ES 
wntac6 Dose ower Supply 1 
F 
rks 1 
"s 
C 
Ft3 t--* O YES 
O ES 
1 conl-aU 
ose ,6 
E F"ý O ES 
E Fµ O ES (G) 17 
\ý/ 
Ftl E 
sE 
st e Fa p ES 18 
Jrý 
F"-=* O ES 
rnntx% 
pn6 
ES 
I 
19 
E=Empty S 
N' 
E 
ý OS 
O= Overpressurized p 
S= Safe soar cmlacts c. 9. e. 
N= Normal 23 
OEFO ES 
ON 
, cnntacis 
r 
Ft21=* pE 
contacts 
O 22 
F ES 
Figure 9.4 Cause-Consequence Diagram following the extraction of PSI 
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Figure 9.5 Modified Fault trees following PS 1 extraction 
Further inspection of the cause-consequence diagram indicated that a new dependency 
was present. Components S1, K I, K2, PRSW and TIM in certain operational 
sequences are required to perform two different functions which if successfully 
accomplished results in the components residing in different states at different times. 
For example initially K2 contacts were required to close and then open. As the system 
is not in continuous use it is possible that the K2 contacts could fail closed between 
operations and hence be the cause of K2 being in the closed state at the beginning of 
the operational sequence. In this event the tank would overpressurise as a continuous 
supply of power would be supplied to the pump. This type of failure would not be 
incorporated in the cause-consequence diagram analysis outlined thus far. An 
alternative method therefore had to be developed in order to deal with such 
'inconsistent failure events'. To illustrate the development of the method the simple 
cause-consequence diagram section shown in figure 9.6 can be utilised with the 
relevant fault trees depicted in figure 9.7. This diagram represents the extracted 
relevant dependency features from the main cause-consequence diagram. 
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Figure 9.6 Example Cause-Consequence Diagram 
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Figure 9.7 Fault Trees for example Cause-Consequence Diagram 
The problem with this cause-consequence diagram is that the component K2 is 
required to perform two different functions, firstly to close, decision box 1, and then 
later in the sequence to open, decision box 3. 
For decision box 1, `K2 contacts close', the event of travelling down the YES outlet 
branch can be governed by two independent situations. Firstly K2 contacts can close 
due to the correct functioning of the system, i. e. fault tree 1 (Ftl) does not occur. This 
implies that K2 contacts do not fail open AND the event Pl does not occur. This 
situation results in a time implication for travelling down the NO outlet branch of 
decision box 3. The NO outlet branch of decision box 3 represents the situation where 
K2 contacts have failed closed and as K2 contacts functioned correctly at decision box 
1, it implies that they could only have failed closed in the time it took the system to 
travel to decision box 3. 
The second situation that can occur to cause the YES outlet branch to be followed 
from decision box I is that K2 contacts could have failed closed between two 
operations. This situation results in the fault tree representing the causes of decision 
box 3 to occur with certainty, arriving at the outcome system failure, F. The two 
situations described above and their respective affect on decision box 1 and 3 in the 
cause-consequence diagram illustrated in figure 9.6, is shown in figure 9.8. 
265 
K2 works between Operations K2 fails closed between Operations 
QK 
2 CC 
contacts dose 2 contacts close 
1 1 
Ftl > NO YES ý1_Ftl 0 NO ES 1 
QK2CC 
contacts open contacts open 
t= time to get to 3 3 
decision box 
Ft3 I NO YES ý1 _Ft3 1 
NO ES 0 
Figure 9.8 Consequences of working/failing between System Operations 
To identify this potential problem it can be seen by inspection of the fault trees Ftl 
and Ft3, which are two of the three trees identifying causes of the cause-consequence 
diagram paths from decision box 1-3, that they contain K2 failing open (K2CO) and 
K2 failing closed (K2CC) respectively. These are inconsistent failure modes and can 
be used to identify the situation described above. For the remainder of this section it 
will be assumed that the first failure event represents the decision box containing the 
first failure mode and the second failure event represents the decision box containing 
the second failure mode. For the example in figure 9.6, then, the first failure event is 
decision box 1, the first failure mode is K2CO, the second failure event is decision 
box 3 and the second failure mode is K2CC. The problem that evolves is that causes 
of the second failure event can be inconsistent with the causes of the first failure 
event. As only one failure mode is represented by each decision box fault tree, the 
problem is to determine how to represent a situation of the type described above. 
An investigation was initiated into the identification of which failure mode, for the 
component with two different functions, caused the occurrence of the fault tree 
corresponding to the first failure event. It was discovered that depending on whether 
the second failure mode was a revealed or unrevealed failure the structure of the 
cause-consequence diagram was different. 
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For the second failure mode, which is a revealed failure, it was discovered that the 
YES branch of the first failure event could not be governed by the second failure 
mode, i. e. the second failure mode cannot occur between two operations. A revealed 
failure represents a component that when failed will cause an event which is 
immediately noticeable. For example, in the pressure tank system K2 contacts failing 
closed is a revealed failure as the tank will overpressurise due to a continuously 
operating pump. Therefore if, in the case of inconsistent failure modes, the second 
failure mode is a revealed failure then the action of the decision box containing the 
first failure mode cannot be caused by the second failure mode as this would be 
immediately noticeable. The decision box containing the first failure mode is 
therefore governed by the fault tree corresponding to the NO outlet branch of the 
decision box. For K2 then in figure 9.6, it was assumed that at decision box 1 if the 
event represented by the YES branch occurred then K2 contacts were considered to be 
functioning correctly, i. e. work closed, and the probability associated with the path 
was equal to 1-P(Ft 1). This assumption resulted in the time implications discussed for 
the decision box containing the second failure mode later in the sequence, decision 
box 3, where the second failure event must have occurred in the time it took the 
system to perform the action represented by the event sequence leading to decision 
box 3. If on the otherhand the event represented by the NO branch of decision box 3 
was caused by the component P3 the time to fail would not be the time it took the 
system to reach decision box 3 but the time associated with the failure of P3, which 
would be dependent on whether P3 was unrevealed or revealed and calculated using 
equation (9.2) and (9.1) respectively. 
For the second failure mode which is an unrevealed failure event, a failure which is 
only revealed when a demand is made on the system (ref. 6) or the component 
inspected, the decision box containing the first failure mode could either be caused by 
the occurrence of the first failure mode, represented by the NO exit branch, or the 
occurrence of the second failure mode, represented by the YES exit branch. For 
example, taking the cause-consequence diagram in figure 9.6 and assuming that the 
event K2CC is an unrevealed failure event, decision box 1 could potentially have two 
different probabilities associated with the NO and YES branches depending solely on 
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the state of the component K2. If K2 contacts were functioning correctly then the 
event represented by theYES outlet branch for decision box 1 would be dependent on 
the fault tree originally associated with the first failure event, Ftl, and would be equal 
to 1-P(Ftl). If, on the otherhand, K2 contacts had failed closed between system 
operations then the event represented by the YES outlet branch for decision box 1 
would be equal to unity, and the probability of entering the start of the sequence 
would be QK2cc, indicating that K2 contacts had failed between operations (Figure 
9.8)_ In order to inspect both eventualities in the cause-consequence diagram a new 
type of decision box was created, the EXISTENCE DECISION BOX (Figure 9.9). 
The existence decision box contains the second failure mode and asks whether the 
component i exists in a particular state or not, generally in a failed state. Similar to 
the traditional decision box, the existence decision box has both YES and NO outlet 
branches and for distinction purposes the YES option was placed on the left-hand side 
of the oval shaped box. 
Component i exists in a 
particular state at time t 
Q. YES NO 1-Q 
Figure 9.9 New Existence Decision Box 
The process of developing a new decision box to represent an event present in fault 
trees lower down in the cause-consequence structure was proceeded, as with the 
extraction process discussed in section 8.4, by duplication of the cause-consequence 
diagram on both outlet branches. The probability attached to the YES outlet branch of 
the existence box containing component i is equal to Q; and the probability of the NO 
outlet branch is equal to 1-Q;. 
Following theYES outlet branch stemming from the existence decision box indicated 
that the second failure mode existed and therefore the first failure mode probability 
could not exist and would be set equal to zero. In addition to this as the second failure 
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mode existed the probability of its occurrence found anywhere in the remainder of the 
sequence following the YES outlet branch of the existence box would be set equal to 
unity. Therefore for figure 9.6, assuming K2CC is an unrevealed failure event, the 
cause-consequence diagram illustrated in figure 9.10 would be created and reduced to 
the form shown in figure 9.1 where Ft4 = Ftl, Ft5 = Ft2 and Ft6 = Ft3. 
K2 cmdacts exud failed 
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FS 
'figure 9.10 Modified Cause-Consequence Diagram for Inconsistent Failure Mode; 
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Figure 9.11 Reduced Cause-Consequence Diagram for Inconsistent Failure Modes 
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Following the NO outlet branch stemming from the existence decision box results in 
the same scenario as if the failure had in fact been a revealed failure. The decision 
box containing the first failure mode is governed by the original fault tree, which 
includes the first failure event. The same implications regarding the time to failure for 
the second failure mode used for a revealed failure event are employed. For K2CC in 
figure 9.11 the time to fail for the second failure mode, following the YES outlet 
branch from decision box 5, is set equal to the time it takes the system to travel from 
decision box 5 to decision box 7. Generally equation (9.2) is used to obtain the 
probability of failure for an unrevealed event. However as the component is 
functioning correctly at the beginning of the sequence, due to the NO outlet branch 
from the existence decision box being traced, the component can only fail in a short 
time period t and is calculated by: 
Q(t) = 1-e ?, 
A summary of the cause-consequence diagram reconstruction process given an 
inconsistent failure event is depicted in table 9.2. 
Failure type for Second failure event 
Revealed Unrevealed 
YES Branch of existence NO Branch of 
decision box: existence decision box: 
Second failure mode in second failure Decision box containing Second failure event 
event occurs in the time it takes the first failure mode is occurs in the time, t, 
system to travel from the first failure governed by the failure of which is equal to the 
event to the second failure event. second failure mode. time it takes the system 
Second failure mode to travel from the first 
probability is set to '1' in failure event to the 
all decision boxes beneath second failure event. 
the existence box. First The probability of 
failure mode probability failure is given by: 
is set to `0'. Q= 1-e't 
Table 9.2 Summary of procedure given an unrevealed or revealed second failure 
event 
9.4 Algorithm for Reconstructing a Cause-Consequence Diagram which contains 
Inconsistent Failure Events. 
An algorithm was developed whereby given a cause-consequence diagram containing 
an inconsistent failure event the event would be identified and the diagram modified 
accordingly to produce a structure which could be analysed simply. 
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9.4.1 Identification and Manipulation of Inconsistent Failure Events 
Initially the cause-consequence diagram is stored using the arrays IFAIL, IWORK, Q, 
COMP, T JAIL and F TYPE. IFAIL, IWORK and Q contain the same data as 
defined for the algorithm developed in chapter 8, however for any existence decision 
box IFAIL represents the YES outlet branch and IWORK the NO outlet branch. 
COMP(i, j) is a2 dimensional array which represents the individual components found 
in the fault tree structures where i represents the fault tree number and j the 
jh 
component in the fault tree structure. Depending on whether the failure of component 
i is revealed or unrevealed T FAIL(i) represents the time governing the failure, t, or 
the maintenance test interval, 0, respectively for component i. F TYPE represents the 
type of failure corresponding to each component in COMP, i. e. revealed, R, or 
unrevealed, U. For figure 9.6 the initial arrays were: 
-1 2 Ftl K2CO P1 0 
IFAIL = -1 IWORK = 3 Q= Ft2 COMP = M P3 0 
-2 -3 Ft3 K2CC P2 0 
z 
It OZ It UIR U/R 
T_FAIL = 
ý 0/ It FTYPE = 
%R %R 
0 It OZ It VR VR 
For figure 9.6 component K2 is required to close and then open at decision box 3. 
The probability of the event `K2 failing to close' is obtained via FtI and the 
probability of the event `K2 failing to open' is stored in Ft3 (Figure 9.7). Comparison 
of these respective fault trees showed that the basic events K2CO and K2CC were 
identical except for the last letter. It was therefore defined that any two events with 
the same label excluding the last letter were deemed the same component with 
inconsistent failure modes. The last variable of the basic event label must be a 
character to warrant it being an inconsistent failure event, as it is common practice to 
label the same type of component with the same name and a different number attached 
to the end, e. g. RI, R2 and R3, symbolising Relays 1,2 and 3. 
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The identification of such events can be achieved alongside the identification of 
common failure events. Each path is scanned using the algorithm depicted in figure 
8.18 and IPATH created, the relevant fault tree structures representing the decision 
boxes in IPATH are compared and any common failure events or inconsistent failure 
events identified. For the cause-consequence diagram in figure 9.6 the first path leads 
to the outcome No Start, NS, following the NO outlet branch stemming from decision 
box 1. As there exists only one decision box in the path there were no trees to 
compare and the next path was identified. The second path was identified as IPATH 
= (2,1)T , which 
indicated that the path consisted of following the YES branch from 
decision box 1 and the NO branch of decision box 2. The basic events of the fault 
trees Ft 1 and Ft2 were compared and no dependencies were found. The third path was 
identified and IPATH = (2,2,1)T, representing that the YES outlet branch from 
decision box 1 and 2 were followed and the NO outlet branch from decision box 3. 
The basic events of the fault trees Ftl, Ft2 and Ft3 were compared and an inconsistent 
failure event was apparent in Ftl and Ft3. Following the identification of an 
inconsistent failure mode, the two failure modes are stored in the array FMODE. The 
first failure mode is stored in FMODE(1) and the second failure mode in FMODE(2). 
For figure 9.6 then FMODE = (K2CO, K2CC)T. In addition the two fault tree 
structures containing the different failure modes are also stored in FTREE and for 
figure 9.6 FTREE = (Ft I, Ft3)T. 
Having identified that an inconsistent failure event is present in the cause- 
consequence diagram the next decision to be made is dependent on the type of failure 
of the second failure mode. FMODE(2) and FTREE(2) are used to scan COMP and 
the element that the second failure mode is stored in found, (ELEMENT. The array 
F TYPE(FTREE(2), IELEMENT) is then inspected and the type of failure identified. 
The algorithm outlining this procedure is shown in figure 9.12. 
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ICOL=FMODE(2) 
IELEMENT=1 
i=FTREE(2) 
COMP(i, IELEMENT) IELEMENT= COMP( (ELEMENT) 
NP- 
(ELEMENT +1 aN (COL 
Yes Yes 
TYPE = 
STOP: ERROR 
TYPE(IELEMENT) F SECOND FAILURE 
_ EVENT NOT 
FOUND 
TYPE=R' Nom 
Yes 
1 
Figure 9.12 Algorithm for Second Failure Event Identification 
Depending on whether the failure type is revealed, 'R', or unrevealed, 'U', the cause- 
consequence diagram reconstruction process is different. If F TYPE shows that the 
failure type of the second failure mode is an 'R' then the time corresponding to the 
second failure mode, in the relevant fault tree, requires modification. Each basic event 
in each fault tree structure, in the sequence under inspection, is examined. When the 
second failure mode is identified the corresponding element in T JAIL is changed to 
equal the time it takes the system to arrive at the decision box containing the second 
failure mode. This time will be predicted by the analyst. The modification process is 
shown as a flowchart in figure 9.13. 
If F TYPE shows that the failure type of the second failure mode is an unrevealed 
failure then the second failure mode is placed in a new existence box and the cause- 
consequence diagram duplicated on both outlet branches. The duplication process and 
the renumbering of the decision boxes and fault trees proceeding the NO branch of the 
new existence decision box is achieved in an identical manner to that for the common 
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failure events outlined in chapter 8. Following the YES path stemming from the 
existence decision box indicates that the second failure event exists. The decision 
boxes that are present on the YES path stemming from the existence decision box are 
then scanned, using an identical algorithm as previously implemented, and the various 
paths beneath the new existence box identified. IPATH is then used and each fault 
tree structure on a path inspected for the presence of the first and second failure mode, 
which when found is replaced with the Boolean variable '0' and '1' respectively in the 
appropriate element of COMP. The NO path is also scanned using an identical 
approach, the only difference being when the second failure mode is found in the 
relevant fault tree structure the time to failure for that particular component is changed 
in T 
_FAIL 
to equal the time it took to complete the operation and the type of failure 
for that particular component reset to revealed, W. The above process is shown as a 
flowchart in figure 9.14. 
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Fý 
trees s 
I 
can e scanned acta 
second failure 
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COMP(TREE, J) >-N J' COMP(TREE. j) 
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T FAIL(TREEJ)= 
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containing second 
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MODMOD+1 
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Figure 9.13 Flowchart for Revealed Failure Type 
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Figure 9.14 Flowchart for Unrevealed Failure Type 
Using the algorithm given in figure 8.20 the fault tree structures are scanned and all 
Boolean variables removed and fault trees minimised. 
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9.5 Application to Pressure Tank System 
The pressure tank system was fully solved by applying the algorithm developed to 
deal with inconsistent failure modes. Following the extraction of the only common 
failure event, PSI, the cause-consequence diagram took the form illustrated in figure 
9.4 and the relevant arrays were modified. Each path was scanned using the algorithm 
in figure 8.18 and following the modification of time to failure for the components 
K2, S1, K1, PRSW, TIM and the inclusion of three existence decision boxes for the 
components S 1, KI and TIM the final cause-consequence diagram was produced 
(Figure 9.15). The corresponding fault trees are shown in figure 9.16. 
The probability of the system entering an overpressurised state was obtained by using 
F TYPE, T JAIL, COMP and the component failure data shown in table 9.3. 
Component Failure Rate Inspection Mean Time to 
Interval, 0 Repair, i 
Switch, S1 S1 FC: 1x 10-6 4368.0 36.0 
S1 FO: 8.698x10-4 NA NA 
Relay KI KID: 0.23x10' NA NA 
K1CC: 0.23x10-6 4368.0 36.0 
KI CO: 0.23x 10-6 NA NA 
Relay K2 K2D: 0.23x10-6 NA NA 
K2CC: 0.23xl0-6 NA NA 
K2CO: 0.23x10-6 NA NA 
Timer Relay TCC: Ix104 4368.0 36.0 
TCO: 1x104 NA NA 
Pressure Switch PSWC: 1x104 NA NA 
PSWO: 1x104 NA NA 
Fuse F: 1x105 NA NA 
Power Supplies 1&2 PS 11 x 10, NA NA 
PS2: 1x106 NA NA 
Motor M: 1x 10 NA NA 
Table 9.3 Failure Data for Pressure Tank System 
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The system functions twice daily and therefore the time between operations is 12 
hours. The probability of failure for revealed failures between operations was hence 
obtained using equation (9.1) with t=12 hours. For unrevealed failures the probability 
of failure was obtained using 0 and i, given in table 9.3, and equation (9.2)_ The 
probability of each fault tree was calculated using the inclusion-exclusion method, 
given in chapter 2, and the probability of overpressure was obtained by summing the 
probabilities of any sequence that terminated in the consequence '0'. There existed 12 
such paths, the details of which are given in Appendix III. The probability of 
overpressure was calculated to equal 1.12x10-5 
In addition to obtaining the probability of overpressure, the probability of the tank 
being empty, a safe operation and a normal operation can also be calculated and 
shown to equal: 
P(Normal Operation) = 0.7666 
P(Safe Operation) = 0.2213 
P(Empty Tank) = 1.21 x 10-2 
9.6 Summary and Conclusion 
The problem to be solved was given a component with different failure modes how 
should the cause-consequence diagram be restructured to yield the numerically correct 
diagram. An algorithm has been developed that given any system that contains 
different operations in the same sequence of events will produce the correct cause- 
consequence diagram and calculate the exact failure probability. The cause- 
consequence diagram is reduced to a mathematically exact form by dealing with the 
type of failure for the different failure modes. Unrevealed and revealed failures are 
considered and used to determine the structure of the cause-consequence diagram. 
The structurally correct cause-consequence diagram is then analysed using the BDD 
procedure which yields the exact probability for system failure. The main advantages 
of the newly developed algorithm is that a system with a start-up and shut-down 
sequence can be analysed without having to unnecessarily use a more complicated 
method, such as simulation. 
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Tank System 
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Figure 9.15b Second page of Final Cause-Consequence Diagram for the Pressure 
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CHAPTER 10 
CAUSE-CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF DEPENDENT SYSTEMS 
10.1 Introduction 
The main disadvantage with the most commonly used reliability tool, FTA, has been 
highlighted as its inability to accurately analysis systems containing dependent 
failures. The development of the combined model in chapter 6 served as a solution to 
this problem. It has, however, been shown that the Cause-Consequence Diagram 
technique also has the capability of representing a system containing dependent 
features and several authors have used this modelling tool to analysis such systems. 
One of the features of the cause-consequence diagram method which separates it from 
other consequence identification tools is the time delay symbol given in table 8.1. In 
order to generalise the cause-consequence diagram method, such that it can be applied 
to dependent types of systems, a further investigation into the use of the technique 
with the inclusion of the time delay symbol was initiated. 
10.2 Cause-Consequence Diagram development using the Time Delay Symbol 
Part of an offshore platform was investigated in order to highlight the analysis 
difficulties associated with systems containing time-dependent failures. The 
configuration of the Isolation-Blowdown system is depicted in figure 10.1 and is of a 
simplified form in order to highlight the required features of the system. Figure 10.1 
contains three separate sections which the gas supply flows through, each of which 
contains a compressor and processor. Only one of these sections will be considered 
for the analysis as all three are identical in composition. The safety system is 
sequentially operated and given a gas leak of a certain size detection should occur and 
various safety systems activated. The detection system activates the 
isolation/blowdown and deluge subsystems. 
In the event of a gas leak the detection system, via gas detectors, detects the leak and 
channels the information to a computer which de-energises a solenoid. Following the 
identification of a leak the isolation system is activated by the detection system, via 
the solenoid, and the isolation valves are closed which isolates the gas supply. 
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Simultaneously the blow-down system is activated which involves depressurizing 
each section by sending the gas supply in the section to `flare'. The deluge system 
may also be activated which uses a water supply to fight a fire, if an ignition is 
immediate, or mitigate an explosion by reducing overpressures if the ignition is 
delayed. The deluge system is assumed here to be a simplified version of that 
analysed in chapter 6, containing only one pump and one power supply (Figure 10.2). 
Figure 10.1 Configuration of the Isolation/Blowdown System 
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Figure 10.2 Deluge Pump System 
Activation of each system takes time and if during these time intervals an ignition 
source occurs then various consequences can result. The detection system takes I 
minute to detect a leak, which is the time it takes the leak to cause the module of gas 
to reach the detectable level, and 30 seconds to close the isolation valves and open the 
blowdown valves. If an ignition source is present prior to activation of the detection 
system then a fire will result. However, if the detection system fails prior to an 
ignition source occuring then an unmitigated explosion will be the outcome, due to the 
deluge system not being activated- An unmitigated explosion can be described as a 
severe explosion where limited alleviation of the overpressures has occurred due to 
the activation of the isolation/blowdown sub-systems. Depending on how many of the 
three subsystems function correctly the consequences of the leak varies. For example 
if all three subsystems function correctly then the leak takes 10 minutes to clear. If 
within this 10 minute period an ignition source occurs then a mitigated explosion will 
result- A mitigated explosion can be described as an explosion which is less severe 
than an unmitigated explosion as the overpressures have been alleviated due to the 
activation of the deluge system. The various clearance times and type of explosion, if 
an ignition source is present between these times, are tabulated in table 10.1 
Systems Function Correctly Time to Clear Leak Type of Explosion 
following an ignition 
source prior to clearance 
Isolation, Blow-Down and Deluge 10 minutes Mitigated 
Isolation and Blow-Down 10 minutes Unmitigated 
Isolation and Deluge 20 minutes Mitigated 
Blow-Down and Deluge 20 minutes Mitigated 
Isolation 20 minutes Unmitigated 
Blow-Down 20 minutes Unmitigated 
Deluge 3 hours Mitigated 
Table 10.1 Clearance Times for a Gas Leak 
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10.2.1 Cause-Consequence Diagram Construction 
The cause-consequence diagram was constructed following the three step construction 
algorithm outlined in section 8.2.2. The temporal sequence for the 
isolation/blowdown system given a leak is: 
Detection System<Isolation System<Blowdown System<Deluge System 
The cause-consequence diagram, following the removal of redundant decision boxes, 
is depicted in figure 10.3, with the corresponding fault trees shown in figure 10.4a and 
10.4b. 
A =2x10' 
i, = 1x10-' 
F= = FIRE 
F UME: = Unmitigated Explosion 
YES 0.92 ME: =Mitigated Explosion 
NE: = No Explosion 
I NE) C uME 
t<720 nuns 
LNE 
FtC* 
O 
NE UM 
ý)4E I 
ME NE UI 
66ýý4E 
NEI E NI ME 
Figure 10.3 Cause-Consequence Diagram for figure 10.1 
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Figure 10.4b Fault Tree Structure Ft3 
The likelihood of a leak occurring was represented on the cause-consequence diagram 
using the initiator triangle symbol, see table 8.1. The frequency of the leak is given by 
XL and for the purpose of this analysis was set equal to 2x 10-3 hr-1. In order to model 
the system correctly the time delay symbol was incorporated in the cause-consequence 
diagram. Prior to each decision box representing an ignition source a time delay 
symbol was inserted on the sequence path which denoted the relevant time interval. 
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For example immediately following a leak the time delay is set equal to 1 minute, due 
to the fact that if an ignition source is present at any point in the time interval 0 to 1 
then a fire will result. Similarly, if the detection system functions correctly but the 
isolation, blowdown and deluge systems all fail then the time interval given for an 
ignition source is set equal to 180 minutes, as if an ignition source is present within 
180 minutes then an unmitigated explosion will result. 
Inspection of fault trees, Ftl and Ft2, showed that a common failure event was 
present. The failure of the solenoid contacts is common to both the isolation and 
blowdown subsystems. In order to produce the minimal cause-consequence diagram 
the solenoid required extraction which was achieved using the algorithm developed in 
section 8.4. Following the extraction of the solenoid the cause-consequence diagram 
changed (Figure 10.5). The corresponding fault trees are given in figure 10.6. 
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Figure 10.5 Minimal Cause-Consequence Diagram for figure 10.1 
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Figure 10.6 Fault Tree Structures Ft4 and Ft5 
103 Cause-Consequence Diagram Analysis 
In order to perform the analysis of a cause-consequence diagram containing time delay 
symbols a new quantification technique required derivation. For the offshore platform 
modelled in this chapter the time delay symbols are used to represent an critical time 
interval for an ignition source. The likelihood of an ignition source being present is 
represented by A, For each time interval then the probability of an ignition source 
being present is given by: 
P(Ignition in interval to to t1) = 
JAe-"-'dt 
to 
A quantification complication arises when more than one ignition source is considered 
in any particular sequence of the cause-consequence diagram, as at one point no 
ignition may be present and later on in the sequence an ignition source may appear. 
For example, consider that in the time interval 0 to 1 minute no ignition source is 
present, the detection system fails to function and an ignition source is present within 
the next 12 hours. The ignition source is inspected twice, yet is only present during 
the second inspection. Equation (10.1) represents this situation. 
1721 min s 
XL-QD JA, e-z'`dt (10.1) 
Imins 
From expression (10.1) it can be seen that the time interval for the ignition source 
ranges from the accumulation of the times in each time delay symbol preceeding the 
last time delay in the sequence to the accumulation of all times in every time delay 
symbol in the sequence. Therefore if a time delay symbol is present in a cause- 
consequence diagram then the integral governing the failure of the event which is 
dependent on the time delay is given by equation (10.2), where to is equal to the 
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summation of time present in every time delay symbol preceding the last time delay 
symbol in the sequence and t1 is equal to the summation of all time delays in the 
sequence. 
P(event i which is dependent on time delay) = 
JAe- `dt (10.2) 
to 
Having developed a quantification technique incorporating the time delay symbol the 
offshore platform could be analysed. As with all cause-consequence diagrams 
investigated, for each type of explosion the frequency of occurrence was obtained by 
summation of the frequency of all paths entering each consequence. 
10.3.1 Consequence 1: FIRE 
The frequency of a fire occurring, given that a leak of a certain size is present, was 
obtained via a single path, Path 1. Path 1 represents the situation where a leak is 
present and an ignition source is apparent within 1 minute of the leak. The frequency 
was calculated to be equal to : 
I 
XpI = Ä, L "JA,, e-Ä1I dt 
0 
10.3.2 Consequence 2: Unmitigated Explosion 
There are seven independent sequences which result in an unmitigated explosion. The 
frequency of an unmitigated explosion was therefore calculated via the summation of 
the frequency of occurrence for each of the seven paths. 
Path 1=A leak is present but no ignition source occurs in the first minute. After a 
minute of leakage the detection system fails and an ignition source occurs within the 
next 12 hours. 
1721 min s 
XPI AL"Qi f 
, e-z'`dt 
Imins 
Path 2=A leak is present but no ignition source is apparent in the first minute. After 
a minute of leakage the detection system detects a leak and attempts to activate the 
safety systems, but an ignition source occurs within 30 seconds of the detection 
systems activation. 
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Path 3=A leak is present but no ignition source is apparent during the first minute. 
After a minute of leakage the detection system detects and attempts to activate the 
safety systems, an ignition source does not occur within 30 seconds of the detection 
systems activation. The common solenoid and deluge subsystem fail and an ignition 
occurs within 180 minutes. 
1815 mins 
Xp3 
-)LL " 
(1 
- 
QD) QSOL 
- 
QFt3 
*J 
2j e-ZIt' dt3 
15 minn 
Path 4: =A leak is present but no ignition source is present during the first minute. 
After a minute of leakage the detection system detects and attempts to activate the 
safety systems, an ignition source does not occur within 30 seconds of the detection 
system's activation. The common solenoid functions correctly and the isolation and 
blowdown subsystems fail. The deluge subsystem fails and an ignition occurs within 
180 minutes. 
1815 mins 
XP4 
=A, L' 
(' 
- 
QD)- (' 
- 
QSOL)- QFt4 QFIS QFt3 
J 
A/ e-Zt' dt3 
15 mins 
Path 5: =A leak is present but no ignition source is present in the first minute. After 
a minute of leakage the detection system detects and attempts to activate the safety 
systems, an ignition source does not occur within 30 seconds of the detection system's 
activation. The common solenoid functions correctly and the isolation subsystem 
fails. The blow-down subsystem functions correctly but the deluge subsystem fails and 
an ignition occurs within 20 minutes. 
215 mna 
Ä, p5 -Ä. L"(1-QD)'0- 
QSOL) 
-QFt4 -0 -QFt5) -QFt3 
JAIe-A"3dt3 
1,5 mills 
Path 6: = A leak is present but no ignition source is apparent during the first minute. 
After a minute of leakage the detection system detects and attempts to activate the 
safety systems, an ignition source does not occur within 30 seconds of the detection 
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system's activation. The common solenoid and the isolation subsystem function 
correctly. The blow-down subsystem and the deluge subsystem fail and an ignition 
occurs within 20 minutes. 
21.5 im. 
XP6 AL-(I-QD 0 
-QSOL ll-QFW 
QR5 
-QFt3 
J; 
e 
""Idt3 
15 .- 
Path 7: =A leak is present but no ignition source is present during the first minute. 
After a minute of leakage the detection system detects and attempts to activate the 
safety systems, an ignition source does not occur within 30 seconds of the detection 
system's activation. The common solenoid, the isolation and blowdown subsystems 
function correctly . 
The deluge subsystem fails and an ignition occurs within 10 
minutes. 
11 S otitis APB 
-ýL (1 QDý 
ll-QSOLý lý 
QFtiý 
ll 
QFLSý QFß 
J'hC ZIaUt3 
1smiý 
10.3.3 Consequence 3: Mitigated Explosion 
There are five independent sequences which result in a mitigated explosion. 
Path 1=A leak is present but no ignition source is apparent in the first minute. After 
a minute of leakage the detection system detects a leak and attempts to activate the 
safety systems, an ignition source does not occur within the next 30 seconds. The 
solenoid fails, the deluge subsystem works and an ignition occurs within 180 minutes. 
181.5 minn 
XPI 
-AL (1-QDý QSOL ý1-QF ) 
J2, 
e-1113dt3 
1 5minn 
Path 2: =A leak is present but no ignition source is apparent in the first minute. After 
a minute of leakage the detection system detects a leak and attempts to activate the 
safety systems, an ignition source does not occur within the next 30 seconds. The 
solenoid functions correctly while the isolation and blow-down subsystems fail. The 
deluge subsystem functions and an ignition occurs within 180 minutes. 
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Path 3: = A leak is present but no ignition source is apparent in the first minute. After 
a minute of leakage the detection system detects a leak and attempts to activate the 
safety systems, an ignition source does not occur within the next 30 seconds. The 
solenoid functions while the isolation subsystem fails. The blow-down subsystem and 
the deluge subsystem function correctly and an ignition occurs within 20 minutes. 
215 mit 
Ä. P3 -%[. (1-Qn)-(l-QSOL)"QF14-01-QFts) -0-QF13)' 
Ji1, 
ie 
At dt3 
Path 4: =A leak is present but no ignition source is apparent in the first minute. After 
a minute of leakage the detection system detects a leak and attempts to activate the 
safety systems, an ignition source does not occur within the next 30 seconds. The 
solenoid and isolation subsystem function correctly. The blow-down subsystem fails 
while the deluge subsystem function correctly and an ignition occurs within 20 
minutes. 
215 minn 
Ä, 
P4 -AL-(1- 
QD) 
-(1- 
QSOL)-('-QFt4)-QFt5 (1-Q ) 
Jlife Zar}dt3 
15 -- 
Path 5: =A leak is present but no ignition source is apparent in the first minute. After 
a minute of leakage the detection system detects a leak and attempts to activate the 
safety systems, an ignition source does not occur within the next 30 seconds. The 
solenoid, isolation subsystem, blow-down subsystem and the deluge subsystem 
function correctly and an ignition occurs within 10 minutes. 
115min 
Ä. 
P5 
AL 
(j-QD)-(1-QSOL)-(1-QFta)-(l-QFK) 
-(I-QFt3) 
joie Z"'dt3 
is- 
Using the component failure data given in table 10.3 the frequency of each outcome 
for the offshore platform, given a leak of a certain size, were calculated and are 
illustrated in table 10.4. 
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Component Probability of failure (Q) or 
Frequency of Occurrence (X) 
Detection System Q= 0.92 
Isolation Value Q= 1.26x10A 
Pressure Relief Valve Q= 1.1x10-3 
_ Power Supply Q= 2.0x10-3 
Filter Q= 2.37x 10-3 
Pump Q= 9.5x10-3 
- Solenoid Q= 1.8x10-4 
Blowdown Valve Q= 2.0x10-4 
Leak AL 2x 103 
Ignition Source A1 =Ix 10-3 
Table 10.3 Component Failure Data for the Offshore Platform 
CONSEQUENCE Frequency of Consequence Occurrence 
hfl 
FIRE 0.333x10-7 
UNMITIGATED EXPLOSION 0.193x10-5 
MITIGATED EXPLOSION 0.3032x10-6 
Table 10.4 Results of Cause-Consequence Analysis for Offshore Platform 
The results obtained are not typical as one would except a mitigated explosion to 
occur more frequently that an unmitigated explosion. The reason, in this case, that 
this trend is not apparent is due to the sequence: 
721 min s 
A1 =XL. QD 
J 
ýtje-z'`dt 
11 
minn 
which leads to the first unmitigated explosion consequence in figure 10.5. This path 
has a frequency of occurrence equal to 0.19085x10-5 hfl, as the detection system fails 
with a probability of 0.08 and an ignition source has a frequency of occurrence equal 
to 0.0119 in a 12 hour period. The remaining sequences that lead to an unmitigated 
explosion have a low frequency of occurrence. 
10.4 Conclusion 
The problem encountered when analysing the simplified detection-isolation- 
blowdown system discussed in this chapter was that the system outcome is dependent 
on the timing of an ignition source. In order to include this feature a time delay 
symbol was included in the cause-consequence diagram of the system and the various 
consequences of a leak on an offshore platform were identified. Following the 
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construction of the cause-consequence diagram, using previously developed 
construction algorithms, a new analysis procedure was devised to incorporate the use 
of the time delay symbol and the system was quantified. 
Conventional methods would not have been capable of modelling this particular 
system, as they do not possess the ability to represent the time dependency of the 
ignition source. It can therefore be concluded that the cause-consequence diagram 
method is superior to such methods for systems that contain an event which can occur 
at different time intervals resulting in different system outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
11.1 Summary of Work 
Following an extensive critical literature review on the available reliability assessment 
techniques for dependency modelling, the development of a new assessment method 
comprising of existing reliability modelling techniques was considered worthy. 
Initially five main methods were investigated, namely FTA, Markov analysis, Petri net 
theory, event tree analysis and cause-consequence analysis. The FTA method was 
shown to be suitable for analysing systems containing independent failure events and 
to a limited degree sequential failures. The main advantage of the FTA method was 
found to be its representation of the system's failure logic. The Markov analysis 
method was shown to be capable of accurately analysing both sequential and standby 
failure events. However the representation of the system on the Markov state- 
transition diagram held no textual description of the system's failure logic and the 
construction process became complicated as the number of the components in the 
system increased. The Petri net method was initially investigated due to its ability to 
represent dynamic systems. The construction procedure, however, was confusing and 
generally the diagram is analysed using simulation. For these reasons the Petri net 
method was not further investigated. The event tree analysis method was shown to be 
capable of analysing independent and dependent failures as was the cause- 
consequence diagram method. The cause-consequence diagram method was chosen 
for further investigation, instead of the event tree analysis method, due to its ability to 
model low level events with different failure modes in the same sequence of events. 
The development of a 'Combined Model' was completed in order to create a model 
that could analyse systems containing independent and dependent failure events whilst 
retaining the most advantageous parts of the FTA and Markov methods. The 
combined model approach uses a combination of FTA and Markov analysis and has 
been successfully demonstrated by its application to industrial systems. A computer 
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program has been developed which implements the analysis of systems containing 
sequential failure events, standby failure events and independent failure events. The 
program requires an input file, the fault tree structure including the PAND gate and 
new standby gates, that contains information about the system and how each 
component in the system is related. If both a qualitative and quantitative assessment 
of the system is required then the program needs an additional input file which 
contains the reliability data for each component in the fault tree. The analysis of the 
system is performed using the data files inputted, transparently to the user. The 
quantification of a system, using the combined model, is achieved through 
identification of independent subtrees of the fault tree. These subtrees are then 
analysed using either FTA or Markov analysis depending on whether the subtrees 
contain independent or dependent failure events respectively. Once solved the 
subtrees are replaced in the fault tree structure as new basic events. This process is 
continued until only one independent subtree requires solution. 
The combined model was tested against the most appropriate conventional modelling 
technique for a deluge pump system and shown to be more efficient in terms of speed 
of computation and memory requirements. The increase in efficiency is due to 
analysing small sections using the most appropriate technique, rather that large 
sections using an inappropriate method for the majority of the section, which occurs 
when analysing dependent failure events using traditional methods. The combined 
model was used to obtain quantitative information about a system. This included the 
calculation of system failure, system unconditional failure intensity, the failure rate of 
the system and the repair rate of the system. The calculation of these parameters using 
the combined model proved to be superior to the approximations obtained using the 
FTA method. Therefore the combined model produced more accurate results, in a 
shorter time, when compared to the FTA procedure. 
The use of the combined model was further developed by embeding it within an 
optimisation scheme. As the combined model retained the fault tree structure, house 
events were used to represent all different design options on a single fault tree. This 
fault tree was then subjected to a Genetic Algorithm optimisation scheme, in order to 
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highlight the 'best design'. A program was developed to incorporate the optimisation 
scheme and a dependent industrial system was successfully optimised. 
During the literature review it was noted that the cause-consequence diagram method 
had interesting features. It was observed that the method had the ability of modelling 
both independent and dependent failure events on a diagram which retained both the 
failure and success logic of the system. As with the FTA method, the diagram is 
logically constructed and would therefore be appealing to engineers. During the 
literature review it was highlighted that the modelling technique had been used to 
analyse dependent failure events yet no generalised set of rules for construction or 
quantification had been developed. It was therefore decided that an investigation into 
the development of such rules should be initiated. An investigation into the cause- 
consequence diagram method for a system containing independent failure events 
highlighted that the cause-consequence diagram method was an alternative 
representation of a BDD, and therefore more efficient than FTA. A further advantage 
noted was that the cause-consequence diagram method retained the failure logic 
description, which is lost when a fault tree is converted to a BDD. A general set of 
construction and quantification rules were developed for the cause-consequence 
diagram method and implemented successfully on an industrial system. 
As the main focus of the thesis was the analysis of dependent failure events the cause- 
consequence diagram method was developed further by investigating its uses in 
analysing dependent systems. In order to quantify dependent systems new 
developments in analysing the cause-consequence diagram were achieved. The 
development of an algorithm to identify and modify components that were required to 
operate in different modes, made it possible to model mutli-phase systems. In 
addition to this the use of a time delay symbol meant that modelling systems, where 
the timing of event failures is relevant, was also possible. All new developments were 
successfully implemented in the quantification of real-life industrial systems. 
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11.2 Conclusions 
The Combined Model 
1. The combined model overcomes some of the disadvantages of conventional FTA to 
produce an accurate result for systems containing dependent failure events. FTA 
assumes independence, due to Kinetic Tree Theory, and therefore cannot model 
"heavy" dependent failure events accurately. The combined model produces an 
accurate analysis of dependent systems by analysing the dependencies using 
Markov analysis and returning the solution of the analysis as a new basic event in 
the fault tree structure. 
2. The combined model overcomes some of the disadvantages of the Markov analysis 
method. Firstly the combined model contains a textual description of the systems 
behaviour, which is not apparent on the Markov diagram, and secondly the 
combined model reduces the number of components that are required to be 
analysed using Markov analysis, therefore reducing the size of the Markov diagram 
and the computational effort required to solve it. The reduction in the size of the 
Markov diagram is due to the combined model identifying independent subtrees 
which are either independent or dependent in nature. The identification of such 
subtrees means that the entire system is not required to be solved using a single 
Markov analysis. 
3. The combined model is capable of evaluating fault trees containing a combination 
of independent and dependent failure events and can obtain a full range of system 
reliability parameters. Due to the modularization of the fault tree and the analysis 
of subtrees containing dependent failure events using Markov analysis, and 
independent subtrees using FTA, the evaluation of the system is performed quickly 
with a minimal amount of memory requirement. 
4. The application of the combined model to an industrial system has shown that this 
new assessment method improves the efficiency and accuracy of the quantification 
of systems containing dependent failure events. 
297 
5_ The combined model was embedded within an optimisation scheme and 
successfully used to highlight the best design for an industrial system which 
contained dependent failure events, hence increasing its useability. 
The Cause-Consequence Diagram Method 
1. A generalised set of rules for the construction and quantification of a cause- 
consequence diagram for independent systems have been established and justified. 
It was shown that the cause-consequence diagram method produces an alternative 
BDD representation. This is achieved by considering the affect of component 
success and failure on the system's functionality. As the cause-consequence 
diagram method is equivalent to a BDD it produces the exact system failure 
probability efficiently, while retaining the textual description of the system failure 
logic. The cause-consequence diagram construction procedure results in a certain 
degree of modularization, as the causes of the NO outlet branch of each decision 
box can be governed by a fault tree. In any particular sequence through the cause- 
consequence diagram the fault trees attached to each decision box may contain the 
same failure events. An algorithm has been developed that extracts such common 
cause events in order to accurately quantify the diagram. A further modularization 
algorithm has been developed which extracts common cause modules from fault 
tree structures in the same sequence. Inclusion of this algorithm has been shown to 
further increase the efficiency of the cause-consequence diagram method. 
2. A generalised set of quantification rules have been established for a cause- 
consequence diagram representing certain dependent failure events. Components 
that are involved in different operation modes or have different outcomes 
depending on what time they occur, can be modelled using the cause-consequence 
diagram method developed. Components that perform different functions during 
different phases of system operation are modelled depending on whether their 
failure events are revealed or unrevealed. An algorithm has been developed that 
identifies dependent failure modes in the same sequence and modifies the cause- 
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consequence diagram accordingly depending on whether the failure events are 
revealed or unrevealed. Systems that result in different consequences due to the 
specific timing of events are modelled on a cause-consequence diagram using a 
time delay symbol. An algorithm has been developed that quantifies such time 
delays accurately using integration. 
3. The combined model can be used to accurately model sequential and standby 
failure events. The cause-consequence diagram method can be used to model 
sequential failures and standby failure events. The cause-consequence diagram 
method, however, is best utilised in systems where repair during operation is not 
possible as inclusion of repair results in an infinite diagram which has yet to be 
accurately solved. 
11.3 Future Work 
11.3.1 Modelling of Different Dependent Failures 
The dependent failures investigated in this thesis, sequential and standby ailures, arc 
two of the most commonly witnessed in safety systems. However it is evident that 
other dependent failure events do exist, such as secondary failure events. Therefore 
these dependencies could be incorporated in the combined model, which would 
increase its usability. In addition to this the switching operator, found on many 
standby systems, could be considered as an event that could also fail and hence effect 
the standby system. In this thesis the switching operator was considered to be perfectly 
reliable. 
11.3.2. Modelling Repair on a Cause-Consequence Diagram 
The developments achieved with the cause-consequence diagram method have 
resulted in a new and exciting modelling technique which is highly applicable to 
independent and dependent systems. One of the main disadvantages with this method 
is that inclusion of component repair into the diagram is complex. The result of 
including repair can be an infinite diagram, the quantification of which has yet to be 
successfully achieved. The development of new rules to construct and quantify a 
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cause-consequence diagram which includes repair would increase the usability of the 
method even further and would make the method more applicable than existing 
conventional reliability modelling tools. 
11.3.3 Time Operating Systems 
It was suggested that feedback loops could be incorporated into the cause- 
consequence diagram in order to represent systems that operate at set time intervals. 
The quantification method used to include feedback loops was however inconclusive. 
An investigation could therefore be initiated into 'flow best to quantify a system using 
the cause-consequence diagram method and feedback loops'. One way could be to 
restart each sequence with the probability calculated at the end of the last time 
sequence. If a quantification technique could be developed to include such a feature 
then the cause-consequence diagram could be applied to an even wider field of 
systems. 
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APPENDIX I 
DATA FILES FOR DELUGE PUMP SYSTEM 
*. ATS FILE FOR DELUGE PUMP SYSTEM 
GTOP WSBY 34 40 G1 G7 G13 G19 
G1 OR 00 11 G2 tvl 
G2 OR 00 11 G3 isoll l 
G3 OR 00 11 G4 prvl 
G4 OR 00 21 G5 G6 ep 
G5 OR 00 02 EP 1 FS $EP 1 FR 
G6 OR 00 02 fl isol2l 
G7 OR 00 11 G8 tv2 
G8 OR 00 11 G9 isol12 
G9 OR 00 11 G10 prv2 
G10 OR 00 21 Gil G12 ep 
Gil OR 00 02 EP2FS $EP2FR 
G12 OR 00 02 f2 isol22 
G13 OR 00 11 G14 tv3 
G14 OR 00 11 G15 isoll3 
G15 OR 00 11 G16 prv3 
G16 OR 00 21 G17 G18 dp 
G17 OR 00 02 DP1FS $DP1FR 
G18 OR 00 02 f3 isol23 
G19 OR 00 11 G20 tv4 
G20 OR 00 11 G21 iso114 
G21 OR 00 11 G22 prv4 
G22 OR 00 21 G23 G24 dp 
G23 OR 00 02 DP2FS $DP2FR 
G24 OR 00 02 f4 iso124 
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*ADQ FILE FOR DELUGE PUMP SYSTEM 
NAME CODE Q; k; 0 
tvl 1 0 0.0000055 0 26 24 0 
isoll1 1 0 0.0000034 0 26 24 0 
prvl 1 0 0.00003 0 26 24 0 
ep 5 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
isol21 1 0 0.0000034 0 26 24 0 
fl 1 0 0.000064 0 26 24 0 
$EP 1 FR 5 0 0.0007 0 0 0 0.00035 
EP 1 FS 0 0.0095 0 0 0 0 0 
tv2 1 0 0.0000055 0 26 24 0 
iso112 1 0 0.0000034 0 26 24 0 
prv2 1 0 0.00003 0 26 24 0 
ep 5 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
isol22 1 0 0.0000034 0 26 24 0 
f2 1 0 0.000064 0 26 24 0 
$EP2FR 5 0 0.0007 0 0 0 0.00035 
EP2FS 0 0.0095 0 0 0 0 0 
tv3 1 0 0.0000055 0 26 24 0 
isol13 1 0 0.0000034 0 26 24 0 
prv3 1 0 0.00003 0 26 24 0 
dp 5 0 0.0001 0 0 0 0 
isol23 1 0 0.0000034 0 26 24 0 
13 1 0 0.000064 0 26 24 0 
$DP 1 FR 5 0 0.0007 0 0 0 0.00035 
DP 1 FS 0 0.0095 0 0 0 0 0 
tv4 1 0 0.0000055 0 26 24 0 
iso114 1 0 0.0000034 0 26 24 0 
prv4 1 0 0.00003 0 26 24 0 
dp 5 0 0.0001 0 0 0 0 
isol24 1 0 0.0000034 0 26 24 0 
f4 1 0 0.000064 0 26 24 0 
$DP2FR 5 0 0.0007 0 0 0 0.00035 
DP2FS 0 0.0095 0 0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX II 
FAULT TREE REPRESENTATION FOR THE DELUGE PUMP SYSTEM 
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APPENDIX III 
FAILURE SEQUENCE PATHS FOR PRESSURE TANK SYSTEM 
Path 1= {Decision Box 24,3,4,5,6} 
Path 1= Si failed closed and K2 contacts close, Motor starts and tank fills but the 
pressure switch fails to open(PSWC could only happen in a short time period so t=30 
minutes)- 
= P(Ft24). (1-P(Ft3)). (1-P(Ft4)). (P(Ft5)) 
= QSIFC-[ 1-(1-(1-QPS1)-(i-QK2D)-(l-QK2CO)-(]-QPSWO))1 
-[1-(1-(1-QF)-(1-QM)-(I -QPS2))]-QPSWCr30mins 
Path 2=SI failed closed and K2 contacts close, Motor starts and tank fills, the 
pressure switch opens but the K2 contacts have failed closed (K2CC could only 
happen in a short time period so t=30 minutes) 
= P(Ft24). (1-P(Ft3)). (I -P(Ft4)). (1-P(Ft5)) 
= QS1FC-[ 1-(1-(1-QPSi)-(1-QK2D)-(l-QK2CO)-(1-QPSWO))1 
.[I -(I -(I -QF)-(1-QM)-(1-QPS2))]-(1-QPSWCr30mins)_QK2CCr30min 
Path 3= Si has not failed closed but closes when depressed. The switch fails to open 
indicated that it has failed closed (therefore Si has failed in a very small time period 
which is set equal to 10 seconds). K2 contacts close, Motor starts and tank fills but 
the pressure switch fails to open(PSWC could only happen in a short time period so 
t=30 minutes). 
_ (1-P(Ft24)). (1-P(Ft25)). (P(Ft26)). (1-P(Ft27)) . (1-P(Ft28)). P(Ft29) 
- 
(1- QSlFC)"[(1-QSIFO)j. QSIFCr-IOs"[ 1-(1-(1-f1PSi)-(1-QK2D)-(1-QK2CO)-(1-QPSWO))1 
. [1 -(1-(1-F). (1-M). (1-PS2))]. 
Qpswct--30mins 
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Path 4=S1 has not failed closed but closes when depressed. The switch fails to open 
indicated that it has failed closed (therefore SI has failed in a very small time period 
which is set equal to 10 seconds). K2 contacts close, Motor starts and tank fills the 
pressure switch opens but the K2 contacts have failed closed (K2CC could only 
happen in a short time period so t=30 minutes) 
_ (1-P(Ft24)). (I -P(Ft25)). (P(Ft26)). (I -P(Ft27)) . (1-P(Ft28)). (I -P(Ft29)). P(Ft30) 
_ 
(1-QSlFC)-[(1-QSIFO)j-QSIFCr]0s-[ 1-(1_(I-QPS1)-(I-QK2D)-(I-QK2CO)-(I-QPSWO))1 
.[ 1-(1-(1-F). (I -M). (1-PS2))]. 
(1-Qpswct 30mins). QK2CCt=30min 
Path 5= Si has not failed closed but closes when depressed and then opens. The 
power supply, PI is present but KI exists failed closed. K2 contacts close, Motor 
starts and the tank fills but the pressure switch fails to open(PSWC could only hal 
in a short time period so t=30 minutes). 
= (1-P(Ft24)). (1-P(Ft25)). (1-P(Ft26)). (1-P(Ft31)) . (P(Ft40)). (I -P(Ft33)). 
P(1-Ft34). P(Ft35) 
= (l-QSlFC)-[(l-QSlFO)]-(l-QSlFCr]Os). (I-QPSI)"QKIFC-[ 1-(1-[(1-QK2D) 
. (1-Qu2co). (1-Qrswo)1)]. [ l -(1-(1-F). (1-M). (1-PS2))]. Qrswcr3o`"ins 
Path 6=S1 has not failed closed but closes when depressed and then opens. The 
power supply, P1 is present but K1 exists failed closed. K2 contacts close, Motor 
starts and the tank fills. The pressure switch opens but the K2 contacts have failed 
closed (K2CC could only happen in a short time period so t=30 minutes) 
= (1-P(Ft24)). (1-P(Ft25)). (1-P(Ft26)). (1-P(Ft31)) . (P(Ft40)). (1-P(Ft33)). 
(1-P(Ft34)). (1-P(Ft35)). 
- (1-QSIFC)-[(1-QSIFO)]"(1-QSIFCrlos)_(1-QPSI)-QKIFC-[ 
1-(1-[(1-QK2D) 
. (1-QK2co). (1-QPswo)])]. [ 1-(1-(1-F). (1-QCM). (1-PS2))]. 
(1-Qpswc 0mins). Q CCt=30min 
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Path 7= Si has not failed closed but closes when depressed and then opens. The 
power supply, P1 is present and K1 does not exists failed closed. The timer exists 
failed closed. K2 contacts close and the Motor starts which fills the tank and the 
pressure switch fails closed(PSWC could only happen in a short time period so t=30 
minutes) 
= (1-P(Ft24)). (1-P(Ft25)). (I -P(Ft26)). (1-P(Ft31)) . (1-P(Ft40)). P(Ft49). 
(1-P(Ft42)). (1-P(Ft43)). P(Ft44) 
= (1-QSIFC)-[(1-QSIFO)]-(1-QSIFCr10s). (1-QPS1)-(1-QKIFC)-QTIMCC-[l-(1-[ 
(1-QK2D)-(1-QK2CO)-(1-Qpswo)])]-11-(1-(1-F). (1-M). (1-PS2))]. QPSWCt--30mins 
Path 8=S1 has not failed closed but closes when depressed and then opens. The 
power supply, P1 is present and K1 does not exists failed closed. The timer exists 
failed closed. K2 contacts close and the Motor starts which fills the tank. The 
pressure switch opens but K2 contacts fail closed(K2CC could only happen in a short 
time period so t=30 minutes) 
= (1-P(Ft24)). (1-P(Ft25)). (1-P(Ft26)). (I -P(Ft3 1)) . (1-P(Ft40)). P(Ft49). 
(1-P(Ft42)). (1-P(Ft43)). (1-P(Ft44)). P(Ft48) 
- 
(1-QS I FC)-[(1-QS I FO)]-(1-QS I FCr10s). 
(1-QPS1)-(1-QKI FC)-QTIMCC" [ 1-(1 
+1-QK2D) 
"(1-QK2CO)-(1-QPSWO)])]-(1-(1-(1-F). (1-M). (11-PS2))]. (1-QPSWCr30mins)-QK2CCt=30mins 
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Path 9=SI has not failed closed but closes when depressed and then opens. The 
power supply, P1 is present and K1 does not exists failed closed. The timer does not 
exists failed closed and K1 contacts close. K2 contacts close and the Motor starts 
which fills the tank. The pressure switch fails closed(PSWC could only happen in a 
short time period so t=30 minutes) and the timer fails to open(TIMCC can only occur 
in small time interval so t=30 minutes). 
_ (1-P(Ft24)). (1-P(Ft25)). (1-P(Ft26)). (l -P(Ft3 1)) . (1-P(Ft40)). (1-P(Ft49)). 
(1-P(Ft50)). (1-P(Ft51)). (1-P(Ft52)). P(Ft53). P(Ft54) 
- 
(1-QSIFC)-[(1-QSIFO)]-(1-QSIFCr10s). (1-QPSI)"(1-QKIFC)-(1-QTIMCC)- 
QK I D)-(1-QK I CO)-(1-QTIMCO)])]- 
[ 1-(1-[(1-QK2D)-(1-QK2CO) 
" 
(1-QPS WO)])]. [ 1-(1-[(1-F). (1- 
M). (l 
-PS2)])]. 
(QPSWCt=30mins) 
. 
QTIMCCr30mins 
Path 10 =S 1 has not failed closed but closes when depressed and then opens. The 
power supply, P1 is present and K1 does not exists failed closed. The timer does not 
exists failed closed and K1 contacts close. K2 contacts close and the Motor starts 
which fills the tank. The pressure switch fails closed(PSWC could only happen in a 
short time period so t=30 minutes). The timer opens but KI contacts failed 
closed(K! CC can only fail in small time interval, t=30 minutes) 
_ (1-P(Ft24)). (1-P(Ft25)). (1-P(Ft26)). (1-P(Ft31)) . (1-P(Ft40)). (I -P(Ft49)). 
(1-P(Ft50)). (1-P(Ft51)). (1-P(Ft52)). P(Ft53). (1-P(Ft54)). P(Ft55) 
= (1-QSIFC)-[(1-QSIFO)]-(1-QSIFCt=10s)-(1-QPSI)-(1-QKIFC)-(l-QTIMCC)" 
QK I D)"(1-QK 1 CO)-(1-QTIMCO)])] -[ 
1-(1- [(1-QK2D)-(1-QK2CO)-(1-QPSwo)])l 
"[ 
1-(1-[(1-F)-(1- 
M). (1-PS2)f)]. (QPSWCt-30mins) 
-(1-QTIMCCr30mins)-QKICCr30mins 
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Path II =S 1 has not failed closed but closes when depressed and then opens. The 
power supply, PI is present and K1 does not exists failed closed. The timer does not 
exists failed closed and KI contacts close. K2 contacts close and the Motor starts 
which fills the tank. The pressure switch fails closed(PSWC could only happen in a 
short time period so t=30 minutes). The timer opens, KI contacts open but K2 
contacts failed closed(K2CC can only fail in small time interval, t=30 minutes) 
= (1-P(Ft24)). (I -P(Ft25)). (l -P(Ft26)). (1-P(Ft31)) . (1-P(Ft40)). (1-P(Ft49)). 
(1-P(Ft50)). (1-P(Ft51)). (1-P(Ft52)). P(Ft53). (1-P(Ft54)). (1-P(Ft55)). (P(Ft56) 
- 
(1-QSIFC)-[(1-QSIFO)]-(1-QSIFCrIOs)-(1_QPS1)"(l-QKIFC)"(l-QTIMCC)- 
QK I D)-(1-QK I CO)-(1-QTIMCO)1)1. 
[ 1-(1-[(I-QK2D)-(l -QK2CO)-(1-Qpswo)])]. [ 1-(l - [(1-F). (1- 
M)-(l-PS2)])]-(QPSWCt=30mins ) 
"(l 
/ 
-Q77MCC 
t=30mins )-(I'QKICC t=30mins )-QK2CC t=30mins 
Path 12 = Si has not failed closed but closes when depressed and then opens. The 
power supply, P1 is present and KI does not exists failed closed. The timer does not 
exists failed closed and K1 contacts close. K2 contacts close and the Motor starts 
which fills the tank. The pressure switch opens but K2 contacts fail closed(K2CC 
could only happen in a short time period so t=30 minutes) 
= (1-P(Ft24)). (1-P(Ft25)). (1-P(Ft26)). (1-P(Ft31)) . (1-P(Ft40)). (l -P(Ft49)). 
(1-P(Ft50)). (1-P(Ft51)). (1-P(Ft52)). (I-P(Ft53)). P(Ft57) 
= (1-QSIFC)-[(l-QSlFO)]-(1-QSIFCr-IOs)-`1_QPS1)"(l-QKIFC)"(l-QTIMCC)- 
QK1 D). (1-QK ICO)"(1-QTIMCO)1)1-[ 
I 
-(I -[(I -QK2D)"(1-QK2co). 
(1-Qpswo)])]. [ 1-(I ++I -F). 
(1- 
M). (1-PS2)])]. (1-Qpswc 30mins) 
. 
QK2CCc=30mins 
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